Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs147 This cannot have been written earlier than 384. The preceding twelve books, of which an instalment only was read to Gregory the Nazianzene and others during the Council of Constantinople, 381, must have occupied him a considerable time: and there may have been an interval after that before this essay was composed., and whose eyes are fixed on truth alone, to take upon his lips the absurd and flippant utterances of a contentious foe, incurs no slight danger of bringing condemnation on himself. I will therefore pass over both those words and the adjoining passage; this, for instance, “Truth gives no evidence of any union of natures with God.” Well, if these words had not been spoken, who ever was there (except yourself) who mentioned a double nature in the Deity at all? You, however, unite each idea of each name with the essence of the Father, and deny that anything externally accrues to Him, centering every one of His names in that essence. Again, “Neither does she write in the statute-book of our religion any idea that is external and fabricated by ourselves.” With regard to these words again I shall deprecate the idea that I have quoted them with a view of amusing the reader with their absurdity; rather I have done so with a view to show with what a slender equipment of arguments this man, after rating us for our want of system, advances to take these audacious liberties with the name of Truth. What is he in reasoning, and what is he in speech, that he should thus revel in showing himself off before his hidebound readers, who applaud him as victorious over everybody by force of argument when he has brought these disjointed utterances of his dry bombastic jargon to an end148 τὰς στομφώδεις…ξηροστομίας κακοσυνθέτως διαπεραίνοντα. The editt. have διαπεραίνοντες, which Gulonius’ Latin follows, “arrogantes has sicci oris voces malâ compositione trajicientes,” i.e. his hearers get through them with bad pronunciation.. “Immortality,” he says, “is the essence itself.” But what, then, do you assert to be the essence of the Only-begotten? I ask you that: is it immortality, or is it not? For remember that in His essence also the singleness admits, as you say, of no complexity of nature. If, then Eunomius denies that immortality is the essence of the Son, it is clear what he is aiming at; for it does not require an exceedingly penetrating understanding to discover what is the direct opposite to the immortal. Just as the logic of dichotomy exhibits the destructible instead of the indestructible, and the mutable instead of the immutable, so it exhibits the mortal instead of the immortal. What, therefore, will this setter forth of new doctrine do? What proper name will he give us for the essence of the Only-begotten? Again I put this question to our author. He must either grant that it is immortality, or deny it. If, then, he will not assent to its being immortality, he must assent to the contradictory proposition; by negativing the superior term he proves that it is death. If, on the other hand, he shrinks from anything so monstrous, and names the essence of the Only-begotten also as immortality, he must perforce agree with us that there is in consequence no difference whatever, as to essence, between them. If the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son are equally immortality, and if immortality does not divide itself by any manner of difference, then it is confessed by our foes themselves, that on the score of essence no manner of difference is discoverable between the Father and the Son.
Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα τί φέρει κέρδος τὸ τὰς φλυαρίας ταύτας ἀξιοῦν ἐξετάσεως. ἀνδρὶ γὰρ ἐν πολιᾷ ζῶντι καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν βλέποντι οὐ μικρὰ πρὸς κατάκρισιν αἰτία τὸ τὰ γελοῖά τε καὶ ἄσπουδα τῆς τοῦ ἀντιπάλου φιλονεικίας διὰ στόματος φέρειν. διὸ παρήσω κἀκεῖνα καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνοις προσκείμενα: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα: « μηδεμίαν », φησί, « τῆς ἀληθείας μήτε τῷ θεῷ συμφυΐαν προσμαρτυρούσης »: εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴρητο τοῦτο, τίς ἦν ὁ διφυᾶ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι λέγων πλὴν σοῦ τοῦ πᾶσαν ὀνόματος ἔννοιαν τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίᾳ συμφύοντος καὶ μηδὲν ἔξωθεν προσεῖναι λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ὀνομάτων τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγκεντρίζοντος; εἶτά φησι « μήτε μὴν ἔξωθεν καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν πλαττομένην τοιαύτην ἔννοιαν εὐσεβείας νόμοις ἐγγραφούσης ». ἀλλὰ παραιτήσομαι πάλιν περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡς οὐχὶ γελωτοποιῶν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὰς ἐπιγελάστους ταύτας ἐξεθέμην φωνάς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πείσαιμι τὸν ἀκροατήν, ἀφ' οἵας οὗτος παρασκευῆς τῶν λόγων ὁρμώμενος ὁ τὸν ἡμέτερον ἰδιωτισμὸν διαπλύνων ἔπειτα τῆς ἀληθείας καταθρασύνεται. τίς ὢν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ οἷα φθεγγόμενος ὁ τοῖς παχυδέρμοις τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἐντρυφῶν τε καὶ ἐμπομπεύων, οἳ τὰς στομφώδεις αὐτὸν ταύτας ξηροστομίας κακοσυνθέτως διαπεραίνοντα ὡς κεκρατηκότα τῶν πάντων τῇ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων ἀνακηρύσσουσιν; ἀλλ' αὐτὴν εἶναί φησι τὴν οὐσίαν ἀθανασίαν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ μονογενοῦς οὐσίαν τί φῄς, πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποιμι ἄν, ἀθανασίαν ἢ οὐχί; ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλότης « οὐδεμίαν », καθὼς φῄς, « συμφυΐαν προσίεται ». εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀρνεῖται τὸ ἀθανασίαν εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν, δῆλον εἰς ὅ τι βλέπει. τὸ γὰρ ἀντιδιαστελλόμενον τῷ ἀθανάτῳ οὐ λίαν ἐστὶ λεπτῆς κατανοῆσαι φρενός. ὡς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄφθαρτον φθαρτὸν ἡ ἀκολουθία τῆς ἀντιδιαιρέσεως δείκνυσι καὶ τρεπτὸν τὸ μὴ ἄτρεπτον, οὕτω καὶ θνητὸν πάντως τὸ μὴ ἀθάνατον. τί οὖν ὁ τῶν καινῶν δογμάτων ἐξηγητής, τί περὶ τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἡμῖν οὐσίας κυριολογήσει; πάλιν γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν προσοίσω τῷ λογογράφῳ ἐρώτησιν. δώσει καὶ ταύτην ἀθανασίαν εἶναι ἢ οὐ συνθήσεται; εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ δέχοιτο τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀθανασίαν εἶναι, ἀναγκαίως τῷ ἐναντίῳ συνθήσεται, διὰ τῆς τοῦ κρείττονος ἀφαιρέσεως θάνατον αὐτὴν εἶναι κατασκευάζων. εἰ δὲ φεύγων τὸ ἄτοπον ἀθανασίαν καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν οὐσίαν κατονομάζοι, οὐδεμίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης διὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διαφορὰν εἶναι συνθήσεται. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίσης ἥ τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ φύσις ἀθανασία ἐστὶν, ἀθανασία δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ διαφορᾶς διασχίζεται, ἄρα καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μηδένα διαφορᾶς λόγον ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εὑρίσκεσθαι.