§39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”

Eunomius does not like the meaning of the Ungenerate to be conveyed by the term Father, because he wants to establish that there was a time when the Son was not. It is in fact a constant question amongst his pupils, “How can He who (always) is be begotten?” This comes, I take it, of not weaning oneself from the human application of words, when we have to think about God. But let us without bitterness at once expose the actual falseness of this ‘arrière pensée’ of his154    αὐτὸ τὸ πεπλασμενον τῆς ὑπονοιας., stating first our conclusions upon the matter.

These names have a different meaning with us, Eunomius; when we come to the transcendent energies they yield another sense. Wide, indeed, is the interval in all else that divides the human from the divine; experience cannot point here below to anything at all resembling in amount what we may guess at and imagine there. So likewise, as regards the meaning of our terms, though there may be, so far as words go, some likeness between man and the Eternal, yet the gulf between these two worlds is the real measure of the separation of meanings. For instance, our Lord calls God a ‘man’ that was a ‘householder’ in the parable155    the parable, i.e. of the Tares. Matthew xiii. 27: cf. v. 52.; but though this title is ever so familiar to us, will the person we think of and the person there meant be of the same description; and will our ‘house’ be the same as that large house, in which, as the Apostle says, there are the vessels of gold, and those of silver156    2 Tim. ii. 20., and those of the other materials which are recounted? Or will not those rather be beyond our immediate apprehension and to be contemplated in a blessed immortality, while ours are earthern, and to dissolve to earth? So in almost all the other terms there is a similarity of names between things human and things divine, revealing nevertheless underneath this sameness a wide difference of meanings. We find alike in both worlds the mention of bodily limbs and senses; as with us, so with the life of God, which all allow to be above sense, there are set down in order fingers and arm and hand, eye and eyelids, hearing, heart, feet and sandals, horses, cavalry, and chariots; and other metaphors innumerable are taken from human life to illustrate symbolically divine things. As, then, each one of these names has a human sound, but not a human meaning, so also that of Father, while applying equally to life divine and human, hides a distinction between the uttered meanings exactly proportionate to the difference existing between the subjects of this title. We think of man’s generation one way; we surmise of the divine generation in another. A man is born in a stated time; and a particular place must be the receptacle of his life; without it it is not in nature that he should have any concrete substance: whence also it is inevitable that sections of time are found enveloping his life; there is a Before, and With, and After him. It is true to say of any one whatever of those born into this world that there was a time when he was not, that he is now, and again there will be time when he will cease to exist; but into the Eternal world these ideas of time do not enter; to a sober thinker they have nothing akin to that world. He who considers what the divine life really is will get beyond the ‘sometime,’ the ‘before,’ and the ‘after,’ and every mark whatever of this extension in time; he will have lofty views upon a subject so lofty; nor will he deem that the Absolute is bound by those laws which he observes to be in force in human generation.

Passion precedes the concrete existence of man; certain material foundations are laid for the formation of the living creature; beneath it all is Nature, by God’s will, with her wonder-working, putting everything under contribution for the proper proportion of nutrition for that which is to be born, taking from each terrestrial element the amount necessary for the particular case, receiving the co-operation of a measured time, and as much of the food of the parents as is necessary for the formation of the child: in a word Nature, advancing through all these processes by which a human life is built up, brings the non-existent to the birth; and accordingly we say that, non-existent once, it now is born; because, at one time not being, at another it begins to be. But when it comes to the Divine generation the mind rejects this ministration of Nature, and this fulness of time in contributing to the development, and everything else which our argument contemplated as taking place in human generation; and he who enters on divine topics with no carnal conceptions will not fall down again to the level of any of those debasing thoughts, but seeks for one in keeping with the majesty of the thing to be expressed; he will not think of passion in connexion with that which is passionless, or count the Creator of all Nature as in need of Nature’s help, or admit extension in time into the Eternal life; he will see that the Divine generation is to be cleared of all such ideas, and will allow to the title ‘Father’ only the meaning that the Only-begotten is not Himself without a source, but derives from That the cause of His being; though, as for the actual beginning of His subsistence, he will not calculate that, because he will not be able to see any sign of the thing in question. ‘Older’ and ‘younger’ and all such notions are found to involve intervals of time; and so, when you mentally abstract time in general, all such indications are got rid of along with it.

Since, then, He who is with the Father, in some inconceivable category, before the ages admits not of a ‘sometime,’ He exists by generation indeed, but nevertheless He never begins to exist. His life is neither in time, nor in place. But when we take away these and all suchlike ideas in contemplating the subsistence of the Son, there is only one thing that we can even think of as before Him—i.e. the Father. But the Only-begotten, as He Himself has told us, is in the Father, and so, from His nature, is not open to the supposition that He ever existed not. If indeed the Father ever was not, the eternity of the Son must be cancelled retrospectively in consequence of this nothingness of the Father: but if the Father is always, how can the Son ever be non-existent, when He cannot be thought of at all by Himself apart from the Father, but is always implied silently in the name Father. This name in fact conveys the two Persons equally; the idea of the Son is inevitably suggested by that word. When was it, then, that the Son was not? In what category shall we detect His non-existence? In place? There is none. In time? Our Lord was before all times; and if so, when was He not? And if He was in the Father, in what place was He not? Tell us that, ye who are so practised in seeing things out of sight. What kind of interval have your cogitations given a shape to? What vacancy in the Son, be it of substance or of conception, have you been able to think of, which shows the Father’s life, when drawn out in parallel, as surpassing that of the Only-begotten? Why, even of men we cannot say absolutely that any one was not, and then was born. Levi, many generations before his own birth in the flesh, was tithed by Melchisedech; so the Apostle says, “Levi also, who receiveth tithes, payed tithes (in Abraham),”157    Heb. vii. 9, 10; Genesis xiv. 18. adding the proof, “for he was yet in the loins of his father, when” Abraham met the priest of the Most High. If, then, a man in a certain sense is not, and is then born, having existed beforehand by virtue of kinship of substance in his progenitor, according to an Apostle’s testimony, how as to the Divine life do they dare to utter the thought that He was not, and then was begotten? For He ‘is in the Father,’ as our Lord has told us; “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me158    John x. 38.,” each of course being in the other in two different senses; the Son being in the Father as the beauty of the image is to be found in the form from which it has been outlined; and the Father in the Son, as that original beauty is to be found in the image of itself. Now in all hand-made images the interval of time is a point of separation between the model and that to which it lends its form; but there the one cannot be separated from the other, neither the “express image” from the “Person,” to use the Apostle’s words159    Heb. i., nor the “brightness” from the “glory” of God, nor the representation from the goodness; but when once thought has grasped one of these, it has admitted the associated Verity as well. “Being,” he says (not becoming), “the brightness of His glory160    Heb. i. 3. (ὢν, not γενόμενος).;” so that clearly we may rid ourselves for ever of the blasphemy which lurks in either of those two conceptions; viz., that the Only-begotten can be thought of as Ungenerate (for he says “the brightness of His glory,” the brightness coming from the glory, and not, reversely, the glory from the brightness); or that He ever began to be. For the word “being” is a witness that interprets to us the Son’s continuity and eternity and superiority to all marks of time.

What occasion, then, had our foes for proposing for the damage of our Faith that trifling question, which they think unanswerable and, so, a proving of their own doctrine, and which they are continually asking, namely, ‘whether One who is can be generated.’ We may boldly answer them at once, that He who is in the Ungenerate was generated from Him, and does derive His source from Him. ‘I live by the Father161    John iv. 57.:’ but it is impossible to name the ‘when’ of His beginning. When there is no intermediate matter, or idea, or interval of time, to separate the being of the Son from the Father, no symbol can be thought of, either, by which the Only-begotten can be unlinked from the Father’s life, and shewn to proceed from some special source of His own. If, then, there is no other principle that guides the Son’s life, if there is nothing that a devout mind can contemplate before (but not divided from) the subsistence of the Son, but the Father only; and if the Father is without beginning or generation, as even our adversaries admit, how can He who can be contemplated only within the Father, who is without beginning, admit Himself of a beginning?

What harm, too, does our Faith suffer from our admitting those expressions of our opponents which they bring forward against us as absurd, when they ask ‘whether He which is can be begotten?’ We do not assert that this can be so in the sense in which Nicodemus put his offensive question162    John iii. 4., wherein he thought it impossible that one who was in existence could come to a second birth: but we assert that, having His existence attached to an Existence which is always and is without beginning, and accompanying every investigator into the antiquities of time, and forestalling the curiosity of thought as it advances into the world beyond, and intimately blended as He is with all our conceptions of the Father, He has no beginning of His existence any more than He is Ungenerate: but He was both begotten and was, evincing on the score of causation generation from the Father, but by virtue of His everlasting life repelling any moment of non-existence.

But this thinker in his exceeding subtlety contravenes this statement; he sunders the being of the Only-begotten from the Father’s nature, on the ground of one being Generated, the other Ungenerate; and although there are such a number of names which with reverence may be applied to the Deity, and all of them suitable to both Persons equally, he pays no attention to anyone of them, because these others indicate that in which Both participate; he fastens on the name Ungenerate, and that alone; and even of this he will not adopt the usual and approved meaning; he revolutionizes the conception of it, and cancels its common associations. Whatever can be the reason of this? For without some very strong one he would not wrest language away from its accepted meaning, and innovate163    ξενίζει, intrans. N.T. Polyb. Lucian. by changing the signification of words. He knows perfectly well that if their meaning was confined to the customary one he would have no power to subvert the sound doctrine; but that if such terms are perverted from their common and current acceptation, he will be able to spoil the doctrine along with the word. For instance (to come to the actual words which he misuses), if, according to the common thinking of our Faith he had allowed that God was to be called Ungenerate only because He was never generated, the whole fabric of his heresy would have collapsed, with the withdrawal of his quibbling about this Ungenerate. If, that is, he was to be persuaded, by following out the analogy of almost all the names of God in use for the Church, to think of the God over all as Ungenerate, just as He is invisible, and passionless, and immaterial; and if he was agreed that in every one of these terms there was signified only that which in no way belongs to God—body, for instance, and passion and colour, and derivation from a cause—then, if his view of the case had been like that, his party’s tenet of the Unlikeness would lose its meaning; for in all else (except the Ungeneracy) that is conceived concerning the God of all even these adversaries allow the likeness existing between the Only-begotten and the Father. But to prevent this, he puts the term Ungenerate in front of all these names indicating God’s transcendent nature; and he makes this one a vantage-ground from which he may sweep down upon our Faith; he transfers the contrariety between the actual expressions ‘Generated’ and ‘Ungenerate’ to the Persons themselves to whom these words apply; and thereby, by this difference between the words he argues by a quibble for a difference between the Beings; not agreeing with us that Generated is to be used only because the Son was generated, and Ungenerate because the Father exists without having been generated; but affirming that he thinks the former has acquired existence by having been generated; though what sort of philosophy leads him to such a view I cannot understand. If one were to attend to the mere meanings of those words by themselves, abstracting in thought those Persons for whom the names are taken to stand, one would discover the groundlessness of these statements of theirs. Consider, then, not that, in consequence of the Father being a conception prior to the Son (as the Faith truly teaches), the order of the names themselves must be arranged so as to correspond with the value and order of that which underlies them; but regard them alone by themselves, to see which of them (the word, I repeat, not the Reality which it represents) is to be placed before the other as a conception of our mind; which of the two conveys the assertion of an idea, which the negation of the same; for instance (to be clear, I think similar pairs of words will give my meaning), Knowledge, Ignorance—Passion, Passionlessness—and suchlike contrasts, which of them possess priority of conception before the others? Those which posit the negation, or those which posit the assertion of the said quality? I take it the latter do so. Knowledge, anger, passion, are conceived of first; and then comes the negation of these ideas. And let no one, in his excess of devotion164    ἐθελοθρησκείας, “will worship.”, blame this argument, as if it would put the Son before the Father. We are not making out that the Son is to be placed in conception before the Father, seeing that the argument is discriminating only the meanings of ‘Generated,’ and ‘Ungenerate.’ So Generation signifies the assertion of some reality or some idea; while Ungeneracy signifies its negation; so that there is every reason that Generation must be thought of first. Why, then, do they insist herein on fixing on the Father the second, in order of conception, of these two names; why do they keep on thinking that a negation can define and can embrace the whole substance of the term in question, and are roused to exasperation against those who point out the groundlessness of their arguments?

οὐ βούλεται ὁ Εὐνόμιος ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν σημασίαν παρίστασθαι, ἵνα τὸ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ κατασκευάσῃ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐρώτημα ὅτι, ὁ ὢν πῶς γεννᾶται; αἴτιον δὲ τούτου οἶμαι τὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θείων διανοημάτων ἀφίστασθαι. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πεπλανημένον τῆς ὑπονοίας εἰς τὸ εὐθὲς προαγάγωμεν, εἰπόντες ἃ περὶ τούτου γινώσκομεν. ἄλλα σημαίνει παρ' ἡμῖν, ὦ Εὐνόμιε, τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἑτέραν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης δυνάμεως τὴν σημασίαν παρέχεται. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι πολλῷ τῷ μέσῳ ἡ θεία φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης διατετείχισται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτον ἡ πεῖρα δείκνυσιν, ὅσον ἐν ἐκείνῃ στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπονοίαις εἰκάζεται. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένοις, κἂν ὁμωνυμία τις ᾖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς τῶν φύσεων ἀποστάσεως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων κεχώρισται. οἷον οἰκοδεσπότην ἄνθρωπον διὰ τῆς παραβολῆς τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει ὁ κύριος: ἀλλὰ πολὺ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὸ ὄνομα. ἆρ' οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκείνου, καὶ τοιοῦτος ὁ ἡμέτερος οἶκος οἵα ἡ μεγάλη οἰκία ἐκείνη, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ἐν ᾗ τὰ σκεύη τὰ χρυσᾶ καὶ τὰ ἀργυρᾶ καὶ ὅσα τῆς λοιπῆς ὕλης ἠρίθμηται; ἢ ἄλλα μὲν ἐκεῖνα ἃ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιγνοίη τις εὐκόλως, ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ μακαριότητι θεωρούμενα, ἄλλα δὲ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκ γῆς ὄντα καὶ εἰς γῆν καταρρέοντα; ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι σχεδὸν ὁμωνυμία τίς ἐστι πρὸς τὰ θεῖα τῶν ἡμετέρων πραγμάτων, ἐν τῇ ταὐτότητι τῶν ὀνομάτων πολὺ τὸ διάφορον τῶν σημαινομένων ἐνδεικνυμένη. διὸ καὶ τὰ τῶν μελῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὀνόματα παραπλησίως ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας τεταγμένα ζωῆς, ἣν ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν εἶναι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι. δάκτυλοι καὶ βραχίων καὶ χεὶρ ὀφθαλμός τε καὶ βλέφαρα καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ καρδία καὶ πόδες καὶ ὑποδήματα καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ἱππασίαι καὶ ἅρματα καὶ μυρία τοιαῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου πρὸς τὴν τῶν θείων δήλωσιν δι' αἰνίγματος ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς μετενήνεκται. ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως σημαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα κἂν ὡσαύτως ἐπί τε τῆς ἡμετέρας καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας λέγηται φύσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὑποκειμένων καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἔχει.
Ἄλλως γὰρ νοοῦμεν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τὴν γέννησιν καὶ ἄλλως περὶ τῆς θείας γεννήσεως στοχαζόμεθα. ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν χρόνῳ τίκτεται καὶ τόπος τις αὐτῷ πάντως τὴν ζωὴν ὑποδέχεται, ὧν ἄνευ συστῆναι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. διὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν τὰ χρονικὰ τμήματα περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζωὴν ἀναγκαίως εὑρίσκεται, τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ λέγω καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν περί τινος τῶν γεγενημένων ὅτι ποτὲ μὴ ὢν νῦν ἔστι, καὶ μέντοι καί ποτε πάλιν τοῦ εἶναι παύσεται: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς προαιωνίου γεννήσεως τὰ χρονικὰ ταῦτα νοήματα ἅτε μηδὲν ἔχοντα συγγενὲς πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν τοῖς νηφόντως λογιζομένοις οὐ συνεισέρχεται. τὸ γὰρ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ὅσα τὴν χρονικὴν ταύτην παράτασιν ἀποσημαίνει, διαβὰς ὁ τὴν θείαν ζωὴν λογιζόμενος ὑψηλῶς τὰ ὑψηλὰ κατασκέψεται, καὶ οὐχ ὅσα περὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην γέννησιν βλέπει, τούτοις νομίσει δουλεύειν καὶ τὴν ἀδέσποτον φύσιν. ἐνταῦθα πάθος προηγεῖται τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συστάσεως, καὶ σωματικαί τινες ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζῴου κατασκευὴν καταβάλλονται, καὶ ὑπόκειται κατὰ τὸ θεῖον βούλημα ἡ τὰ τοιαῦτα θαυματοποιοῦσα φύσις πανταχόθεν τὸ οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ κατάλληλον εἰς τὴν τοῦ γινομένου τελείωσιν ἐρανίζουσα, τῶν τε τοῦ κόσμου στοιχείων ὅσον ἱκανὸν ἀφ' ἑκάστου καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου συνεργίας τὸ μέτριον καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν διαπλασσόντων τὸ τικτόμενον τροφῆς, ὅσον οἰκεοῖν τῷ πλασσομένῳ γίνεται, καὶ συνελόντι φάναι διὰ πάντων χωροῦσα ἡ φύσις, δι' ὧν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ζωὴ τὴν κατασκευὴν ἔχει, οὕτως εἰς γέννησιν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἄγει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὂν γίνεσθαι λέγομεν, ὅτι τὸ ἔν τινι χρόνῳ μὴ ὂν ἐν ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἄρχεται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θείας γεννήσεως ἡ ἔννοια τήν τε τῆς φύσεως ὑπηρεσίαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τελείωσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γινομένου συνεισφοράν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα περὶ τὴν κάτω γέννησιν ὁ λόγος ἐθεώρησεν, οὐ προσίεται καὶ οὐδενὶ τῶν ταπεινῶν νοημάτων συνεμπεσεῖται ὁ μὴ σαρκικαῖς διανοίαις τῶν θείων μυστηρίων ἐπιβατεύων, ἀλλὰ ζητεῖ τινα διάνοιαν τῷ μεγαλείῳ τοῦ σημαινομένου πρέπουσαν: οὔτε γὰρ πάθος περὶ τὸν ἀπαθῆ νοήσει οὔτε συνεργίας φυσικῆς τὸν δημιουργὸν πάσης φύσεως ἐπιδεῖσθαι λογίσεται οὔτε χρονικὴν παράτασιν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς παραδέξεται, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων καθαρεύουσαν τὴν θείαν γέννησιν κατανοήσας μόνον τὸ μὴ ἀνάρχως εἶναι διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς σημασίας τὸν μονογενῆ δηλοῦσθαι συνθήσεται, ὡς τὴν αἰτίαν μὲν ἐκεῖθεν ἔχειν τοῦ εἶναι, ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς ὑποστάσεως μὴ λογίζεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαί τι σημεῖον τοῦ ζητουμένου κατανοῆσαι. τοῦ γὰρ προγενεστέρου καὶ τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων νοημάτων ἐν τοῖς χρονικοῖς διαστήμασιν εὑρισκομένων, ἐὰν ὑφέλῃς τῷ λόγῳ τὸν χρόνον, πάντα συνυφῄρηται τὰ τοιαῦτα σημεῖα καὶ συνυπεσπάσθη μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου.
Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ”ποτέ„ οὐ προσίεται ὁ πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων κατὰ τὸν ἄφραστον λόγον τῷ πατρὶ συνών, γεννητὸς μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ μήν ποτε τοῦ εἶναι ἄρχεται: οὔτε γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ οὔτε ἐν τόπῳ τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει. ἐξαιρεθέντος δὲ καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ παντὸς τοιούτου διανοήματος ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως, τὸ πρὸ ἐκείνου νοούμενον ὁ πατήρ ἐστι μόνος. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ὁ μονογενὴς ὤν, καθὼς αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνός φησι, τὴν τοῦ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι ὑπόνοιαν δέξασθαι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. εἰ μὲν γάρ ποτε οὐκ ἦν καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ἀναγκαίως τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνυπαρξίᾳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀϊδιότης ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω συναπεκόπτετο. εἰ δὲ ἀεί ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ, πῶς ὁ υἱός ποτε οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ χωρὶς τοῦ πατρὸς νοηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον ἀεὶ τῷ πατρὶ συνονομαζόμενος; ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς κλῆσις ἐπίσης τῶν δύο προσώπων ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἐπισημασίαν ἔχει, αὐτομάτως τῆς περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐννοίας τῇ φωνῇ ταύτῃ συνεισιούσης. πότε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱός; ἐν τίνι τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ κατελήφθη; ἐν τόπῳ; τόπος οὐκ ἦν: ἐν χρόνῳ; πρὸ χρόνων ὁ κύριος. εἰ οὖν πρὸ τούτων ἦν, πότε οὐκ ἦν; καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἦν, ἐν τίνι οὐκ ἦν, εἴπατε οἱ τὰ ἀθέατα βλέποντες. τί διὰ μέσου ὁ λογισμὸς ὑμῶν ἀνετυπώσατο; τί καινὸν τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἐνοήσατε ἢ πρᾶγμα ἢ νόημα, ὃ τῷ πατρὶ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον περισσοτέραν αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀποδείκνυσι;
Καὶ τί τοῦτο λέγω; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυρίως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὤν τις ἐγεννήθη. Λευῒς γὰρ πρὸ πολλῶν γενεῶν τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἑαυτοῦ γεννήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ Μελχισεδὲκ δεδεκάτωται: οὕτω γάρ φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ὅτι Λευῒς ὁ τὰς δεκάτας λαμβάνων δεδεκάτωται, καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπήγαγεν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ὀσφύϊ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ὅτε Ἀβραὰμ τῷ ἱερεῖ τοῦ ὑψίστου συνήντησεν. εἰ οὖν ἄνθρωπος τρόπον τινὰ ὢν γεννᾶται, κατὰ τὴν ἀποστολικὴν μαρτυρίαν διὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς οὐσίας ἐν τῷ γεγεννηκότι αὐτὸν προϋφεστώς, πῶς ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην τολμῶσι προφέρειν, ὅτι οὐκ ὢν ἐγεννήθη ὁ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὤν, καθώς φησιν ὁ κύριος: Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί, κατ' ἄλλην δηλαδὴ καὶ ἄλλην ἐπίνοιαν ἑκάτερος ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ εἶναι λεγόμενος, ὁ μὲν υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρί, ὡς τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνος κάλλος ἐν τῇ ἀρχετύπῳ μορφῇ, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ὡς ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πρωτότυπον κάλλος. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν χειροκμήτων εἰκόνων ὁ διὰ μέσου χρόνος τὴν μεταληφθεῖσαν μορφὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου πάντως διΐστησιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χωρίσαι τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, οὔτε τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὸν χαρακτῆρα οὔτε τῆς θείας δόξης τὸ ἀπαύγασμα οὔτε τῆς ἀγαθότητος τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλ' ὁ τούτων τι διανοηθεὶς συνημμένως καὶ τὸ μετ' αὐτοῦ νοούμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ συμπαρεδέξατο. ὢν γάρ, φησίν, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, ὤν, οὐχὶ γενόμενος, ὡς σαφῶς διὰ τούτου τὸ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῶν ὑπολήψεων ἀσεβὲς ἀποπέμψασθαι καὶ μήτε ἀγέννητον οἰηθῆναι τὸν μονογενῆ, διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς δόξης ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἡ δόξα: μήτε ὅτι ποτὲ τοῦ εἶναι ἤρξατο: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὢν μαρτυρία τὸ διηνεκὲς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ τὸ πάσης χρονικῆς σημασίας ὑπερκείμενον ἑρμηνεύει. ὥστε τίνα καιρὸν ἔχει τὴν μικροπρεπῆ ταύτην ἐρώτησιν ἐπὶ λύμῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων προφέρεσθαι, ἣν ὡς ἄμαχον ἡμῖν εἰς κατασκευὴν τοῦ οἰκείου προβάλλονται « δόγματος » διερωτῶντες εἰ ὁ ὢν γεννᾶται; πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν εὐθαρσῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ὢν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐγεννήθη, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν τοῦ εἶναι ἐκεῖθεν ἔχων (Ἐγὼ γάρ, φησί, ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα) τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτε. μὴ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ μεσιτεύοντος προστάγματος ἢ διανοήματος ἢ χρονικοῦ διαστήματος, ᾧ διακρίνεται καὶ διαχωρίζεται τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, οὐδὲν ἐπινοεῖται σημεῖον ἀφ' οὗ ὁ μονογενὴς τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς διαζευχθεὶς ἔκ τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἀρχῆς ἀναφαίνεται. εἰ οὖν οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἄλλη ἀρχή, ἥτις τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ζωῆς ἡγεμονεύει, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ὁ εὐσεβὴς λόγος τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ προθεωρεῖ ἀδιαστάτως, ὁ πατὴρ δὲ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀγέννητος, καθὼς καὶ ἡ τῶν ὑπεναντίων συνομολογεῖ μαρτυρία, πῶς ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαμβάνει ὁ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ἐνθεωρούμενος; τί δὲ βλάπτεται τῆς εὐσεβείας ὁ λόγος ἐκ τοῦ συντίθεσθαι ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων φωναῖς, ἃς ὡς ἀτόπους προτείνονται λέγοντες εἰ ὁ ὢν ἐγεννήθη; οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτό φαμεν, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ῥυπαρὰν τοῦ Νικοδήμου πρὸς τὸν κύριον ἐπαπόρησιν, καθ' ἣν ᾤετο μὴ εἶναι δυνατὸν ἐκεῖνος εἰς δευτέραν γέννησιν τὸν ὄντα ἐλθεῖν, οὕτως ὁ ὢν τὴν γέννησιν δέχεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ ἀνάρχως ὄντος ἐξημμένον ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχων καὶ τῷ τὰ πρεσβύτερα πολυπραγμονοῦντι συνανιὼν καὶ εἰς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης τοῦ νοῦ προλαμβάνων καὶ πάσαις ταῖς περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐννοίαις συγκεκραμένος, οὔτε τοῦ εἶναι ἄρχεται οὔτε ἀγέννητός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγεννήθη καὶ ἦν, τῷ μὲν τῆς αἰτίας λόγῳ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννησιν ὁμολογῶν, τῷ δὲ ἀϊδίῳ τῆς ζωῆς τὸ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι οὐ προσιέμενος.
Ἀλλ' ἀντιβαίνει τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ τὰ περισσὰ σοφιζόμενος καὶ διασχίζει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φύσεως τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν οὐσίαν, διότι ὁ μὲν γεγέννηται, ὁ δὲ ἀγέννητός ἐστι: καὶ τοσούτων ὄντων τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν εὐσεβῶς περιθεωρουμένων τῇ θείᾳ φύσει, ἐν οἷς οὐδεμία παραλλαγὴ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν καθορᾶται, πάντων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἀμφοτέροις ἐφαρμοζόντων, οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμνησθεὶς δι' ὧν τὸ κοινὸν γνωρίζεται, μόνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς ἀγεννησίας προσφύεται: καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτης τὴν συνήθη καὶ νενομισμένην ἔμφασιν δέχεται, ἀλλὰ καινοτομεῖ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν ἔννοιαν, τὰς κοινὰς περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης ὑπολήψεις παραγραφόμενος. τί ποτ' οὖν ἐστι τούτων τὸ αἴτιον; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ μεγάλης τινὸς αἰτίας τῆς μὲν συνήθους τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεως τὸν λόγον ἀφίστησι, ξενίζει δὲ τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῆς τῶν φωνῶν σημασίας. οἶδεν ἀκριβῶς ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς συνηθείας φυλαχθείη τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ χρῆσις, οὐδεμίαν ἰσχὺν εὑρήσει πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος δόγματος, εἰ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ νενομισμένων διανοημάτων παρακινηθείη τὰ ῥήματα, τῇ περὶ τὴν φωνὴν κακοτροπίᾳ ῥᾳδίως δύνασθαι συγκακουργήσειν τὰ δόγματα. οἷον (ἐπ' αὐτῶν γὰρ διέλθωμεν τῶν ἀδικουμένων ῥημάτων) εἰ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν δογμάτων ὑπόληψιν διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι ἀγέννητον λέγεσθαι τὸν θεὸν κατεδέξατο, διέπεσεν ἂν ὅλον αὐτοῖς τὸ μηχάνημα τῆς αἱρέσεως, ὑποσπασθέντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν σοφίσματος. εἰ γὰρ ἐπείσθη διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ταύτης καθ' ὁμοιότητα πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν θεοῦ συντελούντων ὥσπερ ἀόρατον καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀσώματον, οὕτω καὶ ἀγέννητον νοεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων θεόν, δι' ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ μηδαμῶς προσὸν τῷ θεῷ σημαίνεσθαι συντιθέμενος, μὴ σῶμα μὴ πάθος μὴ χρῶμα μὴ τὸ ἐξ αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ὑπέλαβεν, οὐδεμίαν ἔσχεν ἂν δύναμιν ὁ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος λόγος αὐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσιν, ὅσα περὶ τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν θεωρεῖται, συγχωρούντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τῷ μονογενεῖ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τὸ ὅμοιον.
Ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο γένηται, πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάτων, τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν λέγω τῆς ὑπερκειμένης δυνάμεως, προτίθησι τὸ τῆς ἀγεννησίας ὄνομα καὶ τοῦτο πεποίηται τῆς κατὰ τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῶν καταδρομῆς ὁρμητήριον, τὴν τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον κατὰ τὴν προφορὰν ἐναντίωσιν ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσωπα μεταφέρων, οἷς ἐφήρμοσται τὰ ὀνόματα: καὶ διὰ τούτων τὴν ἑτερότητα τῶν οὐσιῶν τῷ παρηλλαγμένῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων σοφίζεται, οὐκ ἐπειδὴ γεγέννηται γεννητόν, οὐδ' ὅτι μὴ γεννηθεὶς ἔστιν ἀγέννητον λέγεσθαι συντιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐκ τῆς « ἀγεννησίας τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῆς » γεννήσεως οὐσιῶσθαι λέγων, οὐκ οἶδα ποίας αὐτὸν σοφίας ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην σύνεσιν χειραγωγούσης. εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὰς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καταμάθοι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰς ἐμφάσεις, ὑφελὼν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πρόσωπα ἐφ' ὧν τετάχθαι δοκεῖ τὰ ὀνόματα, εὑρήσει τὸ μάταιον τῆς διανοίας τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων. μὴ γὰρ ὅτι προεπινοεῖται τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁ πατὴρ κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον τῆς πίστεως, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων τάξιν ἀξιούτω τις τῇ τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς προσώπων ἀξίᾳ καὶ τάξει συνδιατίθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ σκοπείτω ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τὰ ὀνόματα, ποῖον τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπινοίας προτέτακται (τὸ ὄνομα πάλιν φημί, οὐ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος σημαινόμενον), ποῖον τῶν εἰρημένων θέσιν τινὸς νοήματος καὶ ποῖον τὴν τοῦ τεθέντος ἀναίρεσιν ἐνδείκνυται: οἷον (σαφηνείας γὰρ ἕνεκεν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων οἶμαι χρῆναι παραστῆσαι τὸν λόγον) παίδευσις καὶ ἀπαιδευσία ὀργὴ καὶ ἀοργησία πάθος καὶ ἀπάθεια καὶ ὅσα τοῦ τοιούτου εἴδους ἐστί, ποῖα τούτων τὸ προεπινοεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει; ὅσα τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ τεθέντος ἢ ὅσα τὴν θέσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου παρίστησιν; ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτό φημι. πρότερον γὰρ νοεῖται ἡ παίδευσις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὸ πάθος, καὶ τότε ἡ τῶν νοηθέντων ἀναίρεσις. οὕτω καὶ ἡ γέννησις καὶ ἡ ἀγεννησία. καὶ μηδεὶς διὰ τῆς ἐθελοθρησκείας διαβαλλέτω τὸν λόγον ὡς προτιθέντα τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ γεννήσαντος. οὐ γὰρ τὸν υἱὸν προτετάχθαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ προεπινοεῖσθαι κατασκευάζομεν, εἰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ ἀγεννήτου σημασίας διαλαμβάνει ὁ λόγος. οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν γέννησίς τινος πράγματος ἢ νοήματος θέσιν ἀποσημαίνει, ἡ δὲ ἀγεννησία τὴν τοῦ τεθέντος, καθὼς εἶπον, ἀναίρεσιν: ὥστε παντὶ τρόπῳ προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ τῆς ἀγεννησίας ὀνόματος τὸ τῆς γεννήσεως ὄνομα. τί οὖν ἐν τούτοις οἰκεῖον τῷ πατρὶ τὸ τῇ τάξει δεύτερον ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐφαρμόζειν βιάζονται, καὶ οἴονται τό τινος ἀφαιρετικὸν νόημα δεικτικὸν καὶ περιληπτικὸν εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίας, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας τὴν σαθρότητα τῶν λόγων ἀγανακτοῦσι καὶ παροξύνονται;