82

again toward the heterogeneous things; and if this is so, how is it possible for the incarnate Logos, lacking a natural power according to the flesh, to be called a perfect man, or a man at all. For man does not exist without a natural energy, just as no other nature exists without its own and essential one. For the lack of this either makes the nature not even be a nature, or it makes all natures the same as one another, and one in place of all, being mixed together throughout and confused by the loss of that which constitutes them. For if they say the Logos is not without energy in our human reality, it is clear that they say he has an innate and human energy. For how could it be otherwise? For it is not possible to energize without a natural energy, just as it is not possible to exist without substance and nature. But neither must the one who energizes, if he is double in nature, of all necessity have only one innate energy; for then the one who subsists, even if he is composite in hypostasis, would in every way have one nature. For if the former is because of the relation, the latter is in every way also because of the same. For we see this borne unitarily upon both. For both the energy is referred to the one who energizes, and the nature in turn is referred to the one who subsists. Therefore, if they say there is one energy of the one who energizes on account of the union and the singularity of the person, they must for this reason also declare one nature of the one who subsists, so that they may not be caught dogmatizing a relational union, speaking of a union of energies, but not also of natures. For it is not possible for them to unite these to the hypostasis, but rather [they unite] the substance and nature only with respect to the (201) natural energies, which are united to him in nothing else than energy. For just as the natural difference of these [energies] makes two who energize, according to them, so doubtless, in every way, the innate otherness of the substances will also bring together two who subsist. Either, therefore, let them confound these [energies] also into one nature, or let them in no way introduce division to those [natures], which are substances existing naturally and being numbered. For what does not happen in those [natures], could never happen in these [energies]. But the natural difference is indeed shown through their number; but the division is removed through the perfect union. For it is not possible to know that a divine or human nature even exists, let alone that it differs from another, apart from its essential energy. For the definition of the thing is properly the principle of its essential power; and when this is taken away, the subject is in every way also taken away with it. And for this reason we confess that these [energies] are naturally preserved in the incarnate Logos: the one, in the bestowal of divine things upon the flesh; the other, in turn, being shown authoritatively in the experience of human things; so that along with these we may also confess the natures of which they are essential energies.

But to whom is it not clear that in the case of the same substance and nature, it is not possible to see a difference of existence or of natural energy? For no [nature] differs from itself; for this is somehow impossible. But in an individual and person, in every way and in all respects, if it is composite; for we both see the different natures from which it is composed, and the natural movements by which it is known to energize according to nature, confirming its own existence, and it shows in reality that the things from which it exists are one thing and another, through the natural energy which is according to one thing and another, through which, as for the one who looks away from it—I mean the individual—and willingly runs past the natures by abolishing the natural energies, we find his accusation not so much weighing upon this, as cooperating with it. For if the individual is not in every way contained in one natural energy, just as it is not in one nature— for who is it that says this, or is able to demonstrate it? it is clear that it has essential movements equal in number to its natures, that is, its substances, and no one will contradict this. And I pass over saying that the composite person in Christ is not even properly called an individual. For it does not have a relation to that which descends from the most general genus through the subordinate genera to the most specific species

82

αὖθις πρός τά ἑτεροειδῆ· καί εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς δυνατόν φυσικῇ δυνάμει ἀμοιροῦντα κατά σάρκα, τόν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα Λόγον ἄνθρωπον τέλειον, ἤ ὅλως ἄνθρωπον χρηματίζειν. Οὐ γάρ δίχα φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἄλλη φύσις τῆς οἰκείας καί οὐσιώδους. Ἡ γάρ ἔλλειψις ταύτης, ἤ οὐδέ φύσιν εἶναι ποιεῖ τήν φύσιν, ἤ τάς πάσας ἀλλήλαις ταυτόν, καί ἀντί πάντων μίαν, τῇ ἀπολείψει τῆς συνιστώσης συμφυρείσας δι᾿ ὅλου συγχυθείσας. Εἰ γάρ οὐκ ἀνέργητον λέγουσι τό καθ' ἡμᾶς τόν Λόγον, δῆλον ὡς ἔμφυτον καί ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα τοῦτόν φασι. Πῶς γάρ ἄν ἄλλως; Οὐ γάρ ἐνεργεῖν δυνατόν φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας χωρίς· ὥσπερ οὐδέ ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας δίχα καί φύσεως. Ἀλλ' οὐδέ μίαν μόνον, ἄν περ ᾗ τήν φύσιν διπλοῦς, τήν ἔμφυτον ἔχειν ἐνέργειαν τόν ἐνεργοῦντα, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἐπεί καί φύσιν μίαν πάντως τόν ὑφεστῶτα, κἄν σύνθετος ᾗ τήν ὑπόστασιν. Εἰ γάρ διά τήν σχέσιν ἐκεῖνο, διά τήν αὐτήν πάντως καί τοῦτο. Μοναδικῶς γάρ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν ταύτην φερομένην ὁρῶμεν. Ἥ τε γάρ ἐνέργεια πρός τόν ἐνεργοῦντα, καί πρός τόν ὑφεστῶτα πάλιν ἡ φύσις ἀνάγεται. Χρή τοίνυν εἴπερ διά τήν ἕνωσιν καί τό μοναδικόν τοῦ προσώπου, μίαν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντός φασι τήν ἐνέργειαν, μίαν διά τοῦτο καί φύσιν τοῦ ἐφεστῶτος διαγορεύειν, ἵνα μή σχετικήν τήν ἕνωσιν δογματίζοντες φωραθεῖεν, ἐνεργειῶν ταύτην, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί καί φύσεων λέγοντες. Οὐ γάρ πρός ὑπόστασιν ταύτας αὐτούς ἑνοῦν δυνατόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐσίαν καί φύσιν ὅσον ἐπί ταῖς (201) φυσικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι πλήν ἐνεργείας πρός αὐτόν ἑνουμένας. Ἐπεί ὥσπερ ἡ τούτων φυσική διαφορά, δύο τούς ἐνεργοῦντας ποιεῖ κατ᾿ αὐτούς, οὕτω δήπου πάντως, καί ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔμφυτος ἑτερότης, δύο τούς ὑφεστῶτας συνάξει. Ἤ τοίνυν πρός μίαν φύσιν καί ταύτας συμφύρωσιν· ἤ μηδαμῶς ἐκείναις, οὐσίαις τε οὔσαις φυσικῶς καί ἀριθμουμέναις, διαίρεσιν ἐπεισφρήσωσιν. Ὅπερ γάρ ἐν ἐκείναις οὐ γίνεται, οὐδέ ἐν ταύταις συμβαίνῃ ποτ᾿ ἄν. Ἀλλά δηλοῦται μέν ἡ φυσική διαφορά, διά τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτάς ἀριθμοῦ· ἐξίσταται δέ ἡ διαίρεσις διά τῆς ἄκρας ἑνώσεως. Οὐ γάρ δυνατόν θείαν ἤ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ὅτι κἄν ἔστι γνωρίσαι, μή ὅτι γε διαφέρειν πρός ἄλλην, οὐσιώδους ἐνεργείας ἐκτός. Ὅρος γάρ τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσιώδους δυνάμεως κυρίως ἐστίν· ἧς ἀναιρουμένης, συναναιρεῖται πάντως καί τό ὑποκείμενον. Καί διά τοῦτο ταύτας ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐπί τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Λόγου φυσικῶς σωζομένας· τήν μέν, ἐν τῇ σαρκός προσβολῇ τῶν θείων· τήν δέ πάλιν, ἐν τῇ πείρᾳ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐξουσιαστικῶς δεικνυμένην· ἵνα καί τάς φύσεις, ὧν εἰσίν οὐσιώδεις ἐνέργειαι, ταύταις συνομολογήσωμεν.

Τίνι δέ δῆλον οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐπί μέν οὐσίας καί φύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς, διαφοράν ὑπάρξεως ἤ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν; Οὐδεμία γάρ πρός ἑαυτήν διαφέρει· τοῦτο γάρ πως ἀμήχανον. Ἐν ἀτόμῳ δέ καί προσώπῳ πάντη τε καί πάντως, εἴπερ σύνθετον· καί διαφόρους τε γάρ φύσεις, τάς ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, καθορῶμεν, καί τάς φυσικάς κινήσεις, αἷς ἐνεργοῦν κατά φύσιν γνωρίζεται, τήν οἰκείαν πιστούμενος ὕπαρξιν, καί ἄλλο καί ἄλλο τά ἐξ ὧν ἐστι, διά τῆς κατ᾿ ἄλλο καί ἄλλο φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας πραγματικῶς παριστᾷ, δι᾿ οὗ, τοῦ πρός αὐτό, φημί δέ τό ἄτομον, ἀποσκοποῦντος, καί τάς φύσεις ἑκοντί παρατρέχοντος, διά τό τάς φυσικάς ἀνελεῖν ἐνεργείας, τήν καταδρομήν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτῳ βαροῦσαν, ἤ συνεργοῦσαν εὑρίσκομεν. Εἰ γάρ οὐκ εἰς μίαν φυσικήν τό ἄτομον περικλείεται πάντως ἐνέργειαν, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδέ φύσιν· τίς γάρ ὁ λέγων, ἤ παραστῆσαι δυνάμενος; δῆλον ὡς ταῖς κατ᾿ αὐτό φύσεσιν ἤγουν οὐσίαις, ἰσαρίθμους ἔχει τάς οὐσιώδεις κινήσεις, καί οὐδείς ἀντερεῖ. Καί παρῶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐδέ ἄτομον κυρίως τό κατά Χριστόν σύνθετον λέγεται πρόσωπον. Οὐ γάρ σχέσιν ἔχει πρός τήν ἐκ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους διά τῶν ὑπάλληλα καθιεμένην γενῶν πρός τό εἰδικώτατον