6

"But you said in your thought: I will ascend into heaven," which, as has been said, is indicative of his being rational. But if thinking occurs in him, it must be investigated whether repenting does also.

For after understanding comes thinking and repenting. And just as thinking lies in his will, perhaps repenting does also. But let the one who does not grant these things see to it that he does not inadvertently make God the cause of his evil—for if 19 he does not possess reason and mind. And if he has been changed in some way, yet by being rational he has fellowship with those who are of this nature. For even if humans are mortal, we say that the fellowship is not according to mortality, but according to rationality, which is common to both immortals and mortals. And thinking does not belong only to the virtuous or only to the wicked. For just as using the senses is common to both the virtuous and the wicked, which the virtuous man, managing it well, does not use in the same way as the wicked man who looks up to heaven and deifies it, so also is thinking; being found in the virtuous and the wicked, it is changed according to its use. "Have you then," he says, "considered my servant Job, that there is none like him among those on the earth?" Not in vain is it added: "among those on the earth." For there are rational beings like him and above him, existing above the earth. For it is not the same to say, "there is none like him" as to say, "there is none like him among those on the earth." For how was he not surpassing all those on earth, when the God of all testified concerning him in this: "a blameless, true, God-fearing man, abstaining from every evil 20 thing"? And he properly abstains from evil who is by nature able to receive it. For then praise has a place, when one who is able to be wicked abstains from evil out of hatred for it. For not everyone who does not practice evil is said to abstain from it; for one would not say that infants, who do not practice it, properly abstain from evil; for he who does this, does it with judgment and reason. And these things require an aptitude for evil and virtue. And one would not say that an infant abstains from licentiousness or is temperate; for it has not yet come to the discernment of these things. But having discussed these matters in what has gone before, when we also cited things from the first psalm, we showed these things to be according to his God-fearing nature. For he is truly God-fearing who reveres the life of reverence, while those who revere things that are not venerable are impious. And to the blessed one also belongs the "true," both in respect to the contemplation of truth and the unhypocritical in moral matters; for he who practices virtue for the sake of something is not true. "But the devil answered and said before the Lord." It is possible to say plausibly concerning, "before the Lord," that he spoke contrary to the testimony of God, being a lover of 21 evil, or that he thought boldly; for evil is shameless. Thus, indeed, what he adds, he utters from a mind that loves evil, things that diminish the virtue of the just man. For what does he say? "Does Job fear the Lord for nothing? Have you not put a hedge around his possessions outside and the things inside his house and all that he has on every side? You have blessed the work of his hands, and have made his cattle numerous upon the earth." It is characteristic of those who love evil and are hostile to virtue not to consider the good things of their neighbors as genuine, but to say in every case, that this man is just because of an inability to be unjust, this man is temperate because of so-called stupidity, this man has no concern for money and acquisitions because of his unsuitability for them, even considering the gentle man a hypocrite, and in general no wicked person accepts anyone's virtue as genuine. The devil, being the originator of this evil, thinking such things about Job, revealed them to the one who knows what is hidden, saying, that Job is just because of his external goods. And "you have put a hedge" is said by him instead of "security," providing the emphasis, that because of these things he is impregnable and has no means of attack, the 22 multitude of indifferent things being the cause for him

6

"σὺ δὲ εἶπας ἐν τῆι διανοίαι σου· εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβήσομαι", ὅπερ ὡς εἴρηται παραστατικόν ἐστι τοῦ λογικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. γίνεται δὲ εἰ δὲ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γίνεται, ζητητέον, μὴ ἄρα καὶ τὸ μετανοεῖν.

μετὰ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μετανοεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἐν τῇ βουλήσει αὐτοῦ κεῖται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι, μήποτε καὶ τὸ μετανοεῖν. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ διδοὺς ὁράτω, μὴ τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον τῆς κακίας αὐτοῦ λάθῃ τιθέμενος-εἰ γὰρ 19 οὐ κέκτηται λόγον καὶ νοῦν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐξήλλακται κατά τι, ἀλλὰ τῶι λογικὸς εἶναι κοινωνεῖ τοῖς ταύτης οὖσι φύσεως. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωποι θνητοί, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὸ θνητὸν τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λογικόν, ὅπερ κοινὸν καὶ ἀθανάτοις καὶ θνητοῖς ὑπάρχει. καὶ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι δὲ οὐ μόνοις σπουδαίοις ἢ μόνοις φαύλοις πρόσεστιν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ αἰσθήσει χρῆσθαι καὶ σπουδαίῳ καὶ φαύλωι κοινόν, ὅπερ ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖος καλῶς μεθοδεύων οὐ κέχρηται αὐτῶι κατὰ τὸν φαῦλον ἀναβλέποντα εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοποιοῦντα τοῦτον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι· ἐν σπουδαίωι καὶ φαύλωι εὑρισκόμενον κατὰ τὴν χρῆσιν ἐξήλλακται. "προσέσχες οὖν", φησί, "τῆι διανοίᾳ σου κατὰ τοῦ παιδός μου Ἰώβ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς". οὐ μάτην δὴ πρόσκειται· "τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς." εἰσὶν γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν λογικὰ ὑπὲρ γῆν τυγχάνοντα. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ εἰπεῖν· «οὐκ ἔστιν κατ' αὐτόν» τῶι εἰπεῖν· "οὐκ ἔστιν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς". πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς ἐτύγχανε τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων αὐτῷ μαρτυροῦντος ἐν τῷ· "ἄνθρωπος ἄμεμπτος, ἀληθινός, θεοσεβής, ἀπεχόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ 20 πράγματος". ἀπέχεται δὲ κυρίως κακίας ὁ πεφυκὼς αὐτὴν δέχεσθαι. τότε γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος χώραν ἔχει, ὅτε δυνάμενος εἶναι φαῦλος ἀπέχεται κακίας μίσει τῶι πρὸς αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ μὴ χρώμενος κακίᾳ ἀπέχεσθαι ταύτης λέγεται· τὰ γὰρ βρέφη ταύτῃ μὴ χρώμενα οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις κυρίως ἀπέχεσθαι κακίας· ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνεργῶν κρίσει καὶ λόγῳ τοῦτο ποιεῖ. τὰ δὲ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς αἰτεῖ ἐπιτηδειότητα. καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τὸ βρέφος ἀκολασίας ἀπέχεσθαι ἢ σωφρονεῖν· οὔπω γὰρ εἰς τὴν τούτων ἥκει διάκρισιν. διαλαβόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν, ὅτε καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ψαλμοῦ παρετιθέμεθα, εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸν θεοσεβῆ ταῦτα ἠλέγξαμεν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ τῶι ὄντι θεοσεβής ἐστιν ὁ το`̣ν σεβασμοῦ βίον σέβων, τῶν τὰ μὴ σεπτὰ σεβομένων ἀσεβῶν τυγχανόντων. πρόσεστι δὲ τῶι μακαρίωι και`̣ τὸ "ἀληθινὸν" κατά τε θεωρίαν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ἀνυπόκριτον· οὐ γὰρ ὁ διά τι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηδεύων ἀληθινός ἐστιν. "ἀπεκρίθη δὲ ὁ διάβολος καὶ εἶπεν ἐναντίον τοῦ κυρίου." δυνατὸν πιθανῶς εἰπεῖν εἰς τό· "ἐναντίον τοῦ κυρίου", ὅτι ἐναντίως τῆι μαρτυρίαι τοῦ θεοῦ εἶπεν φιλόκα21 κος ὢν ἢ ὅτι θρασέως ἐνενόησεν· ἀναίσχυντον γὰρ ἡ κακία. οὕτω γοῦν καὶ ἃ ἐπιφέρει ἀπὸ φιλοκάκου γνώμης προφέρει τῆς τοῦ δικαίου ἐλαττωτικὰ ἀρετῆς. τί γάρ φησιν; "μὴ δωρεὰν σέβεται Ἰὼβ τὸν κύριον; οὐ σὺ περιέφραξας τὰ ἔξω αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἔσω τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἔξω πάντων τῶν ὄντων αὐτῷ κύκλῳ; τὰ ἔργα τῶν χειρῶν αὐτοῦ εὐλόγησας καὶ τὰ κτήνη αὐτοῦ πολλὰ ἐποίησας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς." ἴδιον τῶν φιλοκάκων καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀπεχθανομένων τὸ μὴ λογίζεσθαι γνήσια τὰ καλὰ τῶν πέλας, ἀλλὰ πάντως λέγειν, ὡς ὅδε τις δίκαιός ἐστιν δι' ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, ὅδε τις σώφρων διὰ τὴν καλουμένην ἠλιθιότητα, ὅδε πρὸς χρήματα καὶ πορισμοὺς οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τὸ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀνεπιτήδειον, ἐσθότε καὶ τὸν πρᾶον ὑποκριτὴν λογιζομένους, καὶ ὅλως οὐδεὶς φαῦλος ἀποδέχεταί τινος ἀρετὴν ὡς γνησίαν. ταύτης ἀρχηγὸς ὢν τῆς κακίας ὁ διάβολος τοιαῦτα ἐννοῶν περὶ τοῦ Ἰὼβ ἐφανέρου αὐτὰ τῷ τὸ κρυπτὸν ἐπισταμένωι λέγων, ὡς διὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ Ἰώβ. τὸ δὲ "περιέφραξας" ἀντὶ ἀσφαλείας αὐτῶι εἴρηται ἔμφασιν παρέχοντος, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ἀκαθαίρετός ἐστιν καὶ ἔφοδον οὐκ ἔχει, τὴν 22 πληθὺν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αἰτίαν αὐτῷ