§34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘Ομοούσιον, and the contention in answer to it.

I will omit to speak of the words which occur before this passage which has been quoted. They contain merely shameless abuse of our Master and Father in God, and nothing bearing on the matter in hand. But on the passage itself, as he advances by the device of this terrible dilemma a double-edged refutation, we cannot be silent; we must accept the intellectual challenge, and fight for the Faith with all the power we have, and show that the formidable two-edged sword which he has sharpened is feebler than a make-believe in a scene-painting.

He attacks the community of substance with two suppositions; he says that we either name as Father and as Son two independent principles drawn out parallel to each other, and then say that one of these existencies is produced by the other existence: or else we say that one and the same essence is conceived of, participating in both names in turn, both being117    Reading οὖσαν for οὐσίαν of Oehler and Migne. Father, and becoming Son, and itself produced in generation from itself. I put this in my own words, thereby not misinterpreting his thought, but only correcting the tumid exaggeration of its expression, in such a way as to reveal his meaning by clearer words and afford a comprehensive view of it. Having blamed us for want of polish and for having brought to the controversy an insufficient amount of learning, he decks out his own work in such a glitter of style, and passes the nail118    ἐξουυχίζει, to use his own phrase, so often over his own sentences, and makes his periods so smart with this elaborate prettiness, that he captivates the reader at once with the attractions of language; such amongst many others is the passage we have just recited by way of preface. We will, by leave, again recite it. “And so the scolding you have given is only a halter, not to be eluded, which you have woven for your own necks; justice, as might have been expected, records in your own words a verdict against yourselves.”

Observe these flowers of the old Attic; what polished brilliance of diction plays over his composition; what a delicate and subtle charm of style is in bloom there! However, let this be as people think. Our course requires us again to turn to the thought in those words; let us plunge once more into the phrases of this pamphleteer. “Either you conceive of the beings as separated and independent of each other, and then bring down one of them, by generation, to the rank of Son, and contend that One who exists independently nevertheless was made by means of the Other existence.” That is enough for the present. He says, then, that we preach119    πρεσβεύειν. So Lucian. Diog. Laert., and Origen passim. two causeless Beings. How can this man, who is always accusing us of levelling and confusing, assert this from our believing, as we do, in a single substance of Both. If two natures, alien to each other on the score of their being, were preached by our Faith, just as it is preached by the Anomœan school, then there would be good reason for thinking that this distinction of natures led to the supposition of two causeless beings. But if, as is the case, we acknowledge one nature with the differences of Person, if, while the Father is believed in, the Son also is glorified, how can such a Faith be misrepresented by our opponents as preaching Two First Causes? Then he says, ‘of these two causes, one is lowered’ by us ‘to the rank of Son.’ Let him point out one champion of such a doctrine; whether he can convict any single person of talking like this, or only knows of such a doctrine as taught anywhere at all in the Church, we will hold our peace. For who is so wild in his reasonings, and so bereft of reflection as, after speaking of Father and Son, to imagine in spite of that two ungenerate beings: and then again to suppose that the One of them has come into being by means of the Other? Besides, what logical necessity does he show for pushing our teaching towards such suppositions? By what arguments does he show that such an absurdity must result from it? If indeed he adduced one single article of our Faith, and then, whether as a quibble or with a real force of demonstration, made this criticism upon it, there might have been some reason for his doing so with a view to invalidate that article. But when there is not, and never can be such a doctrine in the Church, when neither a teacher of it nor a hearer of it is to be found, and the absurdity cannot be shown, either, to be the strict logical consequence of anything, I cannot understand the meaning of his fighting thus with shadows. It is just as if some phenzy-struck person supposed himself to be grappling with an imaginary combatant, and then, having with great efforts thrown himself down, thought that it was his foe who was lying there; our clever pamphleteer is in the same state; he feigns suppositions which we know nothing about, and he fights with the shadows which are sketched by the workings of his own brain.

For I challenge him to say why a believer in the Son as having come into being from the Father must advance to the opinion that there are two First Causes; and let him tell us who is most guilty of this establishment of two First Causes; one who asserts that the Son is falsely so named, or one who insists that, when we call Him that, the name represents a reality? The first, rejecting a real generation of the Son, and affirming simply that He exists, would be more open to the suspicion of making Him a First Cause, if he exists indeed, but not by generation: whereas the second, making the representative sign of the Person of the Only-begotten to consist in subsisting generatively from the Father, cannot by any possibility be drawn into the error of supposing the Son to be Ungenerate. And yet as long as, according to you thinkers, the non-generation of the Son by the Father is to be held, the Son Himself will be properly called Ungenerate in one of the many meanings of the Ungenerate; seeing that, as some things come into existence by being born and others by being fashioned, nothing prevents our calling one of the latter, which does not subsist by generation, an Ungenerate, looking only to the idea of generation; and this your account, defining, as it does, our Lord to be a creature, does establish about Him. So, my very learned sirs, it is in your view, not ours, when it is thus followed out, that the Only-begotten can be named Ungenerate: and you will find that “justice,”—whatever you mean by that,—records in your own words120    your own words, i.e. not ours, as you say. The Codex of Turin has τοῖς ἡμετέροις, and ἡμῖν above: but Oehler has wisely followed that of Venice. Eunomius had said of Basil’s party (§34) ‘justice records in your own words a verdict against yourselves.’ ‘No,’ Gregory answers; ‘your words (interpreting our doctrine) alone lend themselves to that.’ But to change καθ᾽ ἡμῶν of the Codd. also to καθ᾽ ὑμῶν would supply a still better sense. a verdict against us.

It is easy also to find mud in his words after that to cast upon this execrable teaching. For the other horn of his dilemma partakes in the same mental delusion; he says, “or else you first allow one single causeless being, and then marking this out by an act of generation into Father and Son, you declare that this non-generated being came into existence by means of itself.” What is this new and marvellous story? How is one begotten by oneself, having oneself for father, and becoming one’s own son? What dizziness and delusion is here? It is like supposing the roof to be turning down below one’s feet, and the floor above one’s head; it is like the mental state of one with his senses stupified with drink, who shouts out persistently that the ground does not stand still beneath, and that the walls are disappearing, and that everything he sees is whirling round and will not keep still. Perhaps our pamphleteer had such a tumult in his soul when he wrote; if so, we must pity him rather than abhor him. For who is so out of hearing of our divine doctrine, who is so far from the mysteries of the Church, as to accept such a view as this to the detriment of the Faith. Rather, it is hardly enough to say, that no one ever dreamed of such an absurdity to its detriment. Why, in the case of human nature, or any other entity falling within the grasp of the senses who, when he hears of a community of substance, dreams either that all things that are compared together on the ground of substance are without a cause or beginning, or that something comes into existence out of itself, at once producing and being produced by itself?

The first man, and the man born from him, received their being in a different way; the latter by copulation, the former from the moulding of Christ Himself; and yet, though they are thus believed to be two, they are inseparable in the definition of their being, and are not considered as two beings, without beginning or cause, running parallel to each other; nor can the existing one be said to be generated by the existing one, or the two be ever thought of as one in the monstrous sense that each is his own father, and his own son; but it is because the one and the other was a man that the two have the same definition of being; each was mortal, reasoning, capable of intuition and of science. If, then, the idea of humanity in Adam and Abel does not vary with the difference of their origin, neither the order nor the manner of their coming into existence making any difference in their nature, which is the same in both, according to the testimony of every one in his senses, and no one, not greatly needing treatment for insanity, would deny it; what necessity is there that against the divine nature we should admit this strange thought? Having heard of Father and Son from the Truth, we are taught in those two subjects the oneness of their nature; their natural relation to each other expressed by those names indicates that nature; and so do Our Lord’s own words. For when He said, “I and My Father are one121    John x. 30.,” He conveys by that confession of a Father exactly the truth that He Himself is not a first cause, at the same time that He asserts by His union with the Father their common nature; so that these words of His secure our faith from the taint of heretical error on either side: for Sabellius has no ground for his confusion of the individuality of each Person, when the Only-begotten has so distinctly marked Himself off from the Father in those words, “I and My Father;” and Arius finds no confirmation of his doctrine of the strangeness of either nature to the other, since this oneness of both cannot admit distinction in nature. For that which is signified in these words by the oneness of Father and Son is nothing else but what belongs to them on the score of their actual being; all the other moral excellences which are to be observed in them as over and above122    ὄσα ἐπιθεωρεῖται τῇ φύσει. their nature may without error be set down as shared in by all created beings. For instance, Our Lord is called merciful and pitiful by the prophet123    Psalm ciii. 8., and He wills us to be and to be called the same; “Be ye therefore merciful124    Luke vi. 36.,” and “Blessed are the merciful125    Matthew v. 7.,” and many such passages. If, then, any one by diligence and attention has modelled himself according to the divine will, and become kind and pitiful and compassionate, or meek and lowly of heart, such as many of the saints are testified to have become in the pursuit of such excellences, does it follow that they are therefore one with God, or united to Him by virtue of any one of them? Not so. That which is not in every respect the same, cannot be ‘one’ with him whose nature thus varies from it. Accordingly, a man becomes ‘one’ with another, when in will, as our Lord says, they are ‘perfected into one126    John xvii. 23. “I in them, and thou in Me, that they may be perfected into one.” (R.V.),’ this union of wills being added to the connexion of nature. So also the Father and Son are one, the community of nature and the community of will running, in them, into one. But if the Son had been joined in wish only to the Father, and divided from Him in His nature, how is it that we find Him testifying to His oneness with the Father, when all the time He was sundered from Him in the point most proper to Him of all?

Τὰ μὲν οὖν πρὸ τῶν ἀνεγνωσμένων αὐτῷ γεγραμμένα, ὡς ψιλὴν ἔχοντα κατὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν τὴν ἀναισχυντίαν καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν προκείμενον συντελοῦντα σκοπόν, ὑπερβήσομαι: ἐν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐπειδὴ δεινῶς ἡμῖν τοὺς ἀμφήκεις τούτους ἐλέγχους διχόθεν στομώσας διὰ τῆς τῶν διλημμάτων ἐπινοίας προτείνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ σιωπῇ δέξασθαι τὸν κατὰ τοῦ δόγματος πόλεμον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχομεν δυνάμεως συμμαχῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ δεῖξαι τὴν φοβερὰν ταύτην καὶ ἀμφίστομον μάχαιραν, ἣν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐθήξατο, τῶν ἐν ταῖς σκιαγραφίαις φαινομένων ἀδρανεστέραν.
Διπλαῖς ἐννοίαις διαβάλλει τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας καί φησιν ἢ δύο ἀγεννήτους ἀρχὰς ἀντιπαρεξαγομένας ἀλλήλαις τὴν μὲν πατέρα, τὴν δὲ υἱὸν ἡμᾶς ὀνομάζειν, τὸν ὄντα παρὰ τοῦ ὄντος γεγενῆσθαι λέγοντας ἢ μίαν νοουμένην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον ἐν μέρει μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ πατέρα οὖσαν καὶ υἱὸν γινομένην αὐτὴν παρ' ἑαυτῆς διὰ γεννήσεως παραγομένην. ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ λέξεως γράφω, οὐ παρερμηνεύων αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ στομφῶδες καὶ κατεστοιβασμένον τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἐπανορθούμενος, ὡς ἂν εὐσύνοπτον αὐτοῦ πᾶσι τὸ βούλημα γένοιτο, διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν σαφηνείας ἐκκαλυπτόμενον. ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἀμαθίαν ἡμῶν διασύρων καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀρκούσης παρασκευῆς ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἐληλυθέναι προφέρων, οὕτως ἁβρύνει τῇ λαμπρότητι τῆς ἑρμηνείας τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, οὕτως « ἐξονυχίζει », καθὼς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζει, « τὰ ῥήματα », ἐν τῇ περιττῇ ταύτῃ καλλιεπείᾳ τὴν συγγραφὴν ἀγλαΐζων, ὡς αὐτόθεν αἱρεῖν τῇ τῆς λέξεως ἡδονῇ τὸν ἀκούοντα: οἷα μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑπανεγνωσμένα ἐστί. καὶ εἰ δοκεῖ, πάλιν ὑπαναγνώσομαι: « διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις λοιδορίαν ὥσπερ τινὰ πάγην ἄφυκτον καθ' ἑαυτῶν ἐτεκτήνασθε, τῆς δίκης ὡς εἰκὸς τοῖς ὑμετέροις καθ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιψηφιζούσης ».
Ὅρα τὰ ἄνθη τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἀτθίδος, ὡς ἐπαστράπτει τῇ συντάξει τοῦ λόγου τὸ λεῖον καὶ κατεστιλβωμένον τῆς λέξεως, ὡς γλαφυρῶς καὶ ποικίλως τῇ ὥρᾳ τοῦ λόγου περιανθίζεται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐχέτω, ὡς ἄν τῳ δόξῃ, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν εἰρημένων τρεπέσθω πάλιν ὁ δρόμος, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν, εἰ δοκεῖ, γενώμεθα τοῦ λογογράφου τῶν λέξεων. « ἤτοι γὰρ ἀνάρχως ἀλλήλων κεχωρίσθαι τὰς οὐσίας ταύτας ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τούτων δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν εἰς υἱοῦ τάξιν διὰ γεννήσεως ἄγοντες καὶ τὸν ἀνάρχως ὄντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος γεγενῆσθαι διατεινόμενοι ». ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα. δύο φησὶν ἡμᾶς ἀγεννήτους οὐσίας πρεσβεύειν, πῶς τοῦτο λέγων ὁ φύρειν τὰ πάντα καὶ συγχεῖν αἰτιώμενος διὰ τοῦ μίαν ὁμολογεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ δύο φύσεις ἀλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐχούσας καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος ἐπρέσβευε λόγος κατὰ τὸ ἴσον τῶν τὸ ”ἀνόμοιον„ δογματιζόντων, καλῶς εἶχε τὸ διῃρημένον τῆς φύσεως εἰς δύο τινῶν ἀρχῶν ὑπονοίας ἐκφέρειν νομίζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μία φύσις ὁμολογεῖται παρ' ἡμῶν ἐν διαφόροις ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι καὶ πατὴρ πιστεύεται καὶ υἱὸς δοξάζεται, πῶς δύο πρεσβεύειν ἀρχὰς τὸ τοιοῦτον δόγμα παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συκοφαντεῖται; εἶτα ἐκ τῶν δύο τούτων ἀρχῶν τὴν μίαν λέγει παρ' ἡμῶν εἰς υἱοῦ τάξιν κατάγεσθαι καὶ τὸν ὄντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος γεγενῆσθαι. δειξάτω τὸν προστάτην τοῦ λόγου τούτου, καὶ ἡμεῖς σιωπήσομεν, εἴτε τι πρόσωπον διελέγχει τὸ ταῦτα παραφθεγξάμενον εἴτε καὶ ἁπλῶς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐν ἐκκλησίαις οἶδε φερόμενον. τίς γὰρ οὕτως παράφορος τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ἐξεστηκὼς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν λέγειν καὶ δύο πάλιν ἀγέννητα οἴεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἓν αὖθις παρὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεγενῆσθαι νομίζειν; τίς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη ἡ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ὑπονοίας ἐξωθοῦσα τὸ δόγμα; ἐκ ποίων παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγων τοῦτο κατεσκευάσθη, ὡς ἀναγκαίως ταύτην ἀνακύψαι τὴν ἀτοπίαν; εἰ μὲν γάρ τι τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογουμένων προέφερεν, εἶτα διὰ τούτου προῆγεν εἴτε σοφιστικῶς εἴτε κατά τινα δύναμιν ἀποδεικτικὴν τὴν τοιαύτην συκοφαντίαν, εἶχεν ἴσως καιρὸν ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τοῦ δόγματος τὰ τοιαῦτα προφέρειν. εἰ δὲ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε μὴ γένηται λόγος ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ τοιοῦτος οὔτε ὁ εἰπὼν ἐλέγχεται οὔτε ὁ ἀκηκοὼς ἐπιδείκνυται οὔτε ἀνάγκη τις εὑρίσκεται διά τινος ἀκολούθου τὴν ἀτοπίαν ταύτην κατασκευάζουσα, τί βούλεται αὐτῷ ἡ σκιαμαχία, οὐ συνορῶ. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ὑπὸ φρενίτιδος παραπαίων συμπεπλέχθαι νομίζοι τινὶ μηδενὸς προσπαλαίοντος, εἶτα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἑαυτὸν καταβαλὼν τὸν προσμαχόμενον οἴοιτο, τοιοῦτόν τι πέπονθεν ὁ σοφὸς λογογράφος ἀναπλάσσων ὑπονοίας, ἃς ἡμεῖς οὐ γινώσκομεν, καὶ σκιαῖς προσμαχόμενος, ἃς διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀνετυπώσατο.
Εἰπάτω γάρ, τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη τὸν ὁμολογοῦντα υἱὸν ἐκ πατρὸς „γεγεννῆσθαι” εἰς δύο ἀγεννήτων ὑπολήψεις ἐκφέρεσθαι; ἢ τίνος μᾶλλόν ἐστι δύο κατασκευάζειν ἀγέννητα, τοῦ τὸν υἱὸν ψευδωνύμως λέγεσθαι κατασκευάζοντος ἢ τοῦ διαβεβαιουμένου τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τὴν φύσιν ἐπαληθεύεσθαι; ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἀληθῆ γέννησιν τοῦ υἱοῦ μὴ δεξάμενος, εἶναι δὲ ὅλως ὁμολογῶν, οἰκειότερον ἂν ὑπονοηθείη ἀγέννητον λέγειν τὸν ὄντα μέν, μὴ διὰ γεννήσεως δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα: ὁ δὲ τὸ γνωριστικὸν ὁμοίωμα τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως αὐτὸ τὸ γεννητῶς αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστῆναι διοριζόμενος, πῶς ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν οἴεσθαι παρενεχθείη; καίτοι καθ' ὑμᾶς τοὺς σοφούς, ἕως ἂν κρατῇ τὸ μὴ ”γεννηθῆναι„ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, ἑνί τινι τρόπῳ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου σημαινομένων καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγέννητος κυρίως ὀνομασθήσεται. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰ μὲν τικτόμενα τὰ δὲ κατασκευαζόμενα γίνεται, τὸ μὴ διὰ γεννήσεως ὑφεστὸς οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγεννήτως ὑφεστάναι λέγειν κατὰ μόνον τὸ τῆς γεννήσεως σημαινόμενον. τοῦτο δὲ ὁ ὑμέτερος περὶ τοῦ κυρίου κατασκευάζει λόγος ὁ κτίσμα εἶναι διοριζόμενος. οὐκοῦν καθ' ὑμᾶς ὦ σοφώτατοι ἀγέννητος ὁ μονογενὴς ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀκολουθίας ὀνομασθήσεται, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα, καὶ εὑρίσκεται ὑμῖν « ἡ δίκη », ἥντινα καὶ λέγεις δίκην, « τοῖς ὑμετέροις καθ' ὑμῶν ἐπιψηφίζουσα ».
Εὔκαιρον γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ βορβόρου τῶν ἐκεῖθεν λόγων προσπτύσαι τῇ βδελυρίᾳ τοῦ δόγματος. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῶν κατὰ τὸ διλήμματον τεθέντων αὐτῷ τῆς ἴσης ἔχεται παραπληξίας. « ἢ μίαν », φησί, « καὶ μόνην ἄναρχον ὁμολογοῦντες οὐσίαν εἶτα ταύτην εἰς πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν τῇ γεννήσει περιγράφοντες αὐτὴν παρ' ἑαυτῆς γεγεννῆσθαι τὴν ἀγέννητον οὐσίαν φήσετε ». τίς αὕτη πάλιν ἡ καινὴ τερατολογία; πῶς αὐτός τις ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾶται, ἑαυτὸν πατέρα ἔχων καὶ υἱὸς ἑαυτοῦ πάλιν γινόμενος; τίς ἡ ναυτία, τίς ἡ παραφορά, στρέφεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω τὸν ὄροφον καὶ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τὸ ἔδαφος ἔχειν; ὃ οἱ ὑπὸ μέθης καρηβαροῦντες νομίζουσι καὶ βοῶσι καὶ διατείνονται μήτε τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς πεπηγέναι φεύγειν τε καὶ τοὺς τοίχους καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιδινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τὰ φαινόμενα στάσιν. τάχα τοίνυν ἐν τοιούτῳ σάλῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων ὁ λογογράφος συνέγραφε καὶ ἐλεεῖν προσήκει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις αὐτὸν ἢ βδελύττεσθαι. τίς γὰρ οὕτω τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἀνήκοος, τίς οὕτω πόρρω τῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας μυστηρίων ἐστίν, ὡς τὴν τοιαύτην ἔννοιαν κατὰ τῆς πίστεως δέξασθαι; μᾶλλον δὲ μικρὸν ἴσως τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγειν, τὸ μηδένα κατὰ τῆς πίστεως τὴν ἀτοπίαν ταύτην ὑπονοῆσαι. ἀλλὰ τίς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν δι' αἰσθήσεως καταλαμβανομένων, ἐπειδὰν τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἀκούσῃ, ἢ ἄναρχα ὑπονοεῖ πάντα, ὅσα τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλήλοις συμφέρεται, ἢ αὐτό τι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γίνεσθαι λέγει καὶ τίκτειν ἅμα ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾶσθαι;
Ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐκείνου γεγονὼς διαφόρως ἑκάτεροι τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντες, ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ τῶν γονέων, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χοῦ διαπλάσεως, καὶ δύο εἶναι πιστεύονται καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπ' ἀλλήλων οὐ διασχίζονται, καὶ οὔτε ἄναρχοι δύο οὐσίαι ἀλλήλαις ἀντιπαρεξάγεσθαι λέγονται οὔτε ὁ ὢν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος γεννᾶσθαι, οὔτε εἷς οἱ δύο ποτὲ ἐνοήθησαν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τερατολογίᾳ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα καὶ ἑαυτοῦ πάλιν υἱὸν ἀμφοτέρους νομίζεσθαι: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος κἀκεῖνος, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τῶν δύο κοινός: θνητὸς ἑκάτερος, λογικὸς ὁμοίως, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸς ὡσαύτως. εἰ οὖν ὁ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ τοῦ Ἄβελ τῷ παρηλλαγμένῳ τῆς γεννήσεως οὐχ ὑπαλλάσσεται, οὐδεμίαν οὔτε τῆς τάξεως οὔτε τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῇ φύσει τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐμποιούντων, ἀλλ' ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τῇ κοινῇ τῶν νηφόντων συγκαταθέσει διωμολόγηται καὶ οὐδεὶς « ἂν » ἀντείποι τούτῳ μὴ σφόδρα τοῦ ἑλλεβόρου δεόμενος, τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη κατὰ τῆς θείας φύσεως τὸ παράλογον τοῦτο τῆς ἐννοίας κατασκευάζεσθαι;
Πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν παρὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκούσαντες ἐν δύο τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς φύσεως ἐδιδάχθημεν, ὑπό τε τῶν ὀνομάτων φυσικῶς [διὰ] τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως σημαινομένης καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς πάλιν τῆς τοῦ κυρίου φωνῆς. ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν, τί ἄλλο ἢ τό τε μὴ ἄναρχον ἑαυτοῦ διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογίας παρίστησιν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν σημαίνει τῆς φύσεως διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνότητος; ὡς ἄν, οἶμαι, διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων τῆς ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῶν αἱρέσεων παρατροπῆς ὁ τῆς πίστεως καθαρεύοι λόγος, μήτε τοῦ Σαβελλίου χώραν ἔχοντος εἰς σύγχυσιν ἄγειν τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιότητα, φανερῶς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακρίναντος ἐν τῷ εἰπεῖν Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατήρ, μήτε τοῦ Ἀρείου τὸ ξένον τῆς φύσεως κατασκευάζειν ἰσχύοντος, τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἑνότητος οὐ προσιεμένης τὴν κατὰ φύσιν διαίρεσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ τὸ διὰ τῆς ἑνότητος ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ σημαινόμενον πλὴν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτήν: τὰ γὰρ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὅσα ἐπιθεωρεῖται τῇ φύσει, κοινὰ προκεῖσθαι πᾶσιν εἰπών τις καὶ τοῖς διὰ κτίσεως γεγενημένοις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. οἷον Οἰκτίρμων καὶ ἐλεήμων ὁ κύριος, παρὰ τοῦ προφήτου λέγεται. ταῦτα βούλεται πάλιν ὁ κύριος καὶ ἡμᾶς γίνεσθαί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι: Γίνεσθε γὰρ οἰκτίρμονες καὶ Μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἆρ' οὖν, εἴ τις διὰ προσοχῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῷ θείῳ βουλήματι ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιώσας ἀγαθὸς ἢ οἰκτίρμων καὶ ἐλεήμων ἐγένετο ἢ πρᾶος καὶ ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, καθὼς μεμαρτύρηνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τοῖς προτερήμασι τούτοις γενόμενοι, παρὰ τοῦτο ἕν εἰσι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἢ διά τινος τούτων πρὸς αὐτὸν συναπτόμενοι; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν ἓν εἶναι πρὸς τὸν τῇ φύσει διηλλαγμένον οὐ δύναται. διὰ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἓν γίνεται, ὅταν διὰ προαιρέσεως, καθὼς εἶπεν ὁ κύριος, τελειωθῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἕν, τῆς φυσικῆς συναφείας τὴν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἑνότητα προσλαβούσης. καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἕν εἰσι, τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν κοινωνίας εἰς τὸ ἓν συνδραμούσης. εἰ δὲ τῷ θελήματι μόνῳ συνηρμοσμένος κατὰ τὴν φύσιν διῄρητο, πῶς ἐμαρτύρει ἑαυτῷ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνότητα, τῷ κυριωτάτῳ διεσχισμένος;