§3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation, but is without beginning and without end, and not according to the fabrications constructed by Eunomius, in ignorance of His power, from the statements of Plato concerning the soul and from the sabbath rest of the Hebrews.

What he says runs thus:—“As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end, those who admit the origination of the Son are absolutely obliged to say that He then ceased being generated, and not to look incredulously on the beginning of those things which cease being generated, and therefore also surely begin: for the cessation of generation establishes a beginning of begetting and being begotten: and these facts cannot be disbelieved, on the ground at once of nature itself and of the Divine laws860    This quotation from Eunomius presents some difficulties, but it is quite as likely that they are due to the obscurity of his style, as that they are due to corruption of the text.    S. John xi. 25    That is, of the Son’s goodness: for S. Gregory’s comment on the awkward use of the pronoun σφετέρας, see p. 233, inf..” Now since he endeavours to establish his point inferentially, laying down his universal proposition according to the scientific method of those who are skilled in such matters, and including in the general premise the proof of the particular, let us first consider his universal, and then proceed to examine the force of his inferences. Is it a reverent proceeding to draw from “all generation” evidence even as to the pre-temporal generation of the Son? and ought we to put forward ordinary nature as our instructor on the being of the Only-begotten? For my own part, I should not have expected any one to reach such a point of madness, that any such idea of the Divine and unsullied generation should enter his fancy. “All generation,” he says, “is not protracted to infinity.” What is it that he understands by “generation”? Is he speaking of fleshly, bodily birth, or of the formation of inanimate objects? The affections involved in bodily generation are well known—affections which no one would think of transferring to the Divine Nature. In order therefore that our discourse may not, by mentioning the works of nature at length, be made to appear redundant, we shall pass such matters by in silence, as I suppose that every sensible man is himself aware of the causes by which generation is protracted, both in regard to its beginning and to its cessation: it would be tedious and at the same time superfluous to express them all minutely, the coming together of those who generate, the formation in the womb of that which is generated, travail, birth, place, time, without which the generation of a body cannot be brought about,—things which are all equally alien from the Divine generation of the Only-begotten: for if any one of these things were admitted, the rest will of necessity all enter with it. That the Divine generation, therefore, may be clear of every idea connected with passion, we shall avoid conceiving with regard to it even that extension which is measured by intervals. Now that which begins and ends is surely regarded as being in a kind of extension, and all extension is measured by time, and as time (by which we mark both the end of birth and its beginning) is excluded, it would be vain, in the case of the uninterrupted generation, to entertain the idea of end or beginning, since no idea can be formed to mark either the point at which such generation begins or that at which it ceases. If on the other hand it is the inanimate creation to which he is looking, even in this case, in like manner, place, and time, and matter, and preparation, and power of the artificer, and many like things, concur to bring the product to perfection. And since time assuredly is concurrent with all things that are produced, and since with everything that is created, be it animate or inanimate, there are conceived also bases of construction relative to the product, we can find in these cases evident beginnings and endings of the process of formation. For even the procuring of material is actually the beginning of the fabric, and is a sign of place, and is logically connected with time. All these things fix for the products their beginnings and endings; and no one could say that these things have any participation in the pretemporal generation of the Only-begotten God, so that, by the aid of the things now under consideration, we are able to calculate, with regard to that generation, any beginning or end.

Now that we have so far discussed these matters, let us resume consideration of our adversaries’ argument. It says, “As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end.” Now, since the sense of “generation” has been considered with respect to either meaning,—whether he intends by this word to signify the birth of corporeal beings, or the formation of things created (neither of which has anything in common with the unsullied Nature), the premise is shown to have no connection with the subject861    i. e.with the subject of discussion, the generation of the Only-begotten.    ὁ λόγος: the idea of “reason” must be expressed to convey the force required for the argument following.    Cf. Phil. ii. 6. For it is not a matter of absolute necessity, as he maintains, that, because all making and generation ceases at some limit, therefore those who accept the generation of the Son should circumscribe it by a double limit, by supposing, as regards it, a beginning and an end. For it is only as being circumscribed in some quantitative way that things can be said either to begin or to cease on arriving at a limit, and the measure expressed by time (having its extension concomitant with the quantity of that which is produced) differentiates the beginning from the end by the interval between them. But how can any one measure or treat as extended that which is without quantity and without extension? What measure can he find for that which has no quantity, or what interval for that which has no extension? or how can any one define the infinite by “end” and “beginning?” for “beginning” and “end” are names of limits of extension, and, where there is no extension, neither is there any limit. Now the Divine Nature is without extension, and, being without extension, it has no limit; and that which is limitless is infinite, and is spoken of accordingly. Thus it is idle to try to circumscribe the infinite by “beginning” and “ending”—for what is circumscribed cannot be infinite. How comes it, then, that this Platonic Phædrus disconnectedly tacks on to his own doctrine those speculations on the soul which Plato makes in that dialogue? For as Plato there spoke of “cessation of motion,” so this writer too was eager to speak of “cessation of generation,” in order to impose upon those who have no knowledge of these matters, with fine Platonic phrases. “And these facts,” he tells us, “cannot be disbelieved, on the ground at once of nature itself and of the Divine laws.” But nature, from our previous remarks, appears not to be trustworthy for instruction as to the Divine generation,—not even if one were to take the universe itself as an illustration of the argument: since through its creation also, as we learn in the cosmogony of Moses, there ran the measure of time, meted out in a certain order and arrangement by stated days and nights, for each of the things that came into being: and this even our adversaries’ statement does not admit with regard to the being of the Only-begotten, since it acknowledges that the Lord was before the times of the ages.

It remains to consider his support of his point by “the Divine laws,” by which he undertakes to show both an end and a beginning of the generation of the Son. “God,” he says, “willing that the law of creation should be impressed upon the Hebrews, did not appoint the first day of generation for the end of creation, or to be the evidence of its beginning; for He gave them as the memorial of the creation, not the first day of generation, but the seventh, whereon He rested from His works.” Will any one believe that this was written by Eunomius, and that the words cited have not been inserted by us, by way of misrepresenting his composition so as to make him appear ridiculous to our readers, in dragging in to prove his point matters that have nothing to do with the question? For the matter in hand was to show, as he undertook to do, that the Son, not previously existing, came into being; and that in being generated, He took a beginning of generation, and of cessation862    The genitive ληξέως is rather awkward; it may be explained, however, as dependent upon ἀρχήν; “He began to be generated: He began to cease being generated.”    Cf. S. John i. 4    Deut. xxxii. 6.,—His generation being protracted in time, as it were by a kind of travail. And what is his resource for establishing this? The fact that the people of the Hebrews, according to the Law, keep sabbath on the seventh day! How well the evidence agrees with the matter in hand! Because the Jew honours his sabbath by idleness, the fact, as he says, is proved that the Lord both had a beginning of birth and ceased being born! How many other testimonies on this matter has our author passed by, not at all of less weight than that which he employs to establish the point at issue!—the circumcision on the eighth day, the week of unleavened bread, the mystery on the fourteenth day of the moon’s course, the sacrifices of purification, the observation of the lepers, the ram, the calf, the heifer, the scapegoat, the he-goat. If these things are far removed from the point, let those who are so much interested in the Jewish mysteries tell us how that particular matter is within range of the question. We judge it to be mean and unmanly to trample on the fallen, and shall proceed to enquire, from what follows in his writings, whether there is anything there of such a kind as to give trouble to his opponent. All, then, that he maintains in the next passage, as to the impropriety of supposing anything intermediate between the Father and the Son, I shall pass by, as being, in a sense, in agreement with our doctrine. For it would be alike undiscriminating and unfair not to distinguish in his remarks what is irreproachable, and what is blamable, seeing that, while he fights against his own statements, he does not follow his own admissions, speaking of the immediate character of the connection while refusing to admit its continuity, and conceiving that nothing was before the Son and having some suspicion that the Son was while yet contending that He came into being when He was not. We shall spend but a short time on these points (since the argument has already been established beforehand), and then proceed to handle the arguments proposed.

It is not allowable for the same person to set nothing above the existence of the Only-begotten, and to say that before His generation He was not, but that He was generated then when the Father willed. For “then” and “when” have a sense which specially and properly refers to the denoting of time, according to the common use of men who speak soundly, and according to their signification in Scripture. One may take “then shall they say among the heathen863    Ps. cxxvi. 3.    The reference is perhaps to 2 Cor. iv. 18.    Heb. xii. 2.,” and “when I sent you864    S. Luke xxii. 35.    Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 19.” and “then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened865    S. Matt. xxv. 1    If we might read ᾑ for ἢ the sense of the passage would be materially simplified:—“His life is temporal, that life which operates only for the present time, whereon those who hope are the objects of the Apostle’s pity.”,” and countless similar phrases through the whole of Scripture, to prove this point, that the ordinary Scriptural use employs these parts of speech to denote time. If therefore, as our opponent allows, time was not, the signifying of time surely disappears too: and if this did not exist, it will necessarily be replaced by eternity in our conception866    The phrase is obscure, and the text possibly corrupt. To read τὰς ἐννοίας (as Gulonius seems to have done) would simplify matters: but the general sense is clear—that the denial of the existence of time implies eternity.    Altering Oehler’s punctuation.. For in the phrase “was not” there is surely implied “once”: as, if he should speak of “not being,” without the qualification “once,” he would also deny his existence now: but if he admits His present existence, and contends against His eternity, it is surely not “not being” absolutely, but “not being” once which is present to his mind. And as this phrase is utterly unreal, unless it rests upon the signification of time, it would be foolish and idle to say that nothing was before the Son, and yet to maintain that the Son did not always exist. For if there is neither place nor time, nor any other creature where the Word that was in the beginning is not, the statement that the Lord “once was not” is entirely removed from the region of orthodox doctrine. So he is at variance not so much with us as with himself, who declares that the Only-begotten both was and was not. For in confessing that the conjunction of the Son with the Father is not interrupted by anything, He clearly testifies to His eternity. But if he should say that the Son was not in the Father, we shall not ourselves say anything against such a statement, but shall oppose to it the Scripture which declares that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son, without adding to the phrase “once” or “when” or “then,” but testifying His eternity by this affirmative and unqualified utterance.

Ἔχει δὲ οὕτως ἡ λέξις: « πάσης γεννήσεως οὐκ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐκτεινομένης, ἀλλ' εἴς τι τέλος καταληγούσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τοὺς παραδεξαμένους τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν γέννησιν **** ποτὲ πεπαῦσθαι τοῦτον γεννώμενον μηδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπίστως ἔχειν, τῶν παυσαμένων τοῦ γεννᾶσθαι καὶ ἀρξαμένων πάντως: ἡ γὰρ τοῦ γεννᾶσθαι παῦλα πιστοῦται τῆς τε γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ γεννᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τούτοις ἀπιστεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔκ τε τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν θείων νόμων ». ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινῶν τὸ καθόλου προθεὶς ἐπαγωγικῶς κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸ προκείμενον, ἐμπεριλαμβάνων τῇ γενικῇ προτάσει τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπόδειξιν, πρότερον τὸ καθόλου κατανοήσωμεν, εἶθ' οὕτως τὴν τῶν ἐπαγομένων ἐξετάσωμεν δύναμιν. ἆρ' εὐσεβές ἐστιν ἐκ πάσης γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκμήρασθαι τὴν προαιώνιον γέννησιν, καὶ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν διδάσκαλον τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑπάρξεως προβάλλεσθαι χρή; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐλθεῖν τινα μανίας ἐλπίσαιμι, ὡς τοιοῦτό τι κατὰ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀκηράτου φαντασθῆναι γεννήσεως. « πᾶσα », φησί, « γέννησις οὐκ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐκτείνεται ». τί τὸ τῆς γεννήσεώς ἐστι σημαινόμενον; τὴν σαρκώδη καὶ σωματικὴν ἀποκύησιν λέγει ἢ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν ἀψύχων; ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν σωματικῶν γεννήσεων φανερὰ τὰ πάθη, ἅπερ οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν γέννησιν μεταφέροι. καὶ ὡς ἂν μὴ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα διαγράφων ὁ λόγος παρέλκειν δοκοίη, σιωπῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα παρελευσόμεθα, παντὸς οἶμαι τοῦ γε νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γινώσκοντος τὰς αἰτίας καθ' ἃς ἡ γέννησις παρατείνεται καὶ ἀρχομένη καὶ λήγουσα: μακρὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὸν ἅμα πάντα δι' ἀκριβείας ἐκτίθεσθαι, τὴν σύνοδον τῶν γεννώντων, τὴν ἐν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις τοῦ γεννωμένου διάπλασιν, τὴν ὠδῖνα, τὸν τόκον, τὸν χρόνον, ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι συστῆναι σώματος γέννησιν: ἅπερ ἐπίσης πάντα τῆς θείας γεννήσεως τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἠλλοτρίωται. εἰ γὰρ ἕν τι τούτων δοθείη, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην συνεισελεύσεται. ὡς ἂν οὖν καθαρεύοι πάσης ἐμπαθοῦς διανοίας ἡ θεία γέννησις, οὐδὲ τὴν διαστηματικὴν παράτασιν ἐπ' ἐκείνης νοήσομεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀρχόμενον καὶ παυόμενον ἐν παρατάσει τινὶ θεωρεῖται πάντως. πᾶσα δὲ παράτασις χρόνῳ διαμετρεῖται: χρόνου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ᾧ καὶ τέλος τοῦ τόκου καὶ ἀρχὴν σημειούμεθα, μάταιον ἂν εἴη τέλος καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀδιαστάτου γεννήσεως ἐννοεῖν, οὐδενὸς εὑρισκομένου σημειωτικοῦ νοήματος οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἄρχεται οὔτε εἰς ὃ καταλήγει. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα τῶν κτισμάτων ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὡσαύτως καὶ τόπος καὶ χρόνος καὶ ὕλη καὶ παρασκευὴ καὶ δύναμις τοῦ τεχνιτεύοντος καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα συνδραμόντα τελεσιουργεῖ τὸ γινόμενον. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσι τοῖς γινομένοις συμπαρατείνεται πάντως ὁ χρόνος καὶ αἱ κατασκευαστικαὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἀφορμαὶ συνεπινοοῦνται παντὶ τῷ κτιζομένῳ, κἂν ἔμψυχόν τι κἂν ἄψυχον ᾖ, φανερὰς ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς τῆς συστάσεως: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὕλης πορισμὸς ἀρχὴ τοῦ κατασκευάσματος γίνεται καὶ τοπικόν τι σημεῖον καὶ ἀκολουθία χρόνου. πάντα ταῦτα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ τέλη τοῖς γινομένοις ὁρίζει, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι κοινωνίαν ἔχειν τινὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν προαιώνιον τοῦ μονογενοῦς θεοῦ ὕπαρξιν, ὥστε διὰ τῶν ὧδε θεωρουμένων ἀρχήν τινα καὶ τέλος ἐπὶ τῆς γεννήσεως ἐκείνης ἀναλογίζεσθαι.
Τούτων οὖν ἡμῖν οὕτω διῃρημένων πάλιν τὸν λόγον τῶν ἐναντίων κατανοήσωμεν. « πάσης », φησί, « γεννήσεως οὐκ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐκτεινομένης, ἀλλ' εἴς τι τέλος καταληγούσης ». ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν νενόηται τὸ τῆς γεννήσεως σημαινόμενον καθ' ἑκατέραν ἔννοιαν, εἴτε τὴν ἀποκύησιν τῶν σωματικῶν εἴτε τὴν κατασκευὴν ἐθέλοι τῶν κτισμάτων τῷ τοιούτῳ σημαίνειν ὀνόματι, ὧν οὐδέτερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκηράτου φύσεως τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, ἀλλοτρία δέδεικται τοῦ προκειμένου ἡ πρότασις. οὐ γάρ, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ποίησίς τε καὶ γέννησις εἴς τι καταλήγει πέρας, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος κατασκευάζει, καὶ τοὺς παραδεξαμένους τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν γέννησιν διπλοῖς αὐτὴν πέρασι περιγράφειν, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἐννοοῦντας. μόνα γὰρ τὰ πηλικότητι περιγεγραμμένα τινὶ καὶ ἄρχεται γινόμενα καὶ εἰς πέρας λήγει, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου μέτρον τῷ ποσῷ τοῦ γεννωμένου παρατεινόμενον τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ τέλους διΐστησι τῷ μεταξὺ διαστήματι. τὸ δὲ ἄποσον καὶ ἀδιάστατον πῶς ἄν τις ἢ μετρήσειεν ἢ διαστήσειεν; ποῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπόσου μέτρον εὑρὼν ἢ ποῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀδιαστάτου διάστημα; πῶς δέ τις τὸ ἀόριστον τέλει καὶ ἀρχῇ διαλήψεται; ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ τέλος τῶν διαστηματικῶν περάτων ἐστὶν ὀνόματα. διαστάσεως δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ τὸ πέρας ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδιάστατος ἡ θεία φύσις, ἀδιάστατος δὲ οὖσα πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, τὸ δὲ ἀπεράτωτον ἄπειρόν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. μάταιον ἄρα τὸ ἄπειρον ἀρχῇ καὶ τελευτῇ περιγράφειν: τὸ γὰρ περιγεγραμμένον ἄπειρον εἶναι οὐ δύναται. πόθεν οὖν ὁ Πλατωνικὸς οὗτος Φαῖδρος τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐκεῖ φιλοσοφηθέντα τῷ Πλάτωνι τοῖς ἰδίοις δόγμασιν ἀσυναρτήτως ἐρράπτει; ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖ παῦλαν εἶπε κινήσεως, οὕτω « παῦλαν γεννήσεως » καὶ οὗτος εἰπεῖν ἐπεθύμησεν, ὡς ἂν τοὺς ἀπείρους τούτων ταῖς Πλατωνικαῖς καλλιφωνίαις περικομπήσειε. « καὶ τούτοις ἀπιστεῖν οὐκ ἔστι », φησί, « ἔκ τε τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν θείων νόμων ». ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν « φύσις » ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐκ ἀξιόπιστος εἰς διδασκαλίαν τῆς θείας γεννήσεως ἡμῖν ἀναπέφηνεν, οὐδὲ εἰ τὸν κόσμον τις αὐτὸν εἰς ὑπόδειγμα φέροι τοῦ λόγου, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇ τούτου κτίσει, καθὼς ἐν τῇ κοσμογενείᾳ παρὰ τοῦ Μωϋσέως ἐμάθομεν, συνδιεξῄει τὸ ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου μέτρον, ῥηταῖς ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν γινομένων κατά τινα τάξιν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν παραμετρούμενον. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ἐναντίων δέχεται λόγος, ὁμολογῶν πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων εἶναι τὸν κύριον. ὑπόλοιπον δ' ἂν εἴη τὴν « ἐκ τῶν θείων νόμων » συνηγορίαν τοῦ προκειμένου κατανοῆσαι, δι' ἧς ἐπαγγέλλεται καὶ τέλος καὶ ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ γεννήσεως ἀποδεικνύειν. « βουληθείς », φησίν, « ὁ θεὸς τοῖς Ἑβραίοις τὸν περὶ τῆς δημιουργίας ἐντυπωθῆναι νόμον, [οὐ τὴν πρώτην τῆς γεννήσεως ἡμέραν] τῷ τέλει τῆς δημιουργίας ἐναπέθετο καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν πίστιν: οὐ γὰρ τὴν πρώτην τῆς γεννήσεως ἡμέραν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑβδόμην, ἐν ᾗ κατέπαυσεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων, ἔδωκε *** τὴν ὑπόμνησιν τῆς δημιουργίας ». ἆρά τις πεισθήσεται παρ' ἐκείνου ταῦτα γεγράφθαι καὶ οὐχὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος παρεντεθεῖσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα, ὡς ἂν καταγέλαστος δοκοίη τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, τὰ μηδὲν κοινωνοῦντα τοῖς ζητουμένοις εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν προκειμένων ἐπισυρόμενος; τὸ γὰρ ζητούμενον ἦν δεῖξαι, καθὼς ἐπηγγείλατο, μὴ ὄντα τὸν υἱὸν γεγεννῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀρχήν τε λαβεῖν γεννήσεως καὶ λῆξαι γεννώμενον, οἷόν τινος ὠδῖνος ἐν χρόνῳ παρατεινούσης τὴν γέννησιν. ἡ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο κατασκευὴ τίς; τὸ σαββατίζειν ἐκ νόμου κατὰ τὴν ἑβδόμην ἡμέραν τὸν Ἑβραίων λαόν. ὢ πόση συμφωνία τῆς μαρτυρίας πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶται τῇ ἀργίᾳ παρὰ τοῦ Ἰουδαίου τὸ σάββατον, ἀποδέδεικται τὸ τὸν κύριον, καθὼς οὗτος λέγει, ἀρχήν τε λαβεῖν τοῦ τόκου καὶ τικτόμενον παύσασθαι. πόσαι καὶ ἄλλαι πρὸς τοῦτο μαρτυρίαι τῷ λογογράφῳ παρείθησαν οὐδὲν τῆς εἰρημένης πρὸς σύστασιν τοῦ ζητουμένου λειπόμεναι; ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὀγδόην περιτομή, ἡ τῶν ἀζύμων ἑβδομάς, τὸ ἐν τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ τοῦ σεληναίου δρόμου μυστήριον, αἱ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ θυσίαι, ἡ περὶ τῶν λεπρῶν παρατήρησις, ὁ κριός, ὁ μόσχος, ἡ δάμαλις, ὁ ἀποπομπαῖος χίμαρος. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα πόρρω τῶν προκειμένων ἐστίν, πῶς ἐντὸς ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ζητουμένου, λεγέτωσαν οἱ ζηλωταὶ τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν μυστηρίων. ἡμεῖς γὰρ μικροπρεπές τε καὶ ἄνανδρον τὸ τοῖς κειμένοις ἐπεμβαίνειν νομίζοντες ἀναζητήσομεν ἐκ τῆς τῶν γεγραμμένων ἀκολουθίας εἴ τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον ἱδρῶτα κινῆσαι τῷ προσπαλαίοντι. ὅσα τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν μέσον τι τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐννοεῖν κατασκευάζων διέξεισιν, ὡς συμβαίνοντά πως τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς δόγματι παρελεύσομαι. ἀδιακρισίας γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνης ἅμα μὴ διακρίνειν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τὸ ἀνεύθυνόν τε καὶ τὸ ὑπαίτιον, ἐπειδὴ τοῖς ἰδίοις μαχόμενος οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις, καὶ τὸ ἄμεσον λέγων καὶ τὸ συναφὲς οὐ δεχόμενος, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι πρὸ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἐννοῶν καὶ τὸ εἶναι υἱὸν ὑπονοῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντα γεγεννῆσθαι διαμαχόμενος. μικρὸν « οὖν » ἐν τούτοις ἀσχοληθέντες διὰ τὸ τοῖς φθάσασιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη προκατεσκευάσθαι τὸν λόγον τῶν προκειμένων ἑξόμεθα.
Οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν ὑπερτιθέναι τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι λέγειν πρὸ τῆς γεννήσεως, ἀλλὰ τότε γεγεννῆσθαι ὅτε ὁ πατὴρ ἠβουλήθη: τὸ γὰρ „τότε„ καὶ ”ὅτε” κυρίως καὶ προσφυῶς ἐπὶ τὴν χρονικὴν δεῖξιν τὴν σημασίαν φέρει κατά τε τὴν κοινὴν τῶν ὑγιῶς φθεγγομένων συνήθειαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ σημασίαν. Τότε ἐροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι, καὶ Ὅτε ἀπέστειλα ὑμᾶς, καὶ Τότε ὁμοιωθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία, καὶ μυρία τοιαῦτα διὰ πάσης ἔστι τῆς γραφῆς εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προκειμένου λαβεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς τοιούτοις τοῦ λόγου μορίοις τὸν χρόνον ἐπισημειοῦται τῆς γραφῆς ἡ συνήθεια. εἰ οὖν χρόνος οὐκ ἦν, καθὼς ὁ ἀντιλέγων συντίθεται, συνανῄρηται πάντως καὶ ἡ χρονικὴ σημασία: ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς ἐννοίας κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην ἀντεισελεύσεται. τῇ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι φωνῇ καὶ τὸ ποτὲ πάντως συνυπακούεται. εἰ γὰρ χωρὶς τοῦ ποτὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λέγοι, οὐδὲ νῦν εἶναι δώσει: εἰ δὲ τὸ νῦν διδοὺς πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον μάχεται, πάντως οὐ τὸ καθόλου μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι διανενόηται. τῆς δὲ φωνῆς ταύτης ἀνυποστάτου παντάπασιν οὔσης, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χρόνου σημασίαν ἐρείδοιτο, ἀνόητον ἂν εἴη καὶ μάταιον τὸ μήτε τι πρὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ εἶναι λέγειν μήτε πάντοτε τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι κατασκευάζειν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε τόπος μήτε χρόνος μήτε τις ἑτέρα κτίσις ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὢν λόγος, πανταχόθεν τοῦ δόγματος τῆς εὐσεβείας ἐξῄρηται τὸ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸν κύριον. οὐκοῦν οὐχ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ διαμάχεται ὁ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ δογματίζων. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὁμολογεῖν μηδενὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα διαιρεῖσθαι συνάφειαν τὸ ἀΐδιον αὐτῷ πάντως προσμεμαρτύρηκεν. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ λέγοι μὴ εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ οὐκ ἀντεροῦμεν αὐτοί, ἀλλὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἀντιθήσομεν, ἥ φησιν ἐν τῷ πατρί τε εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ τὸν πατέρα, τὸ πότε ἢ ὅτε ἢ τότε μὴ προστιθεῖσα τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀποφατικῇ ταύτῃ καὶ ἀπολύτῳ φωνῇ τὸ ἀΐδιον αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσασα.