§2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not according to the phrase of Eunomius, “The Father begat Him at that time when He chose, and not before:” but that the Son, being the fulness of all that is good and excellent, is always contemplated in the Father; using for this demonstration the support of Eunomius’ own arguments.

However, though there is no interval between them, he does not admit that their communion is immediate and intimate, but condescends to the measure of our knowledge, and converses with us in human phrase as one of ourselves, himself quietly confessing the impotence of reasoning and taking refuge in a line of argument that was never taught by Aristotle and his school. He says, “It was good and proper that He should beget His Son at that time when He willed: and in the minds of sensible men there does not hence arise any questioning why He did not do so before.” What does this mean, Eunomius? Are you too going afoot like us unlettered men? are you leaving your artistic periods and actually taking refuge in unreasoning assent? you, who so much reproached those who take in hand to write without logical skill? You, who say to Basil, “You show your own ignorance when you say that definitions of the terms that express things spiritual are an impossibility for men,” who again elsewhere advance the same charge, “you make your own impotence common to others, when you declare that what is not possible for you is impossible for all”? Is this the way that you, who say such things as these, approach the ears of him who questions about the reason why the Father defers becoming the Father of such a Son? Do you think it an adequate explanation to say, “He begat Him at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on this point”? Has your apprehensive fancy grown so feeble in the maintenance of your doctrines? What has become of your premises that lead to dilemmas? What has become of your forcible proofs? how comes it that those terrible and inevitable syllogistic conclusions of your art have dissolved into vanity and nothingness? “He begat the Son at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on this point!” Is this the finished product of your many labours, of your voluminous undertakings? What was the question asked? “If it is good and fitting for God to have such a Son, why are we not to believe that the good is always present with Him856    To make the grammar of the sentence exact τὴν should here be substituted for τὸν, the object of the verb being apparently γέννησιν not λόγον. The whole section of the analysis is rather confused, and does not clearly reproduce S. Gregory’s division of the subject. A large part of this section, and of that which follows it, is repeated with very slight alteration from Bk. II. §9 (see pp. 113–115 above). The resemblances are much closer in the Greek text than they appear in the present translation, in which different hands have been at work in the two books.    Cf. S. Basil adv. Eun. II. 12, quoted above, p. 207.    S. John x. 9?” What is the answer he makes to us from the very shrine of his philosophy, tightening the bonds of his argument by inevitable necessity? “He made the Son at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning as to why He did not do so before.” Why, if the inquiry before us were concerning some irrational being, that acts by natural impulse, why it did not sooner do whatever it may be,—why the spider did not make her webs, or the bee her honey, or the turtle-dove her nest,—what else could you have said? would not the same answer have been ready—“She did it at that time when she chose: let there be no questioning on this matter”? Nay, if it were concerning some sculptor or painter who works in paintings or in sculptures by his imitative art, whatever it may be (supposing that he exercises his art without being subject to any authority), I imagine that such an answer would meet the case of any one who wished to know why he did not exercise his art sooner,—that, being under no necessity, he made his own choice the occasion of his operation. For men, because they do not always wish the same things857    i.e.S. Basil.    Reading ταὐτὰ for ταῦτα, which appears in the text of Oehler as well as in the earlier editions.    Reading εἴπωμεν, for which Oehler’s text substitutes εἴπομεν, and commonly have not power co-operating with their will, do something which seems good to them at that time when their choice inclines to the work, and they have no external hindrance. But that nature which is always the same, to which no good is adventitious, in which all that variety of plans which arises by way of opposition, from error or from ignorance, has no place, to which there comes nothing as a result of change, which was not with it before, and by which nothing is chosen afterwards which it had not from the beginning regarded as good,—to say of this nature that it does not always possess what is good, but afterwards chooses to have something which it did not choose before,—this belongs to wisdom that surpasses us. For we were taught that the Divine. Nature is at all times full of all good, or rather is itself the fulness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for its perfecting, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of good. Now that which is perfect is equally remote from addition and from diminution; and therefore, we say that perfection of goods which we behold in the Divine Nature always remains the same, as, in whatsoever direction we extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to be such as it is. The Divine Nature, then, is never void of good: but the Son is the fulness of all good: and accordingly He is at all times contemplated in that Father Whose Nature is perfection in all good. But he says, “let there be no questioning about this point, why He did not do so before:” and we shall answer him,—“It is one thing, most sapient sir, to lay down as an ordinance some proposition that you happen to approve858    ἀνωτάτω may be “supreme,” in the sense of “ultimate” or “most remote,” or in the more ordinary sense of “most exalted.”    Reading τι τῶν κατὰ γνωμὴν, for τι τῶν καταγνωμῶν, which is the reading of the editions, but introduces a word otherwise apparently unknown.    S. John i. 18, and another to make converts by reasoning on the points of controversy. So long, therefore, as you cannot assign any reason why we may piously say that the Son was “afterwards” begotten by the Father, your ordinances will be of no effect with sensible men.”

Thus it is then that Eunomius brings the truth to light for us as the result of his scientific attack. And we for our part shall apply his argument, as we are wont to do, for the establishment of the true doctrine, so that even by this passage it may be clear that at every point, constrained against their will, they advocate our view. For if, as our opponent says, “He begat the Son at that time when He chose,” and if He always chose that which is good, and His power coincided with His choice, it follows that the Son will be considered as always with the Father, Who always both chooses that which is excellent, and is able to possess what He chooses. And if we are to reduce his next words also to truth, it is easy for us to adapt them also to the doctrine we hold:—“Let there be no questioning among sensible men on this point, why He did not do so before”—for the word “before” has a temporal sense, opposed to what is “afterwards” and “later”: but on the supposition that time does not exist, the terms expressing temporal interval are surely abolished with it. Now the Lord was before times and before ages: questioning as to “before” or “after” concerning the Maker of the ages is useless in the eyes of reasonable men: for words of this class are devoid of all meaning, if they are not used in reference to time. Since then the Lord is antecedent to times, the words “before” and “after” have no place as applied to Him. This may perhaps be sufficient to refute arguments that need no one to overthrow them, but fall by their own feebleness. For who is there with so much leisure that he can give himself up to such an extent to listen to the arguments on the other side, and to our contention against the silly stuff? Since, however, in men prejudiced by impiety, deceit is like some ingrained dye, hard to wash out, and deeply burned in upon their hearts, let us spend yet a little time upon our argument, if haply we may be able to cleanse their souls from this evil stain. After the utterances that I have quoted, and after adding to them, in the manner of his teacher Prunicus,859    i.e.S. Basil.    So in Book I. πρῶτον μὲν τῆς Προυνίκου σοφίας γίνεται μαθητὴς, and Book XIII. p. 844 (Paris Edit.). It may be questioned whether the phrase in Books I. and XIII., and that here, refers to a supposed connection of Eunomius with Gnosticism. The Προύνικος Σοφία of the Gnostics was a “male-female,” and hence the masculine τὸν παιδεύτην might properly be applied to it. If this point were cleared up, we might be more certain of the meaning to be attached to the word ὀκτάδας, which is also possibly borrowed from the Gnostic phraseology, being akin to the form ὀγδοάδας. [On the Gnostic conception of “Prunicus,” see the note on the subject in Harvey’s Irenæus (vol. I. p. 225), and Smith and Wace’s Dict. Chr. Biogr. s.v. On the Gnostic Ogdoads, see Mansel’s Gnostic Heresies, pp. 152 sqq., 170 sqq., and the articles on Basilides and Valentinus in Dict. Chr. Biogr.]    1 Tim. vi. 16. some unconnected and ill-arranged octads of insolence and abuse, he comes to the crowning point of his arguments, and, leaving the illogical exposition of his folly, arms his discourse once more with the weapons of dialectic, and maintains his absurdity against us, as he imagines, syllogistically.

μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ μεσιτεύοντος, ἄμεσον καὶ συναφῆ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι οὐ καταδέχεται;
Ἀλλ' ὑποκαταβαίνει πρὸς τὰ ἡμέτερα τῆς γνώσεως μέτρα καὶ ἀνθρωπικῶς ἡμῖν ὡς εἷς ἡμῶν καὶ αὐτὸς διαλέγεται ὑφομολογῶν ἠρέμα τῶν λογισμῶν τὴν ἀσθένειαν καὶ καταφεύγων ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐδίδαξαν. « τότε γάρ », φησί, « καλὸν καὶ πρέπον γεννῆσαι τὸν υἱόν, ὅτε ἐβούλετο, μηδεμιᾶς ἐκ τούτου ζητήσεως ἐγγινομένης τοῖς σώφροσιν τοῦ διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον ». τί ταῦτα, Εὐνόμιε; καὶ σὺ πεζεύεις κατὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς καὶ καταλιπὼν τὰς τεχνικὰς περιόδους ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλογον συγκατάθεσιν καὶ αὐτὸς καταφεύγεις ὁ πολλὰ τοῖς ἄνευ λογικῆς ἐντρεχείας ἐπιχειροῦσι τῷ γράφειν ἐπονειδίσας, ὁ πρὸς Βασίλειον λέγων ὅτι « δι' ὧν ἀδύνατον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἶναι λέγεις τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πνευματικῶν λόγων εὐθύνας, τὴν ἰδίαν ἐλέγχεις ἄγνοιαν », καὶ πάλιν ἑτέρωθι τὸ ἴσον προφέρων ὅτι « τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσθένειαν κοινοποιεῖς, τὸ σοὶ » μὴ « δυνατὸν πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον ἀποφαινόμενος »; ὁ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγων οὕτω προσάγεις τὴν ἀκοὴν τοῦ ἐπιζητοῦντος τὴν αἰτίαν καθ' ἣν ἀναβάλλεται τοιούτου γενέσθαι πατὴρ ὁ πατήρ; ἀρκεῖν οἴει πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τότε ἐγέννησεν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζήτησις; οὕτως σοι πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν δογμάτων ἠσθένησεν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία; ποῦ αἱ διλήμματοι προτάσεις; ποῦ αἱ βίαιοι κατασκευαί; πῶς σοι φροῦδα καὶ ἀνυπόστατα διαρρυέντα τῆς τέχνης οἴχεται τὰ φοβερά τε καὶ ἄφυκτα τῶν συλλογισμῶν συμπεράσματα; « τότε ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱὸν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζήτησις ». ταῦτα τῶν πολλῶν ἱδρώτων, ταῦτα τῶν ὑπερόγκων ἐπαγγελμάτων « τὰ » ἀποτελέσματα; τί τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν; εἰ καλὸν καὶ πρέπον θεῷ τοιοῦτον ἔχειν υἱόν, διὰ τί μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι πιστεύεται; τίς ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἣν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀδύτων τῆς φιλοσοφίας πεποίηται, ταῖς ἀλύτοις ἀνάγκαις διασφίγξας τὸν λόγον; τότε ἐποίησε τὸν υἱὸν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, μηδεμία δὲ περὶ τούτου ζήτησις ἔστω, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον. εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων τινὸς ἡ σκέψις προέκειτο τῶν κατά τινα φυσικὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνεργούντων, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον τὸ δοκοῦν κατειργάσατο ἢ ὁ ἀράχνης τὰ νήματα ἢ τὸ κηρίον ἡ μέλιττα ἢ τὴν καλιὰν ἡ τρυγών, τί ἂν ἕτερον εἰπεῖν ἔσχες; ἢ οὐκ αὐτὴ πρόχειρος ἂν ἦν ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὅτι τότε ἐποίησεν ὅτε ἐβούλετο, καὶ μηδεμία ἔστω περὶ τούτου ζήτησις; ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλάστου τινὸς ἢ ζωγράφου τὸ δοκοῦν διὰ τῆς μιμητικῆς ἐνεργοῦντος τέχνης ἢ ἐν γραφαῖς ἢ ἐν πλάσμασιν, ὅταν μὴ ὑποχείριος ὢν ἐξουσίᾳ τινὶ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἄγῃ τὴν τέχνην, ἁρμόζειν οἶμαι τὴν τοιαύτην φωνὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ μαθεῖν ἐθέλοντος, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον ἐνεργὸν τὴν τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων ἀνάγκην καιρὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας πεποίηται τὴν προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωποι γὰρ διὰ τὸ μήτε ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ βούλεσθαι μήτε συνεργοῦσαν ἔχειν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν τότε ποιοῦσί τι τῶν κατὰ γνώμην, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἥ τε προαίρεσις πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ῥέψῃ καὶ μηδὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν. τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ᾧ ἐπίκτητον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν οὐδέν, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα διαφορὰ βουλευμάτων ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κατά τινα πλάνην καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἐγγινομένη χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, ὃ οὐδὲν ἐκ μεταβολῆς γίνεται ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, μηδὲ αἱρεῖταί τι μετὰ ταῦτα ὃ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς ἀγαθὸν κατενόησε_περὶ τούτου λέγειν μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἑλέσθαι τι ἔχειν ὃ μὴ πρότερον εἵλετο, ταῦτα τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἡμᾶς σοφίας ἐστίν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐμάθομεν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀεὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ πλῆρές ἐστιν, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι τὸ πλήρωμα « ἀ »εὶ καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς προσθήκης εἰς τελείωσιν δέεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τελειότης ἐστί: τὸ δὲ τέλειον ἐπίσης αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ μειώσεως ἠλλοτρίωται: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἐπιθεωρουμένην τῇ θείᾳ φύσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν τελειότητα πάντοτέ φαμεν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθ' ὅπερ ἂν τὴν διάνοιαν ἑαυτῶν ἐπεκτείνωμεν, ἐκεῖ τοιαύτην καταλαμβάνοντες. οὐκοῦν οὐδέποτε κενὸν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ θεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοῦ παντὸς πλήρωμα ὁ υἱός: πάντοτε ἄρα ἐν τῷ πατρὶ θεωρεῖται, ᾧ φύσις ἡ ἐν παντὶ ἀγαθῷ τελειότης. ἀλλά, φησί, μηδεμία ἔστω ζήτησις, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον. πρὸς ὃν ἐροῦμεν ἡμεῖς ὅτι ἄλλο ἐστίν, ὦ σοφώτατε, « τὸ » νομοθετεῖν τι τῶν κατὰ γνώμην ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος καὶ ἕτερον τὸ λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἀμφιβαλλομένων προσάγεσθαι. ἕως ἂν τοίνυν μηδεμίαν ἔχῃς αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν, καθ' ἣν εὐσεβές ἐστιν ὕστερον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν προσγεγενῆσθαι λέγειν, ἀργήσει σοι τὸ ἐπίταγμα παρὰ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν.
Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τεχνικῆς ἐφόδου τὴν ἀλήθειαν Εὐνόμιος εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἄγει. ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ σύνηθες ἡμῖν τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον πρὸς κατασκευὴν τῶν τῆς ἀληθείας δογμάτων οἰκειωσώμεθα, ὡς ἂν καὶ διὰ τούτου γένοιτο δῆλον ὅτι πανταχοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς συναγορεύουσι λόγῳ. εἰ γὰρ « τότε ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱὸν ὅτε ἐβούλετο », καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀντίπαλος, ἐβούλετο δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀεί, σύνδρομος δὲ τῇ βουλήσει ἡ δύναμις, ἀεὶ ἄρα ὁ υἱὸς μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς νοηθήσεται τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ βουλομένου τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυναμένου ἔχειν ὃ βούλεται. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τὸν ἐφεξῆς αὐτοῦ λόγον προσαγαγεῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦτον τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς συναρμόσαι δόγματι ὅτι « μηδεμία περὶ τούτου ζήτησις ἔστω τοῖς σώφροσιν, διὰ τί μὴ πρότερον ». ἡ γὰρ τοῦ « πρότερον » λέξις χρονικήν τινα τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἔχει, ἀντιδιαστελλομένη πρὸς τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὕστερον: ὅταν δὲ χρόνος μὴ ᾖ, συναναιρεῖται πάντως καὶ τῆς χρονικῆς διαστάσεως τὰ ὀνόματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων ὁ κύριος: ἄχρηστος ἄρα τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν αἰώνων ἡ τοῦ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ζήτησις: κενὰ γὰρ πάσης διανοίας ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων μὴ ἐπὶ χρόνου λεγόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν πρὸ τῶν χρόνων ὁ κύριος, τὸ πρότερον πάντως καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ χώραν οὐκ ἔχει. τάχα μὲν ἀπόχρη καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τῶν οὐ δεομένων τοῦ προσπαλαίοντος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἀτονίας καταπιπτόντων. τίς γὰρ τοσοῦτον εὔσχολος ἐκ τῶν τοῦ βίου φροντίδων ὡς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἑαυτὸν δοῦναι τῇ ἀκροάσει τῆς τε ματαιότητος τῶν ὑπεναντίων λόγων καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πρὸς τὰ μάταια πράγματα μάχης; ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τοῖς προειλημμένοις τῇ ἀσεβείᾳ καθάπερ τις δευσοποιὸς βαφὴ καὶ δυσέκνιπτος ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ διὰ βάθους ταῖς καρδίαις ἐγκέκαυται, μικρὸν ἔτι τῷ λόγῳ προσδιατρίψωμεν, εἴ πως δυνηθείημεν τῆς πονηρᾶς αὐτῶν ταύτης κηλῖδος τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπορρύψαι. εἰπὼν γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ἐπαγαγὼν τούτοις κατὰ τὸν παιδευτὴν αὐτοῦ Προύνικον ἀσυναρτήτους τινὰς καὶ ἀναρμόστους ὕβρεών τε καὶ λοιδορημάτων ὀκτάδας ἐπὶ τὸν κολοφῶνα τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων μετέρχεται καὶ καταλιπὼν τὴν ἀσυλλόγιστον τῆς ματαιότητος ἔκθεσιν πάλιν τοῖς κέντροις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καθοπλίσας τὸν λόγον συλλογιστικῶς ὡς οἴεται καθ' ἡμῶν κατασκευάζει τὸ ἄτοπον.