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For choice, considered in itself, is neither of these things; for it is neither appetite alone in itself, nor counsel, nor judgment, but a mixture of these, just as the human being among us is a composite of soul and body. For then choice comes to be, and the object of choice is that which has been preferred by counsel, about which the choice is concerned, when it takes on appetite. Necessarily, therefore, choice is concerned with these things after the judgment, about which counsel was concerned before the judgment. For we choose those things about which we deliberate.

About what things do we deliberate. We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done by us; and have an uncertain

outcome. Now, the phrase "in our power" is used because we deliberate only about practical matters. For these are in our power; for we do not deliberate about self-subsistent wisdom. Nor about God, nor about things that happen by necessity and always in the same way, such as the cyclical movement of the seasons; nor about things which are not always, but always happen in the same way, such as the rising and setting of the sun; nor about things that happen by nature, but not always in the same way, (17) but for the most part; for instance, about a sixty-year-old man turning grey, or a twenty-year-old man growing a beard; nor about things that happen by nature, but at different times in different and indefinite ways, such as about rains and droughts and hail. For these reasons, the phrase "in our power" is used. And the phrase, "can be done by us," is used because we do not deliberate about all human beings (or human affairs), nor about every matter; nor indeed about all things that are in our power and done by us, but it must be added, "and have an uncertain outcome." For if it is manifest and agreed upon, we no longer deliberate about it, even if it is in our power and done by us. And it has been shown that deliberation is not about the end, but about the means to the end. For we do not deliberate about being rich, but how and through what means we will become rich. And to speak concisely, we deliberate only about those things whose action is equally possible; and that is equally possible which we are able to do, as well as its opposite. But if we were able to do only one of the opposites, this would be agreed upon, as being beyond doubt, while its opposite would be impossible. For example, when bread and a stone are set before someone, no one deliberates which he will make his food, since the one is agreed upon, and the other is clearly impossible. Therefore, we choose these things that are equally possible, about which we also deliberate.

Concerning judgment. But choice is not a kind of judgment, even if many readily think so;

but of judgment; since they say that judgment is an internal appetite for things in our power, from which choice arises; or a disposition with appetite toward things in our power that have been deliberated upon. For when the appetite is disposed toward what has been decided by counsel, it has become judgment; after which, or to speak more properly, from which, comes choice. Therefore, judgment stands in relation to choice as a state does to an activity.

Concerning authority.

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Οὐδέτερον γάρ τούτων ὑπάρχει καθ᾿ αὑτό θεωρούμενον ἡ προαίρεσις· οὔτε γάρ μόνον ὄρεξις καθ᾿ αὑτήν, οὔτε βουλή, οὔτε κρίσις· ἀλλά ἐκ τούτων σύγκρατος, καθώς ὁ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καί σώματος σύνθετος. Ἐπειδή τότε προαίρεσις, καί προαιρετόν γίνεται, τό προκριθέν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, περί οὗ ἡ προαίρεσις, ὅταν προσλάβῃ τήν ὄρεξιν. Ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἡ προαίρεσις περί ταῦτά ἐστι μετά τήν κρίσιν, περί ἅ ἡ βουλή πρό τῆς κρίσεως. Ἐκεῖνα γάρ προαιρούμεθα, περί ὧν βουλευόμεθα.

Περί τίνων βουλευόμεθα. Βουλευόμεθα δέ περί τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν καί δι' ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων· καί ἄδηλον

ἐχόντων το τέλος. Τό μέν οὖν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν εἴρηται, ἐπειδή περί τῶν πρακτῶν μόνον βουλευόμεθα. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· οὐ γάρ περί τῆς αὐθυποστάτου σοφίας. Οὔτε γάρ περί Θεοῦ, οὔτε περί τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἀεί ὡσαύτως γινομένων· οἷον τῆς κυκλικῆς τῶν χρόνων κινήσεως· οὔτε περί τῶν οὐκ ἀεί μέν ὄντων, ἀεί δέ ὁμοίως γινομένων, οἷον ἀνατολῆς ἡλίου καί δύσεως· οὔτε περί τῶν φύσει μέν, οὐκ ἀεί δέ ὁμοίως γινομένων, (17) ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐπί τό πλεῖστον· οἷον, περί τοῦ πολιοῦσθαι τόν ἑξηκοντούτην, ἤ γενειάσκειν τόν εἰκοσαετῆ· οὔτε περί τῶν φύσει μέν, ἄλλοτε δέ ἄλλως ἀορίστως γινομένων· οἷον περί ὄμβρων καί αὐχμῶν καί χαλάζης. ∆ιά ταῦτα μέν τό ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, εἴρηται· Τό δέ, ∆ι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων· ἐπειδήπερ οὐ περί πάντων ἀνθρώπων ( τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων), οὔτε περί παντός πράγματος βουλευόμεθα· ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ περί πάντων τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γινομένων· ἀλλά δεῖ προσκεῖσθαι, καί ἄδηλον ἐχόντων τό τέλος. Ἐάν γάρ ᾖ φανερόν καί ὁμολογούμενον, οὐκ ἔτι περί αὐτοῦ βουλευόμεθα· κἄν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνηται. Ἐδείχθη δέ, ὡς οὐδέ περί τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλά περί τῶν πρός τό τέλος, ἡ βουλή. Βουλεύομεθα γάρ οὐ πλουτῆσαι· ἀλλ᾿ ὅπως καί δι᾿ ὧν πλουτήσομεν. Καί συντόμως εἰπεῖν, περί τούτων μόνον βουλευόμεθα, ὧν ἡ πρᾶξις ἐπίσης ἐνδέχεται· ἔστι δέ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενον, ὅ αὐτό τε δυνάμεθα, καί τό ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ. Εἰ δέ τό ἕτερον μόνον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἠδυνάμεθα, τοῦτο μέν ἦν ὁμολογούμενον, ὡς ἀναμφίβολον· τό δἐ ἀντικείμενον, ἀδύνατον. Οἷον, ἄρτου καί λίθου προκειμένων, οὐδείς βουλεύεται ποῖον ποιήσεται βρῶμα· τοῦ μέν ὁμολογουμένου· τοῦ δέ σαφῶς ὄντος ἀδυνάτου. Ταῦτα γοῦν προαιρούμεθα, τά ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενα, περί ὧν καί βουλευόμεθα.

Περί γνώμης. Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε γνώμη τίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, κἄν οἱ πολλοί τοῦτο προχείρως νομίζωσιν·

ἀλλά γνώμης· εἴπερ τήν γνώμην εἶναι φασιν ὄρεξιν ἐνδιάθετον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις· ἤ διάθεσιν ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ὀρεκτικῶς βουλευθεῖσι. ∆ιατεθεῖσα γάρ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, γνώμη γέγονε· μεθ᾿ ἥν, ἤ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἕξεως οὖν πρός ἐνέργειαν ἐπέχει λόγον, ἡ γνώμη πρός τήν προαίρεσιν.

Περί ἐξουσίας.