39

Concerning, “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me.” If “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me,” having the emphasis of reluctance,

you take it from the man, “not the one understood according to the Savior (for His willing is in nothing contrary to God, having been wholly deified), but the one according to us, as the human will does not always follow God, but for the most part resists and struggles against Him,” as the divine Gregory says; what do you think of what follows in the prayer, that is, “Not what I will, but let your will prevail”? is it of reluctance, or of courage? of utmost consent, or of division? But that it is not of resistance, nor of cowardice, but rather of perfect connaturality and consent, no one who has a mind will deny.

And if of perfect connaturality and consent, from whom do you accept this? from the man according to us, or from the one understood according to the Savior? But if from the one according to us, the word of the teacher is in error when it declares concerning him: “As the human will not always following the divine will, but for the most part resisting and struggling against it.” For if it follows, it does not resist; and if it resists, it does not follow. For the one is negated (68) and removed by the other as its opposite. But if you take “Not what I will, but let your will prevail” not from the man according to us, but from the one understood according to the Savior, having confessed the utmost consent of the human to His own divine and paternal will; and you have presented the two wills and energies of the one of dual nature as being according to nature; having no opposition whatsoever in either; even if the natural difference in all things of those from which and in which, and which He Himself was, according to nature.

But if, being constrained by these arguments, you are brought to say that “Not what I will” belongs neither to the man according to us, nor to the one understood according to the Savior, but is to be referred negatively to the unoriginate divinity of the Only-begotten; preventing Him from willing anything privately apart from the Father; therefore you of necessity refer also that which was willed, which is the refusal of the cup, to the unoriginate divinity itself. For even if you say the negation is a removal of willing something privately, it is not a rejection of what was willed; for it is not possible for the negation to apply to both: both to the Only-begotten willing something privately apart from the Father, and to what was willed. Since in that case the willing of the will common to the Father and the Son will surely be a negation of that which was willed by God, that is, our salvation. For this is by nature what is willed by him. But if it is not possible to apply the negation to both, it is clear that if you apply this to willing something privately, in order to posit the common will, you do not negate what was willed, that is, the refusal of the cup; but you will bring it against the common and unoriginate divinity, to which you have also referred the willing negatively. But if it is abominable even to think this, then clearly the negation here, that is, “Not what I will,” in every way rejecting opposition, represents the connaturality of the Savior’s human will with His divine and paternal will; as the Logos assumed the substance of the whole of the nature, and deified the whole by that assumption of substance. Whence, as one who for us became as we are, he said in a manner befitting a man to God the Father: Let not my will, but yours, prevail; since he, being God by nature, also had a will as man: the fulfillment of the paternal will. Therefore, according to both those from which, and in which, and of which He was the hypostasis, he was known to be by nature willing and active of ours

39

Περί τοῦ «Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν, παρελθέτω ἀπ᾿ ἐμοῦ τό ποτήριον». Εἰ τό, Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν, παρελθέτω ἀπ᾿ ἐμοῦ τό ποτήριον, συστολῆς ἔμφασιν ἔχον,

ἀπό τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λαμβάνεις, "οὐ τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου (τό γάρ ἐκείνου θέλειν, οὐδέν ὑπεναντίον Θεῷ, θεωθέν ὅλον), ἀλλά τοῦ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ θελήματος οὐ πάντως ἑπομένου τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ἀντιπίπτοντος ὡς τά πολλά καί ἀντιπαλαίοντος" ἧ φησιν ὁ θεῖος Γρηγόριος· τό ἑξῆς τῆς εὐχῆς, ἤγουν τό, Οὐχ ὅ ἐγώ θέλω, ἀλλά τό σόν ἰσχυέτω θέλημα, τί σοι δοκεῖ; συστολῆς ὑπάρχειν, ἤ ἀνδρείας; συννεύσεως ἄκρας, ἤ διαστάσεως; Ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μέν οὐκ ἀντιπτώσεως, οὔτε δειλίας, συμφυΐας δέ μᾶλλον ἐντελοῦς καί συννεύσεως, οὐδείς ἀντερεῖ τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων.

Καί εἰ συμφυΐας ἐντελοῦς καί συννεύσεως, ἐκ τίνος ταύτης προσδέχῃ; τοῦ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ἤ τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου ἀνθρώπου; ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν ἐκ τοῦ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ἡμάρτηται περί αὐτοῦ διαγορεύων ὁ τοῦ διδασκάλου λόγος· " Ὡς τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ θελήματος οὐ πάντως ἑπομένου τῷ θείῳ θελήματι, ἀλλ᾿ ἀντιπίπτοντος ὡς τά πολλά καί ἀντιπαλαίοντος." Εἰ γάρ ἕπεται, οὐκ ἀντιπίπτει· καί εἰ ἀντιπίπτει, οὐχ ἕπεται. Θατέρῳ γάρ θάτερον ὡς ἀντικείμενον (68) ἀναιρεῖται καί ὑπεξίσταται. Εἰ δέ μή τοῦ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλά τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου ἀνθρώπου λαμβάνῃς τό, Οὐχ ὅ ἐγώ θέλω, ἀλλά τό σόν ἰσχυέτω θέλημα, τήν ἄκραν τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ πρός τό θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα καί πατρικόν ὡμολογήσας σύννευσιν· καί δύο τοῦ διπλοῦ τήν φύσιν· τάς τε θελήσεις καί ἐνεργείας κατά φύσιν οὔσας, παρέστησας· ἐν οὐδετέρᾳ τήν οἰανοῦν ἐναντίωσιν ἔχοντος· εἰ καί τήν φυσικήν ἐν πᾶσι διαφοράν τῶν ἐξ ὧν καί ἐν αἷς τε, καί ἅπερ ἦν ὁ αὐτός κατά φύσιν.

Εἰ δέ τούτοις ἐξειργόμενος τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ἐπί τό λέγειν προάγῃ, μήτε τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς, μήτε τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα νοουμένου ἀνθρώπου τυγχάνειν τό, Οὐχ ὅ ἐγώ θέλω, ἀλλ' ἀρνητικῶς, ἐπί τῆς τοῦ ἱονογενοῦς ἀνάρχου θεότητος φέρεσθαι· τοῦ, τί θέλειν αὐτόν ἰδίως παρά τόν Πατέρα διεῖργον· οὐκοῦν καί τό θεληθέν, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ ποτηρίου παραίτησις, ἐπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἀνάγκῃ φέρεις τῆς ἀνάρχου θεότητος. Εἰ γάρ καί τοῦ τί θέλειν ἰδίως ἀναίρεσιν φής ἔχειν τήν ἄρνησιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦ θεληθέντος ἀποσκευήν· οὐ γάρ ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν τίθεσθαι τήν ἄρνησιν δυνατόν· καί τοῦ τι θέλειν ἰδίως τόν Μονογενῆ παρά τόν Πατέρα, καί τοῦ θεληθέντος. Ἐπεί πάντως ἡ τοῦ κοινοῦ Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ θέλησις θελήματος, ἀναίρεσις ἔσται τοῦ θεληθέντος Θεῷ, ἤγουν τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας. Τοῦτο γάρ αὐτῷ φύσει καθέστηκε θελητόν. Εἰ δέ μή δυνατόν ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν τιθέναι τήν ἄρνησιν, δῆλον ὡς εἰ ταύτην ἐπί τοῦ τι θέλειν ἰδίως ἄγεις, ἵνα τήν τοῦ κοινοῦ θέσιν ποιήσῃς θελήματος, οὐκ ἀναιρήσῃς τό θεληθέν, ἤγουν τήν τοῦ ποτηρίου παραίτησιν· ἀλλά κατά τῆς κοινῆς ἐποίσεις καί ἀνάρχου θεότητος, ἐφ᾿ ἧς ἀρνητικῶς καί τό θέλειν ἀνήγαγες. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο κἄν ἐννοεῖν ἀπευκτόν, ἄρα γε σαφῶς ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἄρνησις, ἤγουν τό, Οὐχ ὅ ἐγώ θέλω, πάντη τήν ἐναντίωσιν ἀποσκευαζομένη, τήν τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος πρός τό θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα καί πατρικόν συμφυΐαν παρίστησιν· ὡς ὅλην ὅλου τήν φύσιν οὐσιωθέντος τοῦ Λόγου, καί ὅλην τῇ οὐσιώσει θεώσαντος. Ὅθεν ὡς δι' ἡμᾶς καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς γεγονώς, ἔλεγεν ἀνθρωποπρεπῶς πρός τόν Θεόν καί Πατέρα· Mή τό ἐμόν, ἀλλά τό σόν ἰσχυσάτω θέλημα· ἅτε θέλησιν καί ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔχων αὐτός ὁ φύσει Θεός, τήν τοῦ πατρικοῦ θελήματος πλήρωσιν. ∆ιό κατ᾿ ἄμφω τάς ἐξ ὧν, καί ἐν αἷς, καί ὧν ὑπόστασις ἦν, φύσει θελητικός καί ἐνεργητικός τῆς ἡμῶν ὑπάρχων ἐγνωρίζετο