Book IX.
§1. The ninth book declares that Eunomius’ account of the Nature of God is, up to a certain point, well stated. Then in succession he mixes up with his own argument, on account of its affinity, the expression from Philo’s writings, “God is before all other things, which are generated,” adding also the expression, “He has dominion over His own power.” Detesting the excessive absurdity, Gregory strikingly confutes it852 Oehler’s punctuation here seems faulty. This section of the analysis is so confused that it cannot well be literally translated. In the version given above the general sense rather than the precise grammatical construction has been followed.
But he now turns to loftier language, and elevating himself and puffing himself up with empty conceit, he takes in hand to say something worthy of God’s majesty. “For God,” he says, “being the most highly exalted of all goods, and the mightiest of all, and free from all necessity—” Nobly does the gallant man bring his discourse, like some ship without ballast, driven unguided by the waves of deceit, into the harbour of truth! “God is the most highly exalted of all goods.” Splendid acknowledgment! I suppose he will not bring a charge of unconstitutional conduct against the great John, by whom, in his lofty proclamation, the Only-begotten is declared to be God, Who was with God and was God853 S. John i. 1. If he, then, the proclaimer of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, is worthy of credit, and if “God is the most highly exalted of all goods,” it follows that the Son is alleged by the enemies of His glory, to be “the most highly exalted of all goods.” And as this phrase is also applied to the Father, the superlative force of “most highly exalted” admits of no diminution or addition by way of comparison. But, now that we have obtained from the adversary’s testimony these statements for the proof of the glory of the Only-begotten, we must add in support of sound doctrine his next statement too. He says, “God, the most highly exalted of all goods, being without hindrance from nature, or constraint from cause, or impulse from need, begets and creates according to the supremacy of His own authority, having His will as power sufficient for the constitution of the things produced. If, then, all good is according to His will, He not only determines that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good, if, that is to say, as one may assume, it is an indication of weakness to make what one does not will854 This quotation would appear from what follows not to be a consecutive extract, but one made “omissis omittendis.”.” We shall borrow so far as this, for the confirmation of the orthodox doctrines, from our adversaries’ statement, percolated as that statement is by vile and counterfeit clauses. Yes, He Who has, by the supremacy of His authority, power in His will that suffices for the constitution of the things that are made, He Who created all things without hindrance from nature or compulsion from cause, does determine not only that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good. But He Who made all things is, as the gospel proclaims, the Only-begotten God. He, at that time when He willed it, did make the creation; at that time, by means of the circumambient essence, He surrounded with the body of heaven all that universe that is shut off within its compass: at that time, when He thought it well that this should be, He displayed the dry land to view, He enclosed the waters in their hollow places; vegetation, fruits, the generation of animals, the formation of man, appeared at that time when each of these things seemed expedient to the wisdom of the Creator:—and He Who made all these things (I will once more repeat my statement) is the Only-begotten God Who made the ages. For if the interval of the ages has preceded existing things, it is proper to employ the temporal adverb, and to say “He then willed” and “He then made”: but since the age was not, since no conception of interval is present to our minds in regard to that Divine Nature which is not measured by quantity or by interval, the force of temporal expressions must surely be void. Thus to say that the creation has had given to it a beginning in time, according to the good pleasure of the wisdom of Him Who made all things, does not go beyond probability: but to regard the Divine Nature itself as being in a kind of extension measured by intervals, belongs only to those who have been trained in the new wisdom. What a point is this, embedded in his words, which I intentionally passed by in my eagerness to reach the subject! I will now resume it, and read it to show our author’s cleverness.
“For He Who is most highly exalted in God Himself855 This seems to be the force of the phrase if we are to follow Oehler’s mss. and read ὁ γὰρ ἐξοχώτατος αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. The αὐτὸς θεὸς of the earlier editions gives a simpler sense. The phrase as read by Oehler certainly savours more of Philo than of Eunomius: but it is worth noting that S. Gregory does not dwell upon this part of the clause as being borrowed from Philo (though he may intend to include it in the general statement), but upon what follows it: and from his citation from Philo it would seem that the latter spoke (not of ὁ ἐξοχώτατος θεοῦ but) of ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γεννητά. before all other things that are generated,” he says, “has dominion over His own power.” The phrase has been transferred by our pamphleteer word for word from the Hebrew Philo to his own argument, and Eunomius’ theft will be proved by Philo’s works themselves to any one who cares about it. I note the fact, however, at present, not so much to reproach our speech-monger with the poverty of his own arguments and thoughts, as with the intention of showing to my readers the close relationship between the doctrine of Eunomius and the reasoning of the Jews. For this phrase of Philo would not have fitted word for word into his argument had there not been a sort of kindred between the intention of the one and the other. In the Hebrew author you may find the phrase in this form: “God, before all other things that are generated”; and what follows, “has dominion over His own power,” is an addition of the new Judaism. But what an absurdity this involves an examination of the saying will clearly show. “God,” he says, “has dominion over His own power.” Tell me, what is He? over what has He dominion? Is He something else than His own power, and Lord of a power that is something else than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of power. For that which is something else than power is surely not power, and thus He is found to have dominion over power just in so far as He is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in Himself, and has dominion over the one by the other. And what contest or schism is there, that God should divide the power that exists in Himself, and overthrow one section of His power by the other. I suppose He could not have dominion over His own power without the assistance to that end of some greater and more violent power! Such is Eunomius’ God: a being with double nature, or composite, dividing Himself against Himself, having one power out of harmony with another, so that by one He is urged to disorder, and by the other restrains this discordant motion. Again, with what intent does He dominate the power that urges on to generation? lest some evil should arise if generation be not hindered? or rather let him explain this in the first place,—what is that which is naturally under dominion? His language points to some movement of impulse and choice, considered separately and independently. For that which dominates must needs be one thing, that which is dominated another. Now God “has dominion over His power”—and this is—what? a self-determining nature? or something else than this, pressing on to disquiet, or remaining in a state of quiescence? Well, if he supposes it to be quiescent, that which is tranquil needs no one to have dominion over it: and if he says “He has dominion,” He “has dominion” clearly over something which impels and is in motion: and this, I presume he will say, is something naturally different from Him Who rules it. What then, let him tell us, does he understand in this idea? Is it something else besides God, considered as having an independent existence? How can another existence be in God? Or is it some condition in the Divine Nature considered as having an existence not its own? I hardly think he would say so: for that which has no existence of its own is not: and that which is not, is neither under dominion, nor set free from it. What then is that power which was under dominion, and was restrained in respect of its own activity, while the due time of the generation of Christ was still about to come, and to set this power free to proceed to its natural operation? What was the intervening cause of delay, for which God deferred the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it good as yet to become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as intervening between the life of the Father and that of the Son, that is not time nor space, nor any idea of extension, nor any like thing? To what purpose is it that this keen and clear-sighted eye marks and beholds the separation of the life of God in regard to the life of the Son? When he is driven in all directions he is himself forced to admit that the interval does not exist at all.
Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑψηλοτέρους μετέρχεται λόγους καὶ μετεωρίσας ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὀγκώσας ἐν διακένῳ φυσήματι λέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μεγαλοπρεπείας ἐπάξιον. ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. « θεὸς γὰρ ὤν », φησί, « τὸ πάντων ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ πάσης ἀνάγκης ἐλεύθερον ». καλῶς ὁ γεννάδας καθάπερ τι πλοῖον ἀνερμάτιστον αὐτομάτως ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ἀπάτης κυμάτων τῷ λιμένι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐγκαθορμίζει τὸν λόγον. « πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐξοχώτατόν » ἐστιν ὁ θεός. ὑπέρευγε τῆς ὁμολογίας. πάντως δὲ τὸν μέγαν Ἰωάννην οὐκ ἂν γράψαιτο παρανόμων γραφήν, παρ' οὗ θεὸς ὁ μονογενὴς ἐν ὑψηλῷ τῷ κηρύγματι διαγγέλλεται ὁ καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὢν καὶ θεὸς ὤν. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀξιόπιστος τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς θεότητος κήρυξ ἐκεῖνος, « ὁ δὲ θεὸς τὸ ἐξοχώτατόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν », ὁ υἱὸς ἄρα τὸ ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ μεμαρτύρηται. τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἁρμοζούσης, τὸ ὑπερθετικὸν τῆς τοῦ ἐξοχωτάτου ἐμφάσεως οὐδεμίαν ἐκ συγκρίσεως παραδέχεται μείωσιν ἢ ὑπέρθεσιν. τούτων δὲ ἡμῖν παρὰ τῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν μαρτυρίας πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς δόξης παρειλημμένων, προσθετέον εἰς συμμαχίαν τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος λόγου καὶ τὸν ἐφεξῆς αὐτοῦ λόγον. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι « τὸ ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθόν, ὁ θεός, ἅτε μήτε φύσεως ἐμποδιζούσης μήτε αἰτίας ἀναγκαζούσης μήτε χρείας κατεπειγούσης, γεννᾷ τε καὶ δημιουργεῖ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας ὑπεροχὴν τὴν βούλησιν ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχων δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν γινομένων σύστασιν. εἰ τοίνυν πᾶν καλὸν κατὰ τὴν τούτου βούλησιν, οὐ μόνον τὸ γενόμενον ὁρίζει καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε γενέσθαι καλόν, εἴπερ ἄρα ἀσθενείας τὸ ποιεῖν ὃ μὴ βούλεται ». μέχρι τούτου παραληπτέος ἡμῖν πρὸς σύστασιν τῶν εὐσεβῶν δογμάτων ὁ ἐκ ῥυπαρῶν τε καὶ παρακεκομμένων λεξειδίων † διαπεπορπημένος τῶν ἐναντίων λόγος. ὁ γὰρ « κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας ὑπεροχὴν τὴν βούλησιν ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχων δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν γινομένων σύστασιν », ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας « μήτε φύσεως ἐμποδιζούσης μήτε αἰτίας ἀναγκαζούσης, οὐ μόνον τὸ γενόμενον ὁρίζει καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε γενέσθαι καλόν ». ὁ δὲ πάντα ποιῶν ὁ μονογενής ἐστι θεός, καθὼς κηρύσσει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. οὗτος ὅτε ἠθέλησε, τότε καὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἐποίησεν, τότε περιέσχε τῷ οὐρανίῳ σώματι διὰ τῆς κυκλοφορουμένης οὐσίας πάντα τὸν ἐντὸς τοῦ σχήματος ἀπειλημμένον κόσμον: ὅτε καλῶς ἔχειν ᾠήθη τοῦτο γενέσθαι, τότε ἀνέδειξε τὴν ξηράν, τότε τὰ ὕδατα τοῖς κοίλοις ἐγκατέκλεισε χώροις: τότε βλαστήματα, τότε καρποί, τότε ζῴων γένεσις, τότε ἀνθρώπου πλάσις, ὅτε τούτων ἕκαστον εὔκαιρον ἐδόκει τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ κτίσαντος. ὁ δὲ τὰ πάντα ποιήσας (πάλιν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπαναλήψομαι λόγον) ὁ μονογενής ἐστι θεὸς ὁ τοὺς αἰῶνας ποιήσας. τοῦ γὰρ διαστήματος τῶν αἰώνων προκαταβεβλημένου τῶν ὄντων, εὔκαιρόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν τὸ χρονικὸν τοῦτο ἐπίρρημα, ὅτι « τότε » ἐβουλήθη καὶ « τότε » ἐποίησεν. αἰῶνος δὲ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδέ τινος διαστηματικῆς ἐννοίας περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν τὴν ἄποσόν τε καὶ ἀδιάστατον θεωρουμένης, ἀργεῖν ἀνάγκη πάντως τὰς τῶν χρονικῶν ἐπιρρημάτων ἐμφάσεις. ὥστε τῇ μὲν κτίσει τὴν χρονικὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσαν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ τὰ πάντα πεποιηκότος δεδόσθαι λέγειν οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἐστίν: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐν παρατάσει τινὶ διαστηματικῇ θεωρεῖν μόνων τῶν τὴν νέαν σοφίαν πεπαιδευμένων ἐστίν. οἷον γὰρ κἀκεῖνο τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐγκείμενον ὑπερέβην ἑκών, πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον σπεύδων, ὃ νῦν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀγχινοίας τοῦ λογογράφου ἐπαναλαβὼν ἀναγνώσομαι.
« Ὁ » γὰρ « ἐξοχώτατος » αὐτοῦ « θεὸς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων », φησίν, « ὅσα γεννητά, τῆς αὑτοῦ κρατεῖ δυνάμεως ». ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως ἀπὸ τοῦ Φίλωνος τοῦ Ἑβραίου μετενήνεκται παρὰ τοῦ λογογράφου ἐπὶ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, καὶ ὅτῳ φίλον, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πεπονημένων τῷ Φίλωνι κατάφωρος ἡ κλοπὴ τοῦ Εὐνομίου γενήσεται. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο παρεσημηνάμην ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐ τοσοῦτον τὴν πτωχείαν τῶν ἰδίων λόγων τε καὶ νοημάτων τῷ λογογράφῳ ἐπονειδίζων, ὅσον δεῖξαι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι θέλων τὴν οἰκειότητα πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίων λόγους τῶν Εὐνομίου δογμάτων. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως τοῖς τούτου νοήμασιν ὁ τοῦ Φίλωνος ἐνηρμόσθη λόγος, εἰ μή τις ἦν καὶ τῆς διανοίας τούτου πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου συγγένεια. οὕτω γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν κείμενον παρὰ τῷ Ἑβραίῳ τὸν λόγον τὸ « ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γεννητά », τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἰουδαϊκῆς προσερρίφη τὸ « τῆς ἰδίας κατακρατεῖ δυνάμεως ». τοῦτο δὲ ὅσην τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἔχει, δείξει σαφῶς ὁ λόγος ἐξεταζόμενος. « ὁ θεός », φησί, « κρατεῖ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως ». τί ὤν, εἰπέ μοι, τίνος κρατεῖ; ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν ὢν αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι οὔσης κατακρατεῖ τῆς δυνάμεως; οὐκοῦν ἡττᾶται τῆς ἀδυναμίας ἡ δύναμις. τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν ὂν δύναμις πάντως οὐκ ἔστιν: καὶ οὕτως εὑρίσκεται καθὸ δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν, κατ' ἐκεῖνο κρατῶν τῆς δυνάμεως. ἀλλὰ δύναμις ὢν ὁ θεὸς πάλιν ἄλλην ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ ταύτῃ κατακρατεῖ τῆς ἑτέρας. καὶ τίς ἡ μάχη καὶ ἡ διάστασις, ὥστε μερίσαντα τὸν θεὸν τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ τμήματι τῆς δυνάμεως καταπαλαίειν τὸ ἕτερον; οὐ γὰρ ἂν κρατήσειε τῆς δυνάμεως ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ συμμαχούσης αὐτῷ πρὸς τοῦτο μείζονός τινος καὶ βιαιοτέρας δυνάμεως. τοιοῦτος ὁ Εὐνομίου θεός, διφυής τις ἢ πολυσύνθετος, αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μεριζόμενος, ἀσύμφωνον ἔχων τῇ δυνάμει τὴν δύναμιν, ὡς ταύτῃ μὲν πρὸς ἀταξίαν ἐκφέρεσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἑτέρᾳ κωλύειν τὸ πλημμελὲς τῆς κινήσεως. τί δὲ καὶ βουλόμενος κρατεῖ πρὸς γέννησιν ὁρμῶσαν τὴν δύναμιν, μὴ τί γένηται κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κωλυθῆναι τὴν γέννησιν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸ τούτου τί τῇ φύσει τὸ κρατούμενόν ἐστιν, ἑρμηνευσάτω. τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον ὁρμητικήν τινα καὶ προαιρετικὴν ὑποδείκνυσι κίνησιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἰδιαζόντως θεωρουμένην. ἄλλο γάρ τι τὸ κρατοῦν καὶ ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ τὸ κρατούμενον. κρατεῖ τοίνυν ὁ θεὸς τῆς δυνάμεως τί οὔσης, αὐτοπροαιρέτου τινὸς φύσεως ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τοῦτο; ὁρμώσης πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἀτρεμούσης; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν ὑποτίθεται, τὸ ἡσυχάζον τοῦ κρατοῦντος οὐκ ἐπιδέεται: εἰ δὲ κρατεῖν φησι, δηλονότι κινουμένου τε καὶ ὁρμῶντος κρατεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλο τι τῇ φύσει παρὰ τὸν ἐπικρατοῦντα πάντως ἐρεῖ. τί οὖν νοεῖ τοῦτο, φανερωσάτω τῷ λόγῳ. ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἐν ὑποστάσει θεωρούμενον; καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀλλότριον; ἢ ἕξιν τινὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνυπόστατον ἐν τῇ θείᾳ φύσει θεωρουμένην; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τοῦτο. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑφεστὼς οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὔτε κρατεῖται οὔτε ἀφίεται. τίς οὖν ἡ κρατουμένη δύναμις ἐκείνη καὶ κωλυομένη πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐνέργειαν, ἕως ἔμελλεν ὁ καιρὸς τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ γεννήσεως ἐπιστὰς ἀκώλυτον ἀφιέναι τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν φέρεσθαι; τίς δὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς ἀναβολῆς αἰτία, δι' ἣν ὁ θεὸς τὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑπερέθετο γέννησιν, οὔπω καλὸν εἶναι οἰόμενος τὸ γενέσθαι πατήρ; τί δὲ τὸ μέσον τοῦτο ὃ μεταξὺ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ζωῆς παρενείρεται; οὐ χρόνος, οὐ τόπος, οὐ διαστηματικόν τι νόημα, οὐκ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. πρὸς τί τοίνυν ὁ ὀξὺς καὶ διορατικὸς ὀφθαλμὸς ἀτενίζων ἐνορᾷ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ζωὴν τὴν διάστασιν; ἀλλὰ πανταχόθεν συνελαυνόμενος οὐδὲν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης συντίθεται.