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of will and of activity, and from these, I say of divine nature and of human nature, and in these, and of these the hypostasis is in truth the one and only Christ and Son, how, if the same one is by nature properly God, and by nature properly man, did He not also have by nature properly a divine will and activity, and a human will and activity by nature properly, being by nature deficient in neither of these, through which, verifying the names by the realities, and again confirming the realities by these, the same one was clearly known, having and willing and effecting both divine and human things naturally, and from this being believed to be that from which, and in which, and what He was? Since, if the natural will and the essential activity are taken away, both of the divine and human substance, of the one who is from these and is these and preserves them according to one hypostasis, how will He be God or man? And how will He be shown to be substantially this or that, not preserving unimpaired the property of each nature, apart from all sin? For that which departs from what is according to nature, even if it comes to be outside of substance, has no existence, because it has no natural motion. "For that which has no motion," as the revealer of God and great saint Dionysius says, "neither is, nor is anything; nor is there any position of it at all." For this reason, we who confess the natures of Christ our God, I mean the divine and the human nature which is ours, for the sure confirmation of their existence, and for the truth of our confession concerning them, must in every way also hold the natural wills equal in number to them, and confess the essential activities to be as many; and under the supposed pretext of the divine hypostatic union, neither diminish any of them nor deny them altogether; knowing that the hypostatic union in no way harms the natural properties, just as it does not harm the natures themselves; even though it brings these into one through itself according to the one hypostasis, in no way displacing their existence as two, according to the principle of nature; just as, I say, it again completely unites the natural properties themselves through their coalescence with each other, and in no way allows either to be contemplated without the other, or outside the communion of the one with the other, according to the memorable Leo, pope of the Romans, it does not at all obscure their essential and natural difference, but preserves it perfectly; (97) for in preserving, it is preserved, and in conserving, it is conserved. For a union of things clearly exists so long as their natural difference is preserved; since when this ceases, that union also surely ceases, being completely destroyed by the confusion.

Therefore, since this, I mean the union, does not damage the realities, nor their difference, but only suitably unifies those things in it by designation, there are always and in every way undiminished and perfectly preserved in it the things that are different by nature, suffering no alteration whatsoever and no confusion; not in the substances themselves, not in the wills, not in the activities, not in any other natural thing. How then do some use this as a pretext, a cover for their own—I do not know how to say it euphemistically—beautiful-mindedness; and say that the incarnate Logos is by nature without will, and without activity in that which is ours, that is, in His humanity; since the substance assumed from us in Him is properly without a soul and without reason. For that which is without activity is manifestly motionless and soulless; and that which has no rational will is clearly irrational and mindless. And if the incarnate Logos existed by nature without these things in that which is ours, how will it be believed that He became man? And how rather will He not be shown to have changed His divine nature, and to have fallen involuntarily under the passions of the flesh according to it? For by the denial of the natural properties, both Arius and Apollinarius have made such an attack against Him. For the one, dogmatizing that He was soulless, and the other, that He was irrational, which is to be without activity and without will,

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θελήσεώς τε καί ἐνεργείας, ἐκ τούτων, δέ θείας φύσεως καί ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως λέγω, καί ἐν ταύταις, καί τούτων ὑπόστασις ἐστι κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν ὁ εἷς καί μόνος Χριστός καί Υἱός, πῶς, εἴπερ φύσει κυρίως Θεός, καί φύσει κυρίως ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός, οὐχί καί θεῖον θέλημα καί ἐνέργειαν φύσει κυρίως, καί ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, καί ἐνέργειαν φύσει κυρίως εἶχε, μηδετέρου τούτων κατά φύσιν ὤν ἐλλιπής, δι᾿ ὧν ἐπαληθεύων τοῖς πράγμασι τά ὀνόματα, καί τούτοις αὖθις ἐπικυρῶν τά πράγματα, προδήλως ὁ αὐτός ἐγνωρίζετο, τά τε θεῖα καί ἀνθρώπινα φυσικῶς ἔχων καί θέλων καί ἐνεργῶν, κἀκ τούτου τά ἐξ ὧν, καί ἐν οἷς, καί ἅπερ ὑπῆρχε, πιστευόμενος; Ἐπεί, τοῦ φυσικοῦ θελήματος καί τῆς οὐσιώδους ἐνεργείας ἀναιρουμένων, τῆς τε θείας καί ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας, τοῦ ἐκ τούτων καί ταύτας ὄντος καί σώζοντος κατά μίαν ὑπόστασιν, πῶς Θεός ἤ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται; καί πῶς τοῦτο, ἤ ἐκεῖνο κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὑπάρχων δειχθήσεται, μή σώζων ἑκατέρας φύσεως ἀνελλιπῶς τήν ἰδιότητα, πάσης ἁμαρτίας χωρίς; Τό γάρ τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐκστᾷν, κἄν τῆς ἔξω τῆς οὐσίας γεγένηται, μηδεμίαν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον· ὅτι μηδέ κίνησιν φυσικήν. "Τό γάρ μηδεμίαν κίνησιν ἔχον," ᾗ φησιν ὁ θεοφάντωρ καί μέγας ἅγιος ∆ιονύσιος, "οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτε τί ἐστιν· οὔτε ἔστι τις αὐτοῦ παντελῶς θέσις." ∆ιά τοι τοῦτο τάς Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσεις ὁμολογοῦντας ἡμᾶς, τήν θείαν φημί καί τήν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρωπίνην, πρός βεβαίαν τῆς τε τούτων ὑπάρξεως πίστωσιν, καί τῆς ἡμῶν περί αὐτῶν ὁμολογίας ἀλήθειαν, καί τά φυσικά τούτων ἰσαρίθμως δεῖ πάντως πρεσβεύειν θελήματα, καί τάς οὐσιώδεις τοσαύτας ἐνεργείας ὁμολογεῖν· καί μηδέν αὐτῶν προφάσει δῆθεν τῆς καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν θείας ἑνώσεως ἀπομειοῦν ἤ ἐξαρνεῖσθαι τό σύνολον· γινώσκοντας, ὡς ἡ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις οὐδέν παραβλάπτει τῶν φυσικῶν, καθάπερ οὐδέ τάς φύσεις αὐτάς· εἰ καί ταύτας εἰς ἕν ἄγει δι᾿ ἑαυτῆς κατά τήν μίαν ὑπόστασιν· τοῦ δύο, τῷ φυσικῷ λόγῳ ὑπάρχειν οὐδαμῶς ἐξιστῶσα· ὥσπερ οὖν καὐτά δή λέγω τά φυσικά ἰδιώματα, τῇ πρός ἄλληλα συμφυΐᾳ διόλου πάλιν ἑνίζουσα, καί μηδέτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου χωρίς, ἤ τῆς θατέρου πρός θάτερον κοινωνίας ἐκτός, κατά τόν τῶνῬωμαίων πάπαν ἀοίδιμον Λέοντα θεωρεῖσθαι καθοτιοῦν συγχωροῦσα, τήν τούτων οὐσιώδη καί φυσικήν οὐκ ἀμαυροῖ παντελῶς, ἀλλά τελείως φυλάττει διαφοράν· (97) τῷ γάρ φυλάττειν φυλάττεται, καί τῷ συντηρεῖν συντηρεῖται. Μέχρι γάρ τότε σαφῶς ἕνωσις πραγμάτων ἐστίν, ἕως ἄν ἡ τούτων σώζηται φυσική διαφορά· ἐπεί ταύτης παυσαμένης, παύεται πάντως κἀκείνη, τῇ συγχύσει τελείως ἀφανισθεῖσα.

Ταύτης τοιγαροῦν, λέγω δέ τῆς ἑνώσεως, οὐ λυμαινομένης τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὐδέ τῇ τούτων διαφορᾷ, ἀλλά μόνον τῇ κλήσει προσφυῶς ἑνοποιούσης τά κατ᾿ αὐτήν, εἰσί πάντοτε καί πάντως ἀμειώτως ἐν αὐτῇ καί τελείως σωζόμενα, τά κατά φύσιν διάφορα, τήν οἱανοῦν παρατροπήν οὐ παθόντα καί σύγχυσιν· οὐκ ἐν οὐσίαις αὐταῖς, οὐ θελήμασιν, οὐκ ἐνεργείαις, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί φυσικῷ. Πῶς οὖν ἐπικάλυμμα τῆς ἰδίας, οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως εὐφήμως εἰπεῖν, καλοφροσύνης, ταύτην τινές προφασίζονται· καί τόν σαρκωθέντα Λόγον ἀθέλητον φύσει, καί ἀνενέργητον τῷ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ἤγουν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ, φασί· ἅτε κυρίως ἀψύχου καί ἀλόγου τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν προσληφθείσης οὐσίας ἐν αὐτῷ τυγχανούσης. Τό γάρ ἀνενέργητον, ἀκίνητόν τε καί ἄψυχον προδήλως ἐστί· καί τό μηδεμίαν λογικήν θέλησιν ἔχον, ἄλογον σαφῶς καί ἀνόητον. Καί εἰ τούτων χωρίς κατά φύσιν ὑπῆρχεν ὁ σαρκωθείς Λόγος τό καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, πῶς ὅτι καί ἄνθρωπος γέγονε πιστευθήσεται; πῶς δέ μᾶλλον οὐχί τραπείς τήν θείαν φύσιν, καί σαρκός πάθεσιν ἀκουσίως ὑποπεσών δειχθήσεται κατ᾿ αὐτήν; Τῇ γάρ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀναιρέσει, τήν τῶν τοιούτων καταδρομήν, Ἄρειός τε καί Ἀπολινάριος κατ᾿ αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν. Ὁ μέν γάρ, ἄψυχον, ὁ δέ ἄλογον, ὅπερ ἀνενέργητόν ἐστι καί ἀθέλητον, αὐτόν δογματίσαντες,