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but thine be done. By this pushing away division, and by that again, confusion.

But if they say these things because at another time he seems to have made an emphasis on willing, or at the time of the passion, let them say this also concerning innate understanding, and they will make him mindless. For he does not appear to have said, "I have understood." And similarly concerning the sense of smell, and the rest of the natural things according to us, which he is not recorded as having mentioned. Or also concerning the soul itself, as if it did not previously exist in substance, from when he became man, but only whenever he mentioned it. For not long before the passion is he declared to have done this. Either, then, let them say it was fashioned on the spot, because he did not mention it often and from the beginning; or, not saying this, but dogmatizing according to the great Athanasius, "At once flesh, at once the ensouled, rational flesh of God the Word," they will say that the natural will of the Savior as man did not exist only at the time of the passion, even if he made mention of it then; but from the beginning was consubstantial with the Savior as man naturally according to us; and so they would cease moving and concluding such things at the wrong time. For the present time is one of blood because of our sins, but not of dogmas; and of strong lamentations, for the propitiation of God, but not of sophistical contradictions, for greater indignation against us.

It occurs to me to marvel also concerning energy, how they dogmatize one energy in Christ, by looking and referring, as they say, to the individual. And to omit saying that none of the natural things refers primarily to the individual, but has its reference to its nature and essence. For who could energize anything without the powers naturally belonging to the nature? or from whence does he have the to energize or the to be able, apart from nature? But I wish to ask this: did they put this forward for the abolition of the natural energies, or what? For if for abolition, how, when, and what kind of energy could there be at all upon their cessation? for just as when natures do not exist, that which is from them also vanishes completely, I mean the composite hypostasis; so also when the natural energies do not exist, there will be no other at all. And I do not say this as if another energy were composed from the natural ones. For there is no composition of things in a subject; because it presents not existence in itself at all, but (200) what is random. So if they say that those which are properly according to nature do not exist, how will that which in no way is, exist? For who is it that speaks of a hypostatic energy, and from where, and from whom having received it do they bring it forth? But if they happen to declare this, and they confess the hypostasis to which it refers is composite, and receptive of contraries and opposites—for mortal and immortal, visible and invisible, circumscribed and uncircumscribed, without beginning and under a beginning—then it is likely that the energy will be this also. And how else, but clearly according to state and privation? and some things it will suffer, as existing, and others it will cause to subsist alongside, as not existing. And how will he who has such an energy, according to the same and not another and another, since neither does that [energy], suffer similar things? For it is entirely necessary for the one who energizes to be aptly related to his own energy, and that [energy] to him. And how God, he who is God by state, and not by nature? And how man, he who is man by privation, and not properly existing as this in essence? And what nature is without energy, or outside of natural energy? For just as it is in no way devoid of existence, so neither is it devoid of natural power. But if it lacks this, it would also lack existence. For the powerless, as completely inert, is only that which is not. For whatever is among the things that are, has a constitutive difference, the innate motion being included with the genus, and making the definition of the subject, through which it is properly known that it is and what it is, having the unchangeable in relation to things of the same kind, and the different

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ἀλλά τό σόν γενέσθω. Ταύτῃ μέν τήν διαίρεσιν ἀπωθούμενος, ἐκείνῃ δέ πάλιν τήν σύγχυσιν.

Εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἀλλοτε φαίνεται τοῦ θέλειν ἔμφασιν πεποιημένος, ἤ κατά τόν καιρόν τοῦ πάθους, ταῦτά φασι, τοῦτο καί περί τῆς ἐμφύτου νοήσεως εἴποιεν, καί ἄνουν αὐτόν κατασκευάσουσιν. Οὐ γάρ φαίνεται λέξας ὅτι νενόηκα. Καί περί ὀσφρήσεως ὁμοίως, καί τῶν λοιπῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς φυσικῶν, ὧν μνημονεύσας οὐκ ἀναγέγραπται. Ἤ καί περί τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ὡς οὐ πρότερον οὔσης καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν, ἀφ᾿ οὗ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ᾿ ἤ μόνον ὁπόταν αὐτῆς ἐμνημόνευσεν. Οὐ πρό πολλοῦ γάρ τοῦ πάθους τοῦτο πεποιηκώς ἀνηγόρευται. Ἤ τοίνυν σχεδιασθεῖσαν αὐτήν αὐτίκα εἴπωσιν, ὅτι μή πολλάκις καί ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς ἐμνημόνευσεν · ἤ τοῦτο μή λέγοντες, ἀλλ᾿ " Ἅμα σάρξ, ἅμα Θεοῦ Λόγου σάρξ ἔμψυχος, λογική." κατά τόν μέγαν Ἀθανάσιον δογματίζουσι, καί τό φυσικόν ὡς ἀνθρώπου τοῦ Σωτῆρος θέλημα, μή κατά τόν καιρόν εἶναι τοῦ πάθους λέξουσι μόνον, εἰ καί μνήμην αὐτίκα τούτου πεποίηκεν· ἀλλ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς φυσικῶς τῷ Σωτῆρι συνουσιωμένον· καί παύσοιντο λοιπόν οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ τά τοιαῦτα κινοῦντές τε καί συνάγοντες. Καιρός γάρ ὁ παρών αἱμάτων διά τάς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δογμάτων ἐστί· καί θρήνων ἰσχυρῶν, εἰς Θεοῦ δυσώπησιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ σοφιστικῶν ἀντιῤῥήσεων, εἰς περισσοτέραν καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀγανάκτησιν.

Ἔπεισι δέ μοι θαυμάζειν καί περί ἐνεργείας, ὡς μίαν ταύτην ἐπί Χριστοῦ σογματίζουσι, τῇ πρός τό ἄτομον, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν, ἀποσκοπήσει καί ἀναφορᾷ. Καί ἵνα παρῶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐδέν τῶν φυσικῶν ὡς εἰς ἄτομον προηγουμένως, ἀλλά τήν τούτου φύσιν τε καί οὐσίαν ἔχει τήν ἀναφοράν. Τίς γάρ ἄνευ τῶν φυσικῶς προσόντων τῇ φύσει δυνάμεων, ἐνεργεῖν τι δύναιτ᾿ ἄν; ἤ πόθεν αὐτῷ τό ἐνεργεῖν ἤ δύνασθαι, πάρεξ τῆς φύσεως; Ἐκεῖνο δέ ἐρωτῆσαι βούλομαι· πρός ἀναίρεσιν ἄρα τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν ταύτην προΐσχοντο, ἤ τί; Εἰ γάρ ἐπ᾿ ἀναιρέσει, πῶς, πότε καί ποῖα κατά τήν ἐκείνων ἀπόπαυσιν εἴη τό παράπαν ἐνέργεια; ὡς γάρ φύσεων οὐκ οὐσῶν, καί τό ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀφανίζεται πάντως, ἡ σύνθετος λέγω ὑπόστασις· οὕτω καί τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν οὐκ οὐσῶν, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλη τό σύνολον ἔσται. Καί οὐ λέγω τοῦτο, ὡς ἄλλης ἐνεργείας ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν συνισταμένης. Οὐδέ μία γάρ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ σύνθεσις· Ὅτι μηδέ τήν καθ᾿ ἑαυτά τό σύνολον ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλα τό (200) εἰκαῖον παριστᾷ. Ὡς εἰ τάς κυρίως κατά φύσιν οὔσας οὐκ εἶναι λέγουσι, πῶς ὑπάρξει τό μηδαμῶς ὄν; Τίς γάρ ἐστι ὑποστατικήν λέγων ἐνέργειαν, καί πόθεν τοῦτο, καί παρά τίνος λαβόντες πρσφέρουσιν; Εἰ δέ τοῦτο τυχόν ἀποφαίνονται, σύνθετον δέ τήν ὑπόστασιν ὁμολογοῦσι πρός ἥν ἀναφέρεται, καί τῶν ἐναντίων καί ἀντικειμένων δεκτικήν· θνητήν γάρ καί ἀθάνατον, ὁρατήν καί ἀόρατον, περιγραπτήν καί ἀπερίγραφον, ἄναρχον καί ὑπό ἀρχήν, ἔσται τοῦτο κατά τό εἰκός καί ἡ ἐνέργεια. Καί πῶς ἄλλως, ἤ καθ᾿ ἕξιν δηλονότι καί στέρησιν; καί τά μέν, ὡς οὖσα, πείσεται, τά δέ, ὡς μή οὖσα, παρυποστήσει. Πῶς δέ καί ὁ τοιαύτην ἔχων ἐνέργειαν, κατά τό αὐτό καί οὐκ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο, ὅτι μηδέ ἐκείνη, τά ὅμοια πείσεται; προσφυῶς γάρ ἔχειν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἐνεργείᾳ τόν ἐνεργοῦντα, κἀκείνη τούτῳ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. Καί πῶς Θεός, ὁ ἕξει, καί μή φύσει Θεός; Πῶς δέ ἄνθρωπος, ὁ στερήσει, καί μή οὐσίᾳ κυρίως τοῦτο ὑπάρχων; Τίς δέ φύσις ἀνενέργητος, ἤ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκτός; Ὡς γάρ οὐδαμῶς ὑπάρξεως ἔρημος, οὕτως οὐδέ δυνάμεως φυσικῆς. Εἰ δέ ταύτης ἀμοιρεῖ, καί τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀμοιρήσειεν ἄν. Τό γάρ ἀδύναμον, ὡς ἀδρανές πάντη μόνον ἐστί τό μή ὄν. Πᾶν γάρ εἴ τι τῶν ὄντων, συστατικήν ἔχει διαφοράν, τήν ἔμφυτον κίνησιν τῷ γένει συμπαραλαμβανομένην, καί ποιοῦσαν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τόν ὁρισμόν, δι᾿ οὗ ὅτι ἐστί καί τί ἐστι κυρίως γνωρίζεται, πρός τέ τά ὁμοειδῆ τό ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχον, καί τό διάφορον