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to be most complete, occurring in the faculty of thought, without any utterance; from which they say the spoken word proceeds.

And again, they say that thought is the knowledge of what has been thought that comes to the thinker from the act of thinking; for they speak of thinking, and the object of thought, and the thinker, and thought. And thinking is the relation; the object of thought is what is thought; the thinker is the one who thinks; and thought is the knowledge of the thing thought that has come to the thinker from the act of thinking. If, therefore, this is so, but choice is not so, then choice is not thought.

It has been demonstrated, therefore, as I think, clearly, that the things proposed are not identical with one another, according to those who think this. But if they were to say they are in every way identical, because appetite, that is, the appetitive power of nature, is predicated of all of them equally as a genus; let them also say that all the species—the terrestrial, the winged, and the aquatic—are identical with one another, because animal is predicated of all of them equally as a more general genus, and the order of the universe will vanish for them, not being a hypostasis of different things, but only a manifestation of bare names.

That in no way after the resurrection will the will of the saints be one toward one another and God, even if the thing willed is one for all, as some say.

Therefore choice, having added to itself both the impulse toward and use of the things that are in our power, the end

of our rational movement according to appetite is. For that which is rational by nature, having as a natural power the rational appetite, which they also call the will of the intellectual soul; it desires and it reasons; and having reasoned, it wishes. For they say that wishing is not simply the natural will, but a qualified one; that is, the will concerning something; (21) and wishing, it seeks; and seeking, it considers; and considering, it deliberates; and deliberating, it judges; and judging, it chooses; and choosing, it has an impulse; and having an impulse, it makes use; and making use, its appetitive movement towards that thing ceases. For no one makes use without first having an impulse; and no one has an impulse, without choosing; and no one chooses, without judging; and no one judges, without deliberating; and no one deliberates, without considering; and no one considers, without seeking; and no one seeks, without wishing; and no one wishes, without reasoning; and no one reasons, without desiring; and no one desires rationally, without being by nature rational. Man, therefore, being by nature a rational animal, is appetitive, and reasoning, and willing, and seeking, and considering, and choosing, and impulsive, and using.

But if man, along with the rest, is also by nature an animal that chooses; and choice is of things in our power, and able to be done through us, and having an uncertain end(θ); and in our power is also the principle of the virtues, being the law in operation of the natural powers; and the mode of misuse of the same powers, introducing the passions contrary to nature; therefore everyone by nature capable of choosing is both receptive of and a judge of opposites. And if a judge of opposites, then certainly capable of choosing; and if capable of choosing, since the movement towards both lies in his power, he is not by nature unchangeable. (3) Therefore, since deliberation and judgment and choice are of ambiguous things, as being in our power, whenever ambiguous things do not exist, the self-subsistent truth having been shown manifest to all, there is no choice moving through things that are intermediate and in our power

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εἶναι πληρέστατον ἐν τῷ διαλογιστικῷ γινόμενον, ἄνευ τινός ἐκφωνήσεως· ἐξ οὖ τόν προφορικόν λόγον φασί προϊέναι.

Φρόνημα δέ πάλιν εἶναι λέγουσι, τήν ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπιγινομένην τῷ φρονητικῷ γνῶσιν τοῦ φρονηθέντος· φρόνησιν γάρ, καί φρονητόν καί φρονητικόν καί φρόνημά φασι. Καί φρόνησις μέν ἐστιν, ἡ σχέσις· φρονητόν δέ, τό φρονούμενον· φρονητικόν, τό φρονοῦν· καί φρόνημα, ἡ γενομένη ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως τῷ φρονητικῷ γνῶσις τοῦ φρονηθέντος πράγματος. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο μέν οὕτως · ἡ δέ προαίρεσις οὐχ οὕτως· ἄρα προαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι τό φρόνημα.

∆έδεικται τοίνυν, ὡς οἶμαι, σαφῶς, οὐκ εἶναι ταυτόν ἀλλήλοις τά προταθέντα, κατά τούς τοῦτο νομίζοντας. Εἰ δέ φαῖεν ἀλλήλοις πάντως εἶναι ταυτόν, διά τό πάντων ἐπίσης, ὡς γένος κατηγορεῖσθαι τήν ὄρεξιν, ἤγουν τήν ὀρεκτικήν τῆς φύσεως δύναμιν· εἰπάτωσαν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι ταυτόν καί πάντα τά εἴδη, τά τε χερσαῖα, καί πτηνά καί ἔνυδρα, διά τό πάντων ἐπίσης ὡς γενικώτερον, κατηγορεῖσθαι γένος τό ζῶον, φροῦδος αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ παντός γενήσεται διακόσμησις· πραγμάτων οὐκ οὖσα διαφόρων ὑπόστασις, ἀλλά μόνον ψιλῶν ὀνομάτων ἔκφανσις.

Ὅτι κατά πάντα τρόπον οὐκ ἔσται μετά τήν ἀνάστασιν ἕν τό θέλημα τῶν ἁγίων πρός ἀλλήλους καί τόν Θεόν, κἄν ἕν πᾶσι τό θεληθέν, ὥς τινες λέγουσιν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ προαίρεσις προσλαβοῦσα τήν ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ὁρμήν τε καί χρῆσιν, πέρας

τῆς κατ᾿ ὄρεξιν, ἡμῆν λογικῆς ὑπάρχει κινήσεως. Τό γάρ φύσει λογικόν, δύναμιν ἔχον φυσικήν τόν λογικήν ὄρεξιν, ἤν καί θέλησιν τῆς νοερᾶς καλοῦσι ψυχῆς· ὀρέγεται καί λογίζεται· καί λογισάμενον βούλεται. Βούλησιν γάρ εἶναί φασιν, οὐ τήν ἁπλῶς φυσικήν, ἀλλά τήν ποιάν· τουτέστι, τήν περί τινος θέλησιν· (21) καί βουλόμενον ζητεῖ· καί ζητοῦν σκέπτεται· καί σκεπτόμενον βουλεύεται· καί βουλευόμενον κρίνει· και κρίνον προαιρεῖται· καί προαιρούμενον ὁρμᾷ· καί ὁρμῶν, κέχρηται· καί χρώμενον παύεται τῆς ὀρεκτικῆς ἐπ᾿ ἐκεῖνο κινήσεως. Οὐδείς γάρ κέχρηται, μή πρότερον ὁρμήσας· καί οὐδείς ὁρμᾷ, μή προαιρούμενος· καί οὐδείς προαιρεῖται, μή κρίνας· καί οὐδείς κρίνει, μή βουλευσάμενος· καί οὐδείς βουλεύεται, μή σκεψάμενος· καί οὐδείς σκέπτεται, μή ζητήσας· καί οὐδείς ζητεῖ, μή βουληθείς· καί οὐδείς βούλεται, μή λογισάμενος· καί οὐδείς λογίζεται, μή ὀρεγόμενος· καί οὐδείς λογικῶς ὀρέγεται, μή ὑπάρχων φύσει λογικός. Λογικόν οὖν φύσει ζῶον ὑπάρχων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὀρεκτικός ἐστι, καί λογιστικός, καί βουλητικός, καί ζητητικός, καί σκεπτικός καί προαιρετικός, καί ὁρμητικός καί χρηστικός.

Εἰ δέ μετά τῶν λοιπῶν καί προαιρετικόν φύσει ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων, καί ἄδηλον ἐχόντων τό τέλος(θ) ἐστίν· ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν δέ, καί ὁ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγος, τῶν κατά φύσιν δυνάμεων ὑπάρχων ἐνεργούμενος νόμος· καί ὁ κατά παράχρησιν τῶν αὐτῶν δυνάμεων τρόπος, τά παρά φύσιν πάθη παρυφιστῶν· ἄρα πᾶς φύσει προαιρετικός, τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐπιδεκτικός τε καί κριτικός. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κριτικός, καί προαιρετικός πάντως· εἰ δέ προαιρετικός, ὡς ὑπ᾿ αὐτῷ κειμένης τῆς ἐπ᾿ ἄμφω κινήσεως, οὐκ ἄτρεπτος φύσει καθέστηκεν. (3) Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐστίν, ὡς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἤ τε βουλή καί ἡ κρίσις καί ἡ προαίρεσις, ὅταν οὐκ ἔστι τά ἀμφίβολα, τῆς αὐθυποστάτου πᾶσιν ἐμφανοῦς ἀληθείας δειχθείσης, προαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι διά τῶν μέσων καί ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ὄντων κινουμένη