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of things; that there is not even judgment, which makes a separation of opposites, of which we make the better preferable to the worse; but if then, according to the now prevailing law of nature, there is no choice, all ambiguity of beings having passed away, there will be only an active, intellectual appetite for those who are thus by nature appetitive; ineffably taking hold only of the mystical enjoyment of that which is by nature desired, toward which it had its movement through the things that have been enumerated; of which the satiety is the infinite intensification of the very appetite of those who enjoy; each one supernaturally partaking as much as he desired; and an immediate commingling with that very thing desired by nature. And if as much as one desired, (25) so much he will partake of the desired thing, then by the principle of nature, the will of all will be shown to be one; but by the mode of movement, different.

But if by the mode according to movement the will of all men is not one; never will the will of both God and of the saved become one in every way, as it has seemed to some; even if the thing willed is one for both God and the saints, namely, the salvation of the saved; being a divine purpose, fore-conceived before the ages as the end of all; concerning which an agreement will come to be according to the will, both of the saved towards one another and of God who saves; God having entered whole in all generally, and in each particularly, who fills all things by the measure of grace; and being filled in all, in the manner of members, according to the proportion of faith in each who has grown together with Him. For if the will of God is by nature salvific, and that of men is by nature saved, that which by nature saves and that which by nature is saved could never be the same; even if the purpose of both is one, the salvation of all things has been established; put forth by God, but chosen by the saints.

But if the divine and the human will will be the same and one in number, according to those who say so, since by His will God established all the ages, the chorus of saints will also be a creator by the same will, whether natural or gnomic; and simply, by which they are naturally disposed to be identified with the divine; which is absurd, and is the work, as I think, only of a wandering mind. For as long as not all are creators, or only apostles, or only prophets; and these in turn, or only Peter, or only Moses; and there are not one, but many mansions with God the Father for the saints; the human will, moved toward it in imitation, could be identical with the will that is good by nature, both in natural quality and quantity, which is impossible (for how could that which by nature participates be identical with that which by nature is participated in?) it is impossible for there to be one mind in every way of both God and the chorus of the saints; even if, as I said, the thing willed is one for both, the salvation of all, concerning which is the union of the wills. But, as it seems, being ignorant what sort of argument of absurdity arises for them from what they say, they allow their own wise thought to be carried aimlessly toward things they ought not. For if will is not in any way conceived or said to be without relation, and not having the genus of "relative" predicated of it; it is a quality, but not of things in themselves, as being, that is, contemplated in another. But if the will is of things contemplated in another, it is certainly an accident; but if an accident, it will be characteristic either of essence (4), or of hypostasis (28) (for there is nothing intermediate between these considered in itself, that is, either partaking of neither, or composed of both); and if of essence, they will predicate one nature of both God and the saints; all having suffered, through the one will, a contraction into one essence. For that which is predicated of certain things generally and equally, is indicative of the essence under which they are ranked. But if of hypostasis, there will be one hypostasis of all, of both God and the saints, all having been fused into the same thing with one another. For that which particularly to someone

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πραγμάτων· ὅτι μηδέ κρίσις, ἀφορισμόν ποιουμένη τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ὧν τό κρεῖττον ποιούμεθα πρό τοῦ χείρονος αἱρετόν· εἰ δέ τότε κατά τόν νῦν κρατοῦντα νόμον τῆς φύσεως, προαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι, πάσης ἀπογενομένης τῶν ὄντων ἀμφιβολίας, ὄρεξις ἐνεργής ἔσται μόνη νοερά, τοῖς οὕτω κατά φύσιν ὀρεκτικοῖς· μόνης ἀφράστως ἐπειλημμένη τῆς τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὀρεκτοῦ μυστικῆς ἀπολαύσεως, πρός ἤν ἔσχε διά τῶν ἀπηριθμημένων τήν κίνησιν· ἧς ὁ κόρος ἐστίν, ἡ ἐπ᾿ ἄπειρον ἐπίτασις αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν ἀπολαυόντων ὀρέξεως· ἑκάστου τοσοῦτον ὑπερφυῶς μεθέξοντος, ὅσον ἐπόθησε· καί πρός αὐτό τό φύσει ποθούμενον ἄμεσος συνανάκρασις. Εἰ δέ ὅσον τις ἐπόθησε, (25) τοσοῦτον μεθέξει τοῦ ποθουμένου· τῷ μέν τῆς φύσεως λόγῳ, μία δειχθήσεται πάντων ἡ θέλησις· τῷ δέ τῆς κινήσεως τρόπῳ, διάφορος.

Εἰ δέ τρόπῳ τῷ κατά τήν κίνησις οὐ μία πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡ θέλησις· οὐδέποτε μία τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καί τῶν σωζομένων, ὥς τισιν ἔδοξε, κατά πάντα τρόπον γενήσεται θέλησις· κἄν ἕν τό θεληθέν ἐστι τῷ τε Θεῷ καί τοῖς ἁγίοις, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν σωζομένων· σκοπός ὑπάρχουσα θεῖος, ὥς τέλος πάντων προεπινοηθέν τῶν αἰώνων· περί ὅ, τῶν τε σωζομένων πρός ἀλλήλους καί Θεοῦ τοῦ σώζοντος, κατά τήν θέλησιν γενήσεται σύμβασις· ὅλου ἐν πᾶσι γενικῶς , καί τό καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἰδικῶς χωρήσαντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ τά πάντα πληροῦντος τῷ μέτρῳ τῆς χάριτος· καί ἐν πᾶσι πληρουμένου, μελῶν δίκην, κατά τήν ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ πίστεως αὐτῷ συμφυεῖσιν. Εἰ γάρ τοῦ μέν Θεοῦ τό θέλημα φύσει σωστικόν, τό δέ τῶν ἄνθρώπων φύσει σωζόμενον ταυτόν οὐκ ἄν εἴη ποτέ τό φύσει σῶζον, καί τό φύσει σωζόμενον· κἄν εἷς ἀμφοτέρων σκοπός, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων καθέστηκεν· ὑπό μέν τοῦ Θεοῦ προβεβλημένη· ὑπό δέ τῶν ἁγίων προῃρημένη.

Εἰ δέ ταυτόν ἔσται καί ἕν ἀριθμῷ τό τε θεῖον καί τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, κατά τούς λέγοντας, ἐπειδή θελήματι πάντας ὁ Θεός ὑπέστησε τούς αἰῶνας, ἔσται τῷ αὐτῷ θελήματι δημιουργός καί ὁ τῶν ἁγίων χορός, εἴτε φυσικῷ, εἴτε γνωμικῷ· καί ἁπλῶς, ᾧ πεφύκασι πρός τό θεῖον ταυτίζεσθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον, καί μόνης, ὡς οἶμαι, ῥεμβαζομένης ἔργον διανοίας ἐστιν. Ἑως γάρ ἄν μή πάντες δημιουργοί, ἤ μόνον ἀπόστολοι, ἤ μόνον προφῆται· καί οὗτοι πάλιν, ἤ Πέτρος μόνον, ἤ Μωσῆς μόνον· καί οὐ μία, πολλαί δέ παρά τῷ Θεῷ καί Πατρί μοναί τοῖς ἁγίοις εἰσί· τῷ τε κατά φύσιν ἀγαθῷ θελήματι, τό κατά μίμησιν πρός αὐτό κινηθέν ἀνθρώπινον, ποιότητι τε φυσικῇ καί ποσότητι εἴη ταυτόν, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον (πῶς γάρ ἄν τῷ φύσει μεθεκτικῷ, τό φύσει μεθεκτόν εἴη ταυτόν;) μίαν γνώμην κατά πάντα τρόπον εἶναι τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καί τοῦ τῶν ἁγίων χοροῦ, ἀδύνατον· κἄν, ὡς εἶπον, ἕν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέροις τό θεληθέν, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων· περί ἥν τῶν θελημάτων ἡ ἕνωσις. Ἀλλ᾿, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀγνοοῦτες οἷος αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν ἀτοπίας ἀναφύεται λόγος, ἀσκόπως ἐφ᾿ ἅ μή δεῖ φέρεσθαι τήν σοφῶν αὐτῶν συγχωροῦσι διάνοιαν. Εἰ γάρ οὐκ ἔστι θέλημα, ὁπωσοῦν νοούμενον ἤ λεγόμενον ἄσχετον, καί τό πρός τι γένος οὐκ ἔχον κατηγορούμενον· ποιότης ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν καθ᾿ αὐτά, ὡς ἐν ἑτέρῳ δηλαδή θεωρούμενον. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ θεωρουμένων ἐστί τό θέλημα, συμβεβηκός πάντως ἐστίν· εἰ δέ συμβεβηκός, ἤ οὐσία; (4), ἤ ὑποστάσεως ἔσται χαρακτηριστικόν (28) (τούτων γάρ οὐδέν μέσον ἐστί καθ᾿ αὐτό θεωρούμενον, ἤτοι μηδετέρων μετέχον, ἤ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον)· καί εἰ μέν οὐσίας, μίαν τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων φύσιν κατηγορήσουσι· πάντων διά τοῦ ἑνός θελήματος, τήν εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν παθόντων συναίρεσιν. Τό γάρ γενικῶς τινων ἐπίσης κατηγορούμενον, οὐσίας, ὑφ᾿ ἥν τελοῦσιν, ὑπάρχει δηλωτικόν. Εἰ δέ ὑποστάσεως, μία πάντων ἔσται τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων ὑπόστασις, πάντων ἀλλήλοις εἰς ταυτόν συγχωνευθέντων. Τό γάρ ἰδικῶς τινι