What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in these words: “He will, then, be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated.” It is plain to any possessing the least reflection, without our testing this logically, how absurdly foolish it is, or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same argument as that whereby he establishes this union of the perishable and the unbeginning, he can make sport of any proper and worthily conceived name for the Deity. For it is not these two ideas only that we associate with the Divine Life, I mean, the being without beginning, and the not admitting of dissolution; but It is called as well immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just; and there are numberless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each one of which is announced by an expressive sound with a peculiar meaning of its own. Well, to any name—any name, I mean, expressive of some proper conception of the Deity—it is open for us to apply this method of unnatural union devised by Eunomius. For instance, immateriality and absence of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life; but not with the same thought in both cases; for by the term immaterial we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term “without anger” the strangeness to any emotion of anger. Now in all probability Eunomius will run trippingly over all this, and have his dance, just as before, upon our words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: “If wherein He is separated from all mixture with matter He is called immaterial, in this respect He will not be without anger; and if by reason of His not indulging in anger He is without anger, it is impossible to attribute to him immateriality, but logic will compel us to admit that, in so far as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful;” and so you will find the same to be the case in respect to his other attributes. And if you like we will propound another pairing of the same, i.e. His immutability and His incorporeality. For both these terms being used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case also Eunomius’ skill will embellish the same absurdity. For if His being always as He is is signified by the term immutable, and if the term incorporeal represents the spirituality of His essence, Eunomius will certainly say the same here also, that the terms are irreconcilable, and alien to each other, and that the notions which our minds attach to them have no point of contact one with the other; for insofar as God is always the same He is immutable, but not incorporeal; and in regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His essence, while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable; so that it happens that when immutability is considered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It is corporeal; but if spirituality is the object of search, you prove that It is at once incorporeal and mutable.

Τί τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀνόητον ταύτην παιδιὰν παρεκίνησεν, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπαναλαβόντα τὸ ἴσον εἰπεῖν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασι: « ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννητός ». τοῦτο δὲ κἂν μὴ παρ' ἡμῶν διευκρινηθῇ τῷ λόγῳ, παντὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστι τῷ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν διανοίας μετέχοντι ὅπως ἐστὶ καταγέλαστον καὶ ἀνόητον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσεβὲς καὶ κατάκριτον. ᾧ γὰρ λόγῳ κατασκευάζει τὴν τοῦ φθαρτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄναρχον συζυγίαν, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ παντὸς εὐσεβοῦς τε καὶ θεοπρεποῦς καταπαίζει ὀνόματος. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ δύο ταῦτα περὶ τὴν θείαν θεωρεῖται ζωήν, τὸ ἀνάρχως τε εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄϋλός τε καὶ ἀόργητος λέγεται ἄτρεπτός τε καὶ ἀσώματος ἀόρατός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἀληθής τε καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωήν ἐστι νοήματα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατά τινα ἰδιάζουσαν ἔννοιαν ταῖς σημαντικαῖς φωναῖς ἐξαγγέλλεται. παντὶ τοίνυν ὀνόματι, τῷ σημαντικῷ λέγω τῆς θεοπρεποῦς ὑπολήψεως, ἔξεστι συμπλέξαι τὴν ἐπινοηθεῖσαν παρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου κατὰ τὸ ἀλλόκοτον συζυγίαν. οἷον τὸ ἄϋλόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀόργητον ἀμφότερα λέγεται περὶ τὴν θείαν ζωήν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἑκάτερον: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθαρεύειν ὑλικῆς ἐπιμιξίας τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀΰλου φωνῆς ἐνοήσαμεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀοργήτῳ ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὀργὴν πάθους σημαίνεται. ἐπιδραμεῖται τοίνυν καὶ τούτοις κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὁ Εὐνόμιος καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀρχήσεται. λέξει γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἱρμὸν τὴν ἀτοπίαν συμπλέκων: εἰ καθὸ κεχώρισται τῆς ὑλικῆς ἐπιμιξίας, ἄϋλος λέγεται, κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται ἀόργητος, καὶ εἰ διὰ τὸ μὴ προσίεσθαι τὴν ὀργήν ἐστιν ἀόργητος, οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὁμολογεῖσθαι τὸ ἄϋλον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην ἐν μὲν τῷ καθαρεύειν ὕλης ἄϋλος ὁμοῦ καὶ ὀργίλος ἀναδειχθήσεται, ἐν δὲ τῷ τὴν ὀργὴν μὴ προσίεσθαι ἀόργητός τε καὶ ὑλικὸς κατὰ ταὐτὸν εὑρεθήσεται. οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιήσει πάντων. καὶ εἰ δοκεῖ, προθῶμεν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὀνομάτων τοιαύτην, τὸ ἄτρεπτον λέγω καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. τῶν γὰρ δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων ἑκατέρου κατὰ τὴν ἰδιάζουσαν ἔμφασιν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας λεγομένων ζωῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἡ τοῦ Εὐνομίου σοφία κατασκευάσει τὴν ἀτοπίαν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ ἀτρέπτου σημαίνεται καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἡ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου προσηγορία παρίστησιν, ἐρεῖ πάντως τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ Εὐνόμιος, ὅτι ἀσύμβατά ἐστι καὶ ἀλλότρια καὶ ἀκοινωνήτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνθεωρούμενα τούτοις νοήματα. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ πάντοτε ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τὸ θεῖον μόνον ἄτρεπτον ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἀσώματον, ἐν δὲ τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ ἀειδεῖ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔχει, τοῦ δὲ ἀτρέπτου κεχώρισται: ὥστε συμβαίνειν ὅταν μὲν τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον ἐπὶ τῆς θείας θεωρῆται ζωῆς, μετὰ τοῦ ἀτρέπτου καὶ σῶμα αὐτὴν εἶναι κατασκευάζεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ τὸ νοερὸν ἐξετάζηται, ὁμοῦ τε ἀσώματον αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ τρεπτὴν διορίζεσθαι.