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But choice is not authority. For choice, as I have often said, is a deliberative desire for things to be done that are in our power; but authority is a lawful mastery over things to be done that are in our power; or an unhindered mastery of the use of things in our power; or an unenslaved desire for things in our power. Therefore, authority and choice are not the same; since we choose according to authority, but we do not exercise authority according to choice; and the one only selects, while the other uses what is in our power, and what is over what is in our power, that is, choice and judgment and counsel. For according to authority we deliberate, (20) and judge, and choose, and are moved to action, and use what is in our power.

Concerning opinion But choice is not any kind of opinion. For opinion is twofold: rational and irrational.

but choice is changeable. So they say that irrational opinion is a simple and ready knowledge; as when someone brings forth another's opinion, being ignorant of its cause. For example, saying the soul is immortal, and not giving a demonstrative cause of its immortality. But rational opinion, they say, is knowledge constituted by the conclusion of thought; as when someone, having reasoned something out, also gives its cause scientifically. For thought is that which extends and operates discursively, beginning from a premise up to a conclusion. For example, someone proposes to show the soul is immortal, and says: Since the soul is self-moving; and what is self-moving is ever-moving; and what is ever-moving is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. Or again: Since the soul is uncompounded; and what is uncompounded is indissoluble; and what is indissoluble is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. For it is proper to thought to traverse a certain path leading to the knowledge of the matter; and it travels from premises through syllogisms to conclusions, and makes rational opinion. And again, opinion is not only of things in our power, but also of things not in our power; but choice is only of things in our power; and we call an opinion true and false, but we do not call a choice true and false, but good and bad; and opinion is of universals, but choice is of particulars; for choice is about things to be done, for these are the particulars. Through many things, as I think, it has become clear that choice is not opinion. For if opinion, being constituted by the conclusion of thought, is knowledge; but choice is a deliberative desire for things to be done that are in our power, choice is not the same as opinion.

Concerning thought(e), that is, prudence. But choice is neither thought, that is, prudence. Since prudence, on the one hand,

they say is a theoretical desire for rational and cognitive studies; (21) or a state opposed to both folly and excessive thinking; but choice, as the argument has variously rendered it, is a deliberative desire for things in our power. And they say that prudence comes to be in this manner: for instance, the first movement of the mind they call thought; and the thought about something, they call a concept; which, having persisted and having impressed the soul towards what is being thought, is called a reflection; and the reflection, having remained in the same state, and having examined itself, is named prudence; and prudence, having been expanded, produces reasoning; called internal reason by those skilled in these things; which, describing it, they say is a movement of the soul

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Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε ἐξουσία ἐστίν ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἡ μέν γάρ προαίρεσις, ὡς πολλάκις ἔφην, ὄρεξις ἐστι βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ἡ δέ ἐξουσία, κυριότης ἔννομος τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμιν πρακτῶν · ἤ κυριότης ἀκώλυτος τῆς τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν χρήσεως· ἤ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ἀδούλωτος. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ταυτόν ἐξουσία καί προαίρεσις· εἴπερ κατ᾿ ἐξουσίαν μέν προαιρούμεθα· οὐκ ἐξουσιάζομεν δέ κατά προαίρεσιν· καί ἡ μέν ἐπιλέγεται μόνον· ἡ δέ χρᾶται τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καί τοῖς ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἤγουν, προαιρέσει καί κρίσει καί βουλῇ. Κατ' ἐξουσίαν γάρ βουλευόμεθα, (20) καί κρίνομεν, καί προαιρούμεθα, καί ὁρμῶμεν, καί χρώμεθα τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν.

Περί δόξης Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε δόξα τίς ἐστιν ἤ προαίρεσις. Ἡ μέν γάρ δόξα διττή· λογική τε, καί ἄλογος·

ἡ δέ προαίρεσις τρεπτή. Τήν μέν οὖν ἄλογον δόξαν εἶναί φασιν, ἁπλῆν γνῶσιν καί πρόχειρον· ὡς ὅταν τις προφέρῃ δόξαν ἀλλοτρίαν, ἀγνοῶν τήν αὐτῆς αἰτίαν. Οἷον, ἀθάνατον λέγων τήν ψυχήν, καί μή διδούς ἀποδεικτικήν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς. Τήν δέ λογικήν δόξαν, γνῶσιν εἶναι λέγουσι, κατά ἀποπεράτωσιν τῆς διανοίας συνισταμένην· ὡς ὅταν τις λογισάμενός τι, καί τήν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστημονικῶς ἀποδίδωσι. ∆ιανοία γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ διήκουσα καί διαστηματικῶς ἐνεργοῦσα, ἀπό προτάσεως ἀρχομένη μέχρι συμπεράσματος. Οἷον, προτίθεταί τις δεῖξαι τήν ψυχήν ἀθάνατον, καί λέγει· Ἐπειδή αὐτοκίνητος ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· τό δέ αὐτοκίνητον, ἀεικίνητον· τό δέ ἀεικίνητον, ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀθάνατος. Ἤ πάλιν· Ἐπειδή ἀσύνθετός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· τό δέ ἀσύνθετον, ἀδιάλυτον· τό δέ ἀδιάλυτον, ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀθάνατος. ∆ιανοίας γάρ ἴδιον, τό διανύειν τινά ὁδόν ἐπί τήν τοῦ πράγματος γνῶσιν φέρουσαν· ὁδεύει δέ ἀπό τῶν προτάσεων διά τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐπί τά συμπεράσματα, καί ποιεῖ τήν λογικήν δόξαν. Καί πάλιν, ἡ μέν δόξα οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἀλλά καί τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· καί δόξαν μέν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν καί ψευδῆ· προαίρεσιν δέ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀληθῆ καί ψευδῆ· ἀλλά καλήν καί κακήν· καί ἡ μέν δόξα, τῶν καθόλου· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, τῶν καθέκαστα· περί γάρ τῶν πρακτῶν ἡ προαίρεσις· ταῦτα γάρ τά καθέκαστα. ∆ιά πλειόνων, ὡς οἶμαι, φανερόν γέγονε, μή εἶναι δόξαν, τήν προαίρεσιν. Εἰ γάρ ἡ μέν δόξα κατ᾿ ἀποπεράτωσιν τῆς διανοίας συνισταμένη, γνῶσίς ἐστιν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ὄρεξις βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, οὐκ ἔστι τῇ δόξῃ ταυτόν ἡ προαίρεσις.

Περί φρονήματος(ε), ἤγουν φρονήσεως. Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε φρόνημα ἤγουν φρόνησίς ἐστι ἡ προαίρεσις. Εἴπερ τήν μέν φρόνησιν,

ὄρεξιν θεωρητικήν λογικῶν καί γνωστικῶν μαθημάτων φασίν· (21) ἤ ἔξιν ἀνοίας τε καί ὑπερνοίας ἀντίπαλον· τήν δέ προαίρεσιν, ὡς διαφόρως ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ λόγος, ὄρεξιν βουλευτικήν τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν. Γίνεσθαι δέ τήν φρόνησίν φασι κατά τόν τρόπον τοῦτον· οἶον, τήν μέν πρώτην τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν, νόησιν καλοῦσι· τήν δέ περί τινος νόησιν, ἔννοιαν λέγουσι· ἥτις ἐπιμείνασα καί τυπώσασα τήν ψυχήν πρός τό νοούμενον, ἐνθύμησις προσαγορεύεται· ἡ δέ ἐνθύμησις ἐν ταυτῷ μείνασα, καί ἑαυτήν βασανίσασα, φρόνησις ὀνομάζεται· ἡ δέ φρόνησις πλατυνθεῖσα, ποιεῖ τόν διαλογισμόν· ἐνδιάθετον λόγον παρά τοῖς ταῦτα δεινοῖς ὀνομαζόμενον· ὅν ὑπογράφοντές φασι, κίνημα τῆς ψυχῆς