Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing, and that that of being unending is another, then of necessity, in the case of things differing from each other, the force of the one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of the imperishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable, but the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must beg my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the mockeries of our opponent, that we might thereby break through the puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too wearisome to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what Eunomius says in his own words. “If,” says he, “God is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated.” Then returning to the charge, he repeats, “He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable: and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated;” for I pass over the superfluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed here, as in no way contributing to the proving of his point. Now I think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he lays against us. “For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate,” says the Master, “using these words with different applications.” “His transcending,” he continues, “every limit of the ages, and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either hand in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy.” But Eunomius would make out that we say that the being without beginning is His essence, and again that the being without end is His essence, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he establishes an absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument in any single point. For that God is imperishable only wherein His Life is unending, is his statement, not ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning, is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a negative attribute an essence; whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a negative attribute of God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in defining ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means133    The Latin is wrong here, “secundum rerum intellectarum distinctricem significationem;” for νοουμένων without the article must be the gen. absol. Besides this the mss. read παράτασιν (not παράστασιν). one thing, and end means another, by virtue of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the first of these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half subsisting in this being without beginning, and not to extend further, by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if ungeneracy be regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are essence, then, according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of Eunomius will not be without force, inasmuch as that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa, since according to his account each of the things mentioned is an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different to that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.

ἄλλο τι φήσει τῷ σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἓν τὰ δύο συνθήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἓν ἀμφότερα λέγοι, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ συναγορεύσει λόγῳ: εἰ δὲ ἄλλο φήσει τοῦ ἀφθάρτου εἶναι καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀφθάρτου ἡ ἔννοια καὶ τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου πάλιν ἑτέρα, καί ἐστι τούτων ἑκάτερον ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι δώσει οὔτε τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλὰ φθαρτὸν μὲν ἔσται τὸ ἀτελεύτητον, τελευτητὸν δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. ἀλλὰ παραιτοῦμαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ καθ' ἡμῶν τρέψαι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ γελοίῳ κατάγνωσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἡμεῖς πρὸς τὸν γελοιαστὴν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἐπαίξαμεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὁμοίας παιδιᾶς τὴν μειρακιώδη τοῦ σοφίσματος αὐτοῦ πλοκὴν διαλύσωμεν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ βαρύ τε καὶ ὀχληρὸν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαίνοιτο, οὐκ ἄκαιρον ἂν εἴη πάλιν ἐπὶ λέξεως ἐκθέσθαι τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὰ ῥήματα. « εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον », φησί, « τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται ». καὶ ἐπαναλαβὼν τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν φησὶν « ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννητός ». τὰς γὰρ ἀκαίρους ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῶν περιττῶν παρενθήκας ὡς οὐδὲν πλέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου κατασκευὴν συντελούσας παρίημι. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς οὗτος παρέθετο, παντὶ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι κατανοῆσαι ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὴν κατασκευασθεῖσαν αὐτῷ καθ' ἡμῶν κατηγορίαν. ἄφθαρτον γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητον τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων λέγομεν, φησὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι. τῷ γὰρ ὑπερεκπίπτειν αὐτόν, φησί, τῆς τῶν αἰώνων περιγραφῆς κατὰ πᾶν διάστημα τῆς χρονικῆς παρατάσεως, εἴτε τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς λογιζοίμεθα, τὸ καθ' ἑκατέραν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀϊδίου ζωῆς ἀόριστόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον τὸ μὲν τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ τῷ τῆς ἀγεννησίας διασημαίνομεν. οὑτοσὶ δέ φησι λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὸ ἄναρχον οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐσία πάλιν ἐστίν, ὡς δύο τμήματα οὐσιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον λεγόμενα παρ' ἡμῶν συμβάλλεσθαι: καὶ οὕτω κατασκευάζει τὸ ἄτοπον, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τιθεὶς καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συμπλεκόμενος, καὶ τὰς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ συντεθείσας διανοίας ἐξωθῶν εἰς τὸ ἄτοπον κατ' οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων προσάπτεται. τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τούτου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἄναρχον μὴ εἶναι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἀγχινοίας [τὸ] εὕρημα τῆς τὸ μὴ προσὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον κατατασσούσης. ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν μὴ προσόντων οὐσίαν εἶναι διοριζόμεθα. οὐ πρόσεστι δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὔτε τὸ εἰς φθορὰν τὴν ζωὴν καταλῆξαι οὔτε τὸ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἄρξασθαι: ὅπερ διὰ τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων, τῆς τε ἀφθαρσίας καὶ τῆς ἀγεννησίας, παρίσταται. ὁ δὲ τὸν ἴδιον λῆρον τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιθρυλήσας ἑαυτὸν στηλιτεύων διὰ τῆς κατηγορίας τῆς καθ' ἡμῶν οὐ συνίησιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐσίαν τὴν « ἀγεννησίαν » εἶναι διοριζόμενος εἰς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐκβήσεται ἣν τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιφέρει. ἄλλο γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ τέλους κατὰ τὴν διαστηματικὴν παράτασιν νοουμένων, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἑνὸς τούτων στέρησιν οὐσίαν τις εἶναι δοίη, ἐξ ἡμισείας αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν ὑποστήσει μόνῳ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ὑφεστῶσαν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐκέτι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπεκτείνουσαν, εἴπερ φύσις ἡ ἀγεννησία νομίζοιτο: εἰ δὲ ἀμφότερά τις οὐσίαν εἶναι βιάζοιτο, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγον ἑκάτερον τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐγκειμένην ἔμφασιν καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχον μόνον, ὅσον ἡ σημασία τῆς προσηγορίας ἐνδείκνυται: καὶ οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὁ τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγος γενήσεται οὔτε τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ ἄναρχον, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον καὶ ἀμίκτως τὰ δύο ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὔτε ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον οὔτε τὰ ἀναιρετικὰ τούτων ὀνόματα πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῖς σημασίαις συμφέρεται.