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a perfect victory over the desired thing, and a cessation of motion, the ever-moving stability, according to which the death that once held sway over nature disappears, as nature is not defeated by it through transgression. For you no longer endure agitation, on account of the prevailing grace of the Spirit, by which, holding on through prayers, you are held, and knowingly traversing its paths, you indeed show in practice how many royal and divine paths there are for those wishing to travel straight along the unerring path of piety; and of these you define the deviations on either side; and you reveal the threatened sorrows of the one, and the promised sacred rewards of the other; so that you might lead them by fear and longing to divine perfection. And having marveled at your work, I fittingly praise your understanding; or rather, amazed at the vigor in both, I glorify God who empowers and gives you wisdom, beseeching you to use the same methods towards those who lack sense, and not to grow weary; for virtue knows no weariness, being the accomplisher of all good things, until you create the mind of Christ, and teach them to search the depths of the Spirit, whose very manifestations circumscribe all the wisdom and power of existing things, and it reveals that which is spoken in a mystery, to those who, like you, have attached themselves to it, and have judged nothing more precious for communion with it.

But since you possess the first and last of all virtues, the one that guides our actions and shines forth as a seal; I mean humility, you have deigned to ask your servant and disciple, about the definition of the natural will, which the pious monk has made, whether it is correct or not, saying, "It is an appetitive power for that which is according to nature, and a power which holds together all the properties essentially belonging to the nature." And, that this is one thing, and the gnomic will another, I take to be correct, and not discordant with the teaching of the divinely-judging Fathers, even if some have thought it is not so, claiming that the Fathers define the will as willing and what is willed or willable (188). And who defines it thus, and which of the Fathers, I would gladly ask them. For if it is so, what else has this become but a reciprocal definition, which does not clarify its own proper meaning, but improbably posits the same for each through the other, and proposes that which is the defining of will by willing, and this again by that. For what is defined turns back upon its own definition. For it is clear that they also call the will (θέλημα) willing (θέλησιν). However, they do not say this as a definition of the will. For who can show it? Since in that case, according to those who say this, volition will be the definition of volition, and motion again of motion, and humanity of man. But whether they signify the thing signified in this way or that, they in no way damage its existence, whether what is indicated be motion or essence. For if this were so, the existence of all universals and particulars alike would certainly fall apart. For in all things we use different significations. And I also say this, that even if they call the will (θέλημα) willing (θέλησιν), they in no way call it what is willed (θεληθέν) or willable (θελητόν). For how can appetite and the object of appetite be the same? For if this were so, towards what will it be moved, since it is itself properly that towards which it is moved, and is not by nature other than that? For this is a middle relation between the extremes; it unites them through itself, but does not coincide with them in existence. And the divine and great Gregory is a witness, who does not bring what is willed and what is begotten into identity with the will and with begetting at all; but through these, as natural relations, he leads back to the one who begets and wills. For if he did not deign to make the reference of what is willed or begotten to the will and begetting, although it is naturally in the middle, "For it does not by any means follow," he says, how was he going to bring them into identity, and declare them to be one?

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ποθουμένου τελείαν ἐκνίκησιν, καί παύλαν κινήσεως τήν ἀεικίνητον στάσιν, καθ᾿ ἥν ὁ πάλαι τῆς φύσεως κρατήσας ἐξαφανίζεται θάνατος, οὐχ ἠττωμένης τούτῳ διά παραβάσεως. Οὐ γάρ ἔτι σάλον ὑφίστασαι, διά τήν ἐπικρατήσασαν χάριν τοῦ Πνεύματος, ὑφ᾿ ἧς τῷ ἀντέχεσθαι κατ᾿ εὐχάς ἀντεχόμενος, καί τάς ταύτης ἐπιστημόνως ἐξανύων τρίβους, ὑποδεικνύεις μέν κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν, ὅσαι βασιλικαί καί θεῖαι τυγχάνουσιν, τοῖς πρός ἀπλανῆ τρίβον τήν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἰθυπορεῖν βουλομένοις· τούτων δέ τάς παρ᾿ ἑκάτερον ἐκτροπάς διορίζεις· καί τῶν μέν τάς ἠπειλημένας ἀνίας· τῶν δέ τάς ἐπηγγελμένας ἱεράς ἀμοιβάς ὑποφαίνεις· ὡς ἄν δέει καί πόθῳ πρός τήν ἔνθεον ἀγάγοις τελείωσιν. Καί σοῦ τήν ἐργασίαν ἀποθαυμάσας ἐπαινῶ προσηκόντως τήν σύνεσιν· μᾶλλον δέ τήν περί ἑκατέρα καταπλαγείς εὐτονίαν, τόν δυναμοῦντά σε καί σοφίζοντα δοξάζω Θεόν, λιπαρῶν ταῖς αὐταῖς χρῆσθαι μεθόδοις πρός τούς ἐνδεεῖς φρενῶν, καί μή κάμνειν· οὐ γάρ ἔχει κάματον ἡ ἀρετή, πάντων οὖσα κατεργαστική τῶν καλῶν, μέχρις ὅτου νοῦν ἐμποιήσῃς Χριστοῦ, καί τά βάθη τοῦ Πνεύματος διερευνᾷν ἐκπαιδεύσῃ, οὗ καί τά ἐμφανῆ, πᾶσαν τῶν ὄντων περιγράφει σοφίαν καί δύναμιν, καί τήν ἐν μυστηρίῳ λαλουμένην ἀποκαλύπτει, τοῖς κατά σέ προσθεμένοις αὐτῷ, καί μηδέν εἰς συμβίωσιν τούτου προκρίνασι τιμιώτερον.

Ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδή τήν πασῶν πρωτίστην ὁμοίως καί τελευταῖαν, ὡς πραγωγόν καί σφραγίδα περιλάμπουσαν ἀρετήν κεκτημένος· λέγω δή τήν ταπείνωσιν, πυθέσθαι κατηξίωσας τόν σόν οἰκέτην καί μαθητήν, διά τόν περί φυσικοῦ θελήματος ὁρισμόν, ὅν ὁ εὐλαβής πεποίηκε μοναχός, εἰ εὖ ἔχει, ἤ μή, φήσας, "∆ύναμιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικήν, καί τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικήν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων." Καί, ὅτι ἄλλο τοῦτο, καί τό γνωμικόν ἄλλο, καλῶς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, καί τῆς τῶν θεοκρίτων οὐκ ἀπᾴδοντα διδασκαλίας Πατέρων, εἰ καί τισιν ἐνομίσθη μή οὕτως ἔχειν, θέλησιν καί θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν (188) ἰσχυριζομένοις τό θέλημα τούς Πατέρας ὁρίζεσθαι. Καί τίς οὕτως ὁρίζεται, καί ποῖος τῶν Πατέρων, ἠδέως ἄν ἠρόμην αὐτούς. Εἰ γάρ οὕτως, τί ποτε ἄλλο τοῦτο καθέστηκεν, ἤ διάλληλος δεῖξις, ἡ τόν αὐτοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτόν μή διευκρινοῦσα λόγον, ἀλλ᾿ ἑκατέρου τόν αὐτόν δι᾿ ἑκατέρου τιθεμένη παρά τό εἰκός, καί προΐσχουσα, ὅπερ ὑπάρχει τό, θέλησιν ὁρίζειν τό θέλημα, καί τοῦτο αὖθις ἐκείνην. Ἀντιστρέφει γάρ πρός τόν οἰκεῖον ὅρον τά ὁριζόμενα. Ὅτι γάρ καί θέλησιν τό θέλημα λέγουσιν, δῆλον. Οὐ μήν ὡς ὁρισμόν θελήματος τοῦτό φασι. Τίς γάρ ὁ δεῖξαι δυνάμενος· ἐπεί καί βουλήματος βούλησις, καί κίνησις αὖθις κινήματος, καί ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπότης ἔσται, κατά τούς λέγοντας, ὁρισμός. Εἴτε δέ οὕτως, εἴτ᾿ ἐκείνως σημαίνουσι τό σημαινόμενον, οὐδαμῶς τήν ὕπαρξιν αὐτοῦ παραβλάπτουσι, εἴτε κίνησις, εἴτε οὐσία τό δηλούμενον ᾗ. Καί γάρ εἰ τοῦτο, πάντων καθολικῶν ἅμα καί μερικῶν διαπεσεῖται πάντως ἡ ὕπαρξις. ∆ιαφόροις γάρ ἐν πᾶσι προσχρώμεθα σημασίαις. Κἀκεῖνο δέ φημι, ὡς εἰ καί θέλησιν τό θέλημα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδαμῶς θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν. Πῶς γάρ ταυτόν ἔφεσις, καί ἐφετόν; Εἰ γάρ τοῦτο, πρός τί κινηθήσεται, αὐτό τοῦτο κυρίως ὑπάρχουσα πρός ὅπερ ἄν καί κινεῖται, καί μή ἄλλο παρ᾿ ἐκεῖνο τήν φύσιν τυγχάνουσα; Μέση γάρ αὕτη τῶν ἄκρων σχέσις ἐστίν· ἑνωποιοῦσα μέν ταῦτα δι᾿ ἑαυτῆς, οὐ συμβαίνουσα δέ τούτοις κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν. Καί μάρτυς ὁ θεῖος καί μέγας Γρηγόριος, τό θεληθέν καί γεννηθέν, οὐκ εἰς ταυτόν ἄγων τῇ θελήσει καί τῇ γεννήσει καθάπαξ· ἀλλά διά τούτων ὡς σχέσεων φυσικῶν, ἀνάγων ἐπί τόν γεννῶντα καί θέλοντα. Εἰ γάρ μήτε τήν ἀναφοράν τοῦ θεληθέντος ἤ γεννηθέντος πρός τήν θέλησιν καί τήν γέννησιν ποιῆσαι κατεδέξατο, καίτοι μέσης κατά φύσιν οὔσης, "Οὐ γάρ ἕπεται πάντως, φησί, πῶς ἔμελλεν εἰς ταὐτόν ἀγαγεῖν, καί ἕν εἶναι ταῦτα διαγορεύειν."