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Moreover: if they say that the will is that which is willed, and we are by nature what is willed and willable; for we happen to be God's creation, then God has no other natural will than only us, which comes to be and ceases to be, just as we do; and before we existed, He was destitute of all will. And the same will be concluded in our case; only what is willed externally, both what is and what is not; good and not so, will be fabricated; how indeed what is willed is also among the external things. For it is called 'willed' and 'willable' on account of the one who is moved by will towards it, but not on account of itself. So that if he who has the natural will wills none of the things that exist, for him there is nothing willed or willable. What then is the argument for those who maintain that the will is that which is willed, or who declare that it is so called by the holy Fathers?

(189) But let it be so called according to them, for our discussion is not about a difference of names, but of pious concepts; but let them answer what we properly ask: whether the divine will is by nature other than the human will; and the latter other than the former, even if it is called and named ten thousand times; let them teach this, and establish our mind that is shaken by what is unknown; and we who are greatly displeased with their coinages of names, yet if we also might contribute something of our own in these matters. For if they are not substantially other and other, it is clear that they are by nature one and the same. And if this is so, then the nature is of necessity one and unchangeable. For where there is no natural otherness of wills, there is none at all of essence and nature. But if they are by nature other and other, they are certainly different; and if they are different, how is it not necessary to confess the number in which they exist? For the denial of this brings about the complete annihilation both of it and of the differing things, as if they did not exist. For how is it possible for them both to exist and not be numbered, and for what reason? or how is it that the wills, while existing by nature, are not numbered in the same way, if indeed the natures themselves do not reasonably cease to be numbered? For what is right in their case, being natural and constitutive of the realities, ought also to apply to the realities themselves, and either they should remove number from these things, as if according to them it is destructive, or, as it in no way harms, it should be included in those things as well. For a declaration of the natural difference that unites them, for which we use it even in the case of the essences; or let them show how, by their refusal concerning the number, they do not bring about a universal abolition or confusion of the Savior's natural human will.

And how is the incarnate Logos a perfect man, without a natural will? For to be deified by the union with God, just as also the nature itself of the flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul, does not remove it from its essential being; just as the extreme and thorough co-mingling and union with fire does not remove iron from its own [nature]; but it suffers the properties of fire, since by the union it has become fire; but again by nature it has weight, and it cuts, because it has not suffered any damage to its own nature, nor has it departed entirely from its natural energy; although existing with fire according to the selfsame and one hypostasis, and acting without separation, both the things according to its own nature—I mean, the cutting—and again the things according to the union, which is the burning. For cutting belongs to it, just as it belongs to the fire, on account of their extreme perichoresis and interchange with one another; and we are not at all prevented from naming or numbering its nature—I mean, that of the iron—even if it is seen with fire, (192) nor its natural energy, even if it is perceived with burning, and has no separation from it, but is manifested and known in a unified manner with it and in it. What then is the reason for not numbering what is naturally present to the nature, that is, the will, and in this way to attest that what is according to us is incomplete in the all-perfect and pre-perfect God the Word incarnate, although all things equally, by the good pleasure of the Father, and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit for our

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Ἄλλως τε· εἰ θέλημά φασι τό θεληθέν, θεληθέν δέ καί θελητόν κατά φύσιν ἡμεῖς· Θεοῦ γάρ κτίσμα τυγχάνομεν, οὐκ ἄλλο λοιπόν ἤ μόνον ἡμᾶς θέλημα κατά φύσιν ἔχει Θεός, γινόμενόν τε καί ἀπογινόμενον, καθά καί ἡμεῖς· πρίν δέ εἶναι, παντός ὤν θελήματος ἔρημος. Τό αὐτό δέ καί ἐπί ἡμῶν συναχθήσεται· μόνον δέ τό ἔξωθεν θεληθέν, ὄν τε καί μή ὄν· καλόν καί μή τοιοῦτον, περιπλασθήσεται· πῶς ( πρός) δέ καί θεληθέν τε τῶν ἐκτός ὑπάρχει. ∆ιά γάρ τόν πρός αὐτό θελήσει κινούμενον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δι᾿ αὐτό λέγεται, θεληθέν καί θελητόν. Ὡς ἐάν μηδέν θελήσῃ τῶν ὄντων, ὁ τήν φυσικήν θέλησιν ἔχων, οὐδέν αὐτῷ θεληθέν ἤ θελητόν. Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος τοῖς θέλημα τό θεληθέν ἰσχυριζομένοις ὑπάρχειν , ἤ λέγεσθαι πρός τῶν ἁγίων Πατέρων ἀποφαινομένοις;

(189) Ἔστω δέ καί οὕτω λεγόμενον κατ᾿ αὐτούς, οὐ γάρ περί διαφορᾶς ὀνομάτων ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' εὐσεβῶν νοημάτων ὁ λόγος· ἐκεῖνο δέ προσηκόντως ἐρομένοις ἀποκριθῶσιν, εἰ ἄλλο κατά φύσιν ἐστί τό θεῖον πρός τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα· καί ἄλλο πρός ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο, κἄν εἰ μυρίως καλῆται καί ὀνομάζηται· τοῦτο διδάξωσι, καί κραδαινομένην ἡμῶν ἐπί τῷ ἀγνώστῳ στηρίζωσι τήν διάνοιαν· καί οἱ λίαν αὐτῶν ταῖς ὀνοματοθεσίαις δυσχεράνομεν, ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι καί παρ᾿ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τούτοις συνεισενέγκομεν. Εἰ γάρ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο κατ᾿οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὡς ἕν φύσει καί ταὐτόν. Καί εἰ τοῦτο, καί ἡ φύσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης μία καί ἀπαράλλακτος. Οὗ γάρ ἑτερότης φυσική θελημάτων οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' οὐσίας τό παράπαν καί φύσεως. Εἰ δέ ἄλλο φύσει καί ἄλλο, διάφορα πάντως· καί εἰ διάφορα, πῶς τόν ἐν πόσῳ τούτων ἀριθμόν οὐχ ὁμολογῆσαι χρεών; Ἡ γάρ τούτου ἐξάρνησις, αὐτῆς τε πάμπαν ἀφανισμόν, καί τῶν διαφερόντων, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων, ἐργάζεται. Πῶς γάρ καί εἶναι δυνατόν καί μή ἀριθμεῖσθαι, καί δι᾿ ἥντινα τήν αἰτίαν; ἤ πῶς ὄντα μέν κατά φύσιν, οὐκ ἀριθμούμενα δέ τά θελήματα τήν αὐτήν, εἴπερ εὐλόγως μή παύσοιντο τοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι καὐταί αἱ φύσεις; Τό γάρ ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων καλόν, ἐμφύτων ὄντων καί συστατικῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, καί ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν προσήκει τοῖς πράγμασι, καί ἤ κἀκ τούτων ἀνέλωσι τόν ἀριθμόν, ὡς ὅτι κατ᾿ αὐτούς λυμαινόμενον, ἤ μηδαμῶς παραβλάπτοντα, καί ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων περιληφθῇ. Πρός δήλωσιν τῆς ἑνούσης αὐτοῖς ἐμφύτου διαφορᾶς, δι᾿ ἥν αὐτῷ κἄν ταῖς οὐσίαις προσχρώμεθα· ἤ δείξωσι, πῶς μή ἀναίρεσιν πάντωνς ἤ σύγχυσιν, τοῦ κατά ἄνθρωπον φυσικοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος θελήματος ἀπεργάζονται, διά τῆς κατά τόν ἀριθμόν παραιτήσεως.

Καί πῶς τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ὁ σαρκωθείς Λόγος, θελήματος ἐκτός φυσικοῦ; Τό γάρ θεωθῆναι τῇ πρός Θεόν ἑνώσει, καθά καί τήν φύσιν αὐτήν τῆς λογικῶς τε καί νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης σαρκός, τῆς κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὀντότητος οὐκ ἐξίστησιν· ὥσπερ οὐδέ τῆς οἰκείας τόν σίδηρον, ἡ ἄκρα καί δι᾿ ὅλου πρός τό πῦρ συνανάκρασίς τε καί ἕνωσις· ἀλλά πάσχει μέν τά πυρός, ἐπειδή πῦρ τῇ ἑνώσει γεγένηται· βρίθει δέ πάλιν κατά φύσιν, καί τέμνει, ὅτι μή τῆς οἰκείας λώβην πέπονθε φύσεως, ἤ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐξέστη τό σύνολον· καίτοι μετά πυρός ὑπάρχων κατά τήν αὐτήν καί μίαν ὑπόστασιν, καί ἀδιαστάτως δρῶν, τά τε κατά φύσιν ἰδίαν· λέγω δέ τήν τομήν· καί τά καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν αὖθις, ὅπερ ἐστίν ἡ καῦσις. Αὐτοῦ γάρ ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ καί τοῦ πυρός ἡ τομή, διά τήν ἄκραν τούτων αἰς ἄλληλα περιχώρησίν τε καί ἀντίδοσιν· καί οὔτε τήν φύσιν αὐτοῦ, φημί δέ τοῦ σιδήρου, κἄν μετά πυρός ὁρᾶται, (192) κωλυόμεθα τό παράπαν ὀνομάζειν ἤ ἀριθμεῖν, οὔτε τήν φυσικήν ἐνέργειαν, εἰ καί μετά καύσεως καθορᾶται, καί μηδεμίαν ἔχει πρός ταύτην διάστασιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἑνοειδῶς σύν αὐτῇ τε καί ἐν αὐτῇ διαφαίνεται καί γνωρίζεται. Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος, τοῦ τό φυσικῶς τῇ φύσει προσόν μή ἀριθμεῖν, τουτέστι τό θέλημα, καί ταύτῃ τό καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἀτελές τῷ ὑπερτελεῖ καί προτελείῳ Θεῷ Λόγῳ σεσαρκωμένῳ προσμαρτυρεῖν, καίτοι πάντων ἐπίσης, εὐδοκίᾳ Πατρός, καί συνεργείᾳ Πνεύματος ἁγίου διά τήν ἡμῶν