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choice, a coming together of desire and counsel and judgment. For desiring first, we take counsel; and having taken counsel, we judge; and having judged, we choose what has been shown by the judgment to be better over the worse; and the one is connected only with natural things; while the other, only with things in our power and able to be done by us. Therefore, choice is not will.

Concerning wishing. But neither is choice wishing. For wishing is an imaginative appetite

for things in our power and not in our power (γ); that is, formed by the mind alone. And the imaginative appetite belongs only to the power of the mind without the deliberative reason concerning things in our power; or a kind of natural will. But choice is a deliberative appetite for things to be done that are in our power. Therefore, the argument of the summary alone, having shown the difference between these, would have been sufficient to stop the contentiousness of those who dispute excessively; and who, I know not how to say it politely, clearly contradict what is well known. But since the inquisitive somehow desire to understand the matters of inquiry through more extensive discussion, we will speak in another way. Those who have written about these things say: Wishing does not necessarily apply to all (δ) to whom choosing applies. For we say we wish to be healthy and to be rich and to be made immortal; but we do not say we choose to be rich and to be healthy and to be made immortal; since wishing is for things possible and for things impossible; but choice is only for things possible, and things that can be brought about by us. And again, wishing is of the end; but choice is of the means to the end. Therefore, they say the object of wish is the end; for instance, health; but the object of deliberation is a means to the end; for instance, the place of health. Therefore, they say (16) that wishing has the same analogy to choice as the object of wish has to the object of deliberation; since we choose only those things which we think can be brought about by us. But we also wish for things that cannot be brought about by us. It has been shown, therefore, that choice is not wishing; and it will be shown again that it is neither deliberation nor, that is, counsel.

Concerning counsel, or deliberation. They say that counsel, or deliberation, is an inquisitive appetite concerning some action in our power

taking place. And the object of choice is that which has been judged from counsel. It is clear from this, then, that deliberation is concerned with things still being sought; while choice is concerned with things already decided upon. And this is clear, not only from the definition, but also from the etymology. For the object of choice is that which is to be taken before another. But no one prefers something without having deliberated; nor does one take it without having judged. Therefore, choice is not counsel, that is, deliberation.

Concerning choice. They say that choice is a deliberative appetite for things to be done that are in our power. For choice is something mixed, and

a compound of many things; composed of desire and counsel and judgment.

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προαίρεσις, ὀρέξεως καί βουλῆς καί κρίσεως σύνοδος. Ὀρεγόμενοι γάρ πρότερον βουλευόμεθα· καί βουλευσάμενοι, κρίνομεν· καί κρίναντες, προαιρούμεθα τοῦ χείρονος τό δειχθέν ἐκ τῆς κρίσεως κρεῖττον· καί ἡ μέν, μόνον ἤρτηται τῶν φυσικῶν· ἡ δέ, μόνων τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν θέλησις ἡ προαίρεσις.

Περί βουλήσεως. Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις. Βούλησις μέν γάρ ἐστιν ὄρεξις φανταστική

τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν καί οὐκ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν (γ)· τουτέστι μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ μορφουμένη. Ἡ δέ ὄρεξις φανταστική, μόνης ἐστί τῆς διανοητικῆς δυνάμεως ἄνευ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ λόγου τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· ἤ ποιά φυσική θέλησις. Ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ὄρεξις βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν. Ἤρκει μεν οὖν καί μόνος ὁ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς λόγος, δείξας τήν τούτων διαφοράν, παῦσαι φιλονεικίας τούς περιττῶς φιλολογοῦντας· καί τοῖς καλῶς ἐγνωσμἐνοις, οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως εὐφήμως εἰπεῖν, σαφῶς ἀντιλέγοντας. Ἐπειδή δέ ποθοῦσί πως οἱ φιλοπευστοῦντες διά πλειόνων ἐπιστῆναι τοῖς ζητουμένοις, ἐροῦμεν καί ἄλλως. Φασίν οἱ περί τούτων διειληφότες. Οὐ πᾶσιν (δ) οἷς ἁρμόζει τό προαιρεῖσθαι, πάντως ἁρμόζειν καί τό βούλεσθαι. Βούλεσθαι μέν γάρ ὑγιαίνειν καί πλουτεῖν καί ἀθανατισθῆναι φαμεν· προαιρεῖσθαι δέ πλουτεῖν καί ὑγιαίνειν καί ἀθανατισθῆναι, οὐ λέγομεν· ἐπειδή ἡ μέν βούλησις, καί ἐπί τῶν δυνατῶν καί ἐπί τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ἐπί μόνων δυνατῶν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γενέσθαι δυναμένων. Καί πάλιν, ἡ μέν βούλησις, τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, τῶν πρός τό τέλος. Τέλος οὖν εἶναι φασι τό βουλητόν· οἶον, τήν ὑγίειαν· πρός τό τέλος, δέ, τό βουλευτόν· οἶον, τόν τῆς ὑγιείας τόπον. Τήν αὐτήν οὖν ἀναλογίαν ἥν ἔχει τό βουλητόν πρός τό βουλευτόν, ἔχειν τήν βούλησίν φασι (16) πρός τήν προαίρεσιν· εἴπερ ταῦτα μόνα προαιρούμεθα, ἅ δι᾿ ἡμῶν οἰόμεθα δύνασθαι γενέσθαι. Βουλόμεθα δέ καί τά μή δι᾿ ἡμῶν οἷα τε γενέσθαι. ∆έδεικται τοίνυν, ὡς οὐδέ βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις· δειχθήσεται δέ πάλιν, ὡς οὔτε βούλευσίς ἐστιν ἤγουν βουλή.

Περί βουλῆς ἤγουν βουλεύσεως. Τήν βουλήν ἤγουν βούλευσιν εἶναί φασιν ὄρεξιν ζητητικήν περί τι τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν

πρακτῶν γινομένην. Προαιρετόν δέ, τό ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν. ∆ῆλον οὖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ μέν βούλευσις, ἐπί τοῖς ἔτι ζητουμένοις ἐστίν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ἐπί τοῖς ἤδη προκεκριμένοις. Καί δῆλον, οὐκ ἐκ μόνου τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ, ἀλλά καί τῆς ἐτυμολογίας. Προαιρετόν γάρ ἐστι τό ἕτερον πρό ἑτέρου αἱρετόν. Οὐδείς δέ προκρίνει τι, μή βουλευσάμενος· οὐδέ αἱρεῖται μή κρίνας. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν βουλή, τουτέστι βούλευσις, ἡ προαίρεσις.

Περί προαιρέσεως. Προαίρεσιν εἶναι φασιν ὄρεξιν βουλευτικήν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν. Μικτόν γάρ τι, καί

πολλοῖς σύγκρατον ἡ προαίρεσις· ἐξ ὀρέξεως καί βουλῆς συγκειμένη καί κρίσεως.