79

salvation, through the inseparable union with him who partook of the things of nature, just as indeed of nature itself completely, except for sin alone, because it was not of nature, but of the deliberative will, a deviation and a slip of nature moved contrary to reason and to law?

And for this reason most especially, the aforementioned monk seems to me to have rightly insisted on this, having distinguished the gnomic from the natural will. For the one, according to his well-put definition, is a power desirous of that which is according to nature. For whatever is among beings, and especially rational beings, naturally desires that which is according to nature, and having received this power from God according to its essence, possesses it for its own constitution. For if it does not have the desire for what is according to nature, from where and how could it have desire for what in no way exists, having no existence or motion at all? For only non-being is inert and unsubstantial; and in no way does any power or motion of it exist among beings. But the other has become a self-determined impulse, making deviations to either side; and it is not definitive of nature, but properly of person and hypostasis. And having understood this, the divider and man-worshipper Nestorius impiously dogmatized a union of wills, in order that he might confirm each hypostasis through the other, and that for him the mere man might be preserved, who, as he says, made the union by a certain will and self-determined motion toward God the Word, from which he also constitutes an identity of deliberation, or, to speak more appropriately, a multiplicity of deliberations; inasmuch as by each movement of the gnomic will, he proceeds, according to him, partially from the imperfect to the perfect, being carried along and progressing; but not from the ineffable conception itself, when the divinity of the Word, whole and complete with all its own properties, was united to our whole nature with all its properties, in one and the same hypostasis.

So that, therefore, the aforementioned monk might carefully discern the integrity of nature in the incarnate God, and cast aside the contrary, he defined (193) the natural will in him, but he excluded the gnomic will, giving no room for division to introduce strife in this, nor any entrance for fantasy, since that will did not exist. But if anyone by chance should maintain that it is not possible for the two wills to be spoken of in him otherwise than in opposition, if he means as essentially different, I too accept it, but if as contrary, the argument is false. For not everything that is different is also contrary. For what is contrary is clearly of a will moved irrationally; but difference has become the work of a nature governed by reason; and the one is destructive of nature, while the other is manifestly constitutive. Essential difference, therefore, is for the constitution of things in nature, not opposition, (but) which is for their dissolution. For nature does not possess what is contrary to nature, nor is there any reason in what is in conflict.

Besides, if the two wills are in every way contrary and opposed, how is it that this does not always and in every way happen in the case of rational beings who are divided by nature and hypostasis? For we at times assent to them, although they are gnomic, to God, and to angels, and to one another, but not on this account have we yet lost our judgment, and the will according to it. For if of these, and of the assent to others, that is, as long as we have this, we also hold to other gnomic wills. If, then, this is the case here, and no opposition is seen at all, although the gnomic wills are preserved in their existence and number, and the friendly disposition in relation; how, in the same and one incarnate God the Word, who became man completely for us, will there be opposition in the wills that belong to him naturally and essentially? How then do they say these are contrary,

79

σωτηρίαν, καθ᾿ ἕνωσιν τήν ἀδιάστατον τῶν τῆς φύσεως κεκοινωνηκότι, καθάπερ οὖν καὐτῆς τελείως τῆς φύσεως, πλήν μόνης τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὅτι μηδέ τῆς φύσεως ἦν, ἀλλά γνώμης, παρά τόν λόγον καί τόν νόμον κεκινημένης τῆς φύσεως, ἐκτροπή καί ὀλίσθημα;

Καί μοι δεόντως μάλιστα τούτου γε χάριν ὁ λεχθείς ἐπιστήσας φαίνεται μοναχός, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τό γνωμικόν διαστείλας θελήματος. Τό μέν γάρ, κατά τόν αὐτοῦ καλῶς ἔχοντα ὁρισμόν, ∆ύναμις ὑπάρχει τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική. Πᾶν γάρ εἴ τι τῶν ὄντων καί μάλιστα λογικῶν, φυσικῶς τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρέγεται, καί τούτου παρά Θεοῦ λαβόν κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἔχει τήν δύναμιν, πρός σύστασιν τήν ἑαυτοῦ. Εἰ γάρ τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος οὐκ ἔχει τήν ὄρεξιν, τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος, πόθεν καί πῶς, μηδόλως ὕπαρξιν ἤ κίνησιν ἔχοντος; Μόνον γάρ ἀδρανές τό μή ὄν καί ἀνούσιον· καί οὐδαμῶς οὐδέ μία τούτου δύναμις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχει, καί κίνησις. Τό δέ, αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή καθέστηκε, τάς ἐφ᾿ ἑκάτερα ποιουμένη παρεκτροπάς· καί οὐ φύσεως ὑπάρχον ἀφοριστικόν, ἀλλά προσώπου κυρίως καί ὑποστάσεως. Καί τοῦτό γε διαγνούς ὁ διῃρημένος καί ἀνθρωπολάτρης Νεστόριος, γνωμῶν ἕνωσιν ἀσεβῶς ἐδογμάτισεν· ἵν᾿ ἑκατέραν δι᾿ ἑκατέρας ὑπόστασιν ἐπικυρώσῃ, καί ὁ ψιλός ἄνθρωπος αὐτῷ τηρηθῇ, γνώμῃ τινί καί αὐθαιρέτῳ κινήσει τῇ πρός τόν Θεόν Λόγον, ὡς αὐτός φησι, τήν ἕνωσιν ποιησάμενος, ἐξ ἧς καί τήν ταυτοβουλίαν συνίστησιν, ἤ πολυβουλίαν, εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον· ὅσῳ καί καθ᾿ ἑκάστης τοῦ γνωμικοῦ θελήματος κίνησιν, κατά μέρος ἐκ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐπί τά ἐντελῆ κατ᾿ αὐτόν ἴεται, φερομένη τε καί προκόπτουσα· ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀφράστου συλλήψεως, ὅλης τελείως μετά τῶν αὐτῆς ἁπάντων, πρός ὅλην καί τά κατ᾿ αὐτήν ἅπαντα, τήν ἡμετέραν φύσιν τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος, καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν μίαν καί τήν αὐτήν ἑνωθείσης.

Ὡς ἄν τοίνυν καί τό ἐνελές διακριβώσῃ τῆς φύσεως ἐπί τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ, καί τό ἀντικείνενον διαῤῥίψῃ ὁ λεχθείς μοναχός· τό μέν φυσικόν (193) ὥρισεν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ· τό δέ γνωμικόν ἀποδιώρισε θέλημα, μήτε τῇ διαιρέσει χώραν δούς τῷ στασιάζειν ἐν τούτῳ, μήτε τῇ φαντασίᾳ παρείσδυσιν, τῷ μή ὑπάρχειν ἐκεῖνο. Εἰ δέ τις τυχόν ἰσχυρίζεται, μή ἄν ἄλλως ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ δυνατόν, ἤ κατ᾿ ἐναντίωσιν τά δύο θελήματα λέγεσθαι· εἰ μέν ὡς κατ᾿ οὐσίαν διάφορα, κἀγώ δέχομαι, εἰ δέ ὡς ἀντικείμενα, ψευδής ὁ λόγος. Οὐ γάρ εἴ τι διάφορον πάντως καί ἀντικείμενον. Τό γάρ ἀντικείμενον, γνώμης παραλόγως δηλαδή κινουμένης· τό δέ τό δέ διάφορον, φύσεως λόγῳ κρατουμένης ἔργον καθέστηκε· καί τό μέν φύσεως στασιαστικόν, τό δέ προδήλως συστατικόν. ∆ιαφορά τοιγαροῦν οὐσιώδης, εἰς σύστασιν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πράγμάτων ἐστίν, οὐ μή ἐναντίωσις, (ἀλλά ) πρός τήν τούτων διάλυσιν. Οὐ γάρ ἔχει ἡ φύσις τό παρά φύσιν· οὐδέ λόγος οὐδείς τοῦ στασιάζοντος.

Ἄλλως τε, εἰ τά δύο θελήματα πάντως ἐναντία καί ἀντικείμενα, πῶς ἐπί τε τῶν φύσει καί ὑποστάσει διῃρημένων λογικῶν, οὐ τοῦτο πάντη τε καί πάντως συμβαίνει. Συννεύομεν γάρ ἔστιν ὅτε τούτοις, καίτοι γνωμικοῖς οὖσι, καί Θεῷ, καί ἀγγέλοις, καί ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διά τοῦτο τῆς γνώμης ἤδη, καί τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτήν θελήματος, διαπεπτώκαμεν. Εἰ γάρ τούτων, καί τῆς πρός τούς ἄλλους δηλονότι συννεύσεως, εἴπερ ἕως ταύτην ἔχομεν, καί τῶν ἄλλων γνωμικῶν ἀντεχόμεθα. Εἰ οὖν ἐνταῦθα τοῦτο, καί οὐδαμῶς ἀντίταξις καθορᾶται, καίτοι σωζομένων ὑπάρξει τε καί ἀριθμῷ τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων, καί τήν φιλικήν ἐν σχέσει διάθεσιν· πῶς ἐπί τοῦ αὐτοῦ καί ἑνός σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ Λόγου, καί τελείως δι᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσαντος, ἐν τοῖς φυσικῶς προσοῦσιν αὐτῷ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν θελήμασιν, ἐναντίωσις ἔσται. Πῶς δέ ταῦτά φασιν ἐναντία,