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much that is opposed, to which also sinning follows. For it is by the mode of motion according to misuse, but not by the principle of the power according to nature, that what is contrary to reason and law subsists; since, when suitably formed and moved, even if it does not have that which is united to God, it at least has that which is concordant and not opposed. For just as there is no principle in nature for what is above nature, so too is there none for what is contrary to nature and in conflict. Hence the teacher did not declare that it does not follow in every way and always, but qualified it, saying: "As not always, and as for the most part," to which is implied, sometimes and rarely, because of the difficulty of leading the many to virtue. For the human will of the Savior, even if it was natural, was not merely human as ours is, just as His humanity itself was not, being above us, supremely deified by the union, to which also sinlessness is properly attached. But ours is manifestly merely human, and in no way sinless, because of the deviation that occurs here and there; not changing nature, but diverting motion, or to speak more truly, altering its mode. And this is clear, from doing many things contrary to reason, and in no way passing over into an irrational substance from the innate rational nature which unifies.

(237)) Therefore, the human as it is in us is not one thing, and the human in the Savior another; nor is the willing another, at least according to the principle of nature, even if in another way it is above us; for divinely, the one was hypostasized, and the other was formed, through the supreme union with the divine. But to fit again, most suitably, each of the blameworthy things in us, such as opposition, or resistance, and whatever belongs to this list, even when in thought they inseparably separate the natures, approaching the next nature, it is by no means lawful in these things to include the humanity of Christ. For if not even in us is it considered suitably, but contrary to nature and reason, how can it be attached to Him, even by thought or further thought, so to speak? but only by appropriation, through pity as to the head of the whole body, just as the passions of the sick person are to a physician, until God who became man for our sake should free us from these things. Yet completely consuming and destroying them from us by the power of his embodiment. For the account of the passions is twofold: the one of blamelessness; the other of blameworthiness; and the one characterizes our nature, while the other utterly corrupts it. The former, therefore, as a man willing for our sake, he essentially accepted, both confirming the nature and loosing the condemnation against us; the latter, again, as one who loves mankind, he economically appropriated, which is known in us and in our insubordinate mode, so that, as fire does wax, or as the sun a mist from the earth, having completely consumed them from us, he might impart his own qualities, and from thenceforth make us impassible, and according to the promise, incorruptible. Therefore, one must fittingly accept both the zeal and the labor of one who studies such things for the sake of piety, and urge him toward a more accurate care for the patristic words, on account of the detractors of good things, who out of excessive folly do not even concede that which it is not possible for them to grasp even if they wanted to.

And as for Honorius, the Pope of the Romans, I think that he does not denounce the duality of the innate wills in Christ, in the letter written to Sergius, because he spoke of one will, but rather that he speaks in favor of it, and, as is likely, establishes it, saying this not for the setting aside of the human and natural will of the Savior, but because in no way did a will of the flesh or an impassioned thought precede His conception without seed and His incorruptible birth. For only the divine and Paternal will, through the only-begotten Son

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πολλά ἀντιπίπτον, ᾧ καί τό ἁμαρτάνειν ἐφέπεται. Τῷ γάρ κατά παράχρησιν τῆς κινήσεως τρόπῳ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῷ κατά φύσιν τῆς δυνάμεως λόγῳ, τό παρά λόγον καί νόμον ὑφίσταται· ἐπεί προσφυῶς τυπούμενόν τε καί κινούμενον, εἰ καί τό ἡνωμένον πρός Θεόν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλά γε τό συμβαῖνον καί μή ἀντιπίπτον. Ὡς γάρ οὐδείς ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος τοῦ ὑπέρ φύσειν, οὕτως οὐδέ τοῦ παρά φύσιν καί στασιάζοντος. Ἔνθεν οὐδέ ὡς οὐχ ἕπεται πάντη τε καί πάντως ἀπεφήνατο ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκόλασε φήσας· " Ὡς οὐ πάντως, καί ὡς τά πολλά," ᾧ προσυπακούεται τό, ἔστιν ὅτε καί ὀλιγάκις, διά τό πρός ἀρετήν τῶν πολλῶν δυσανάγωγον. Τό γάρ τοῦ κατά τόν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρωπίνου θέλειν, εἰ καί φυσικόν ἦν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ ψιλόν ἦν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ αὐτό τό ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς, τῇ ἑνώσει κατάκρον θεωθέν, ᾧ καί τό ἀναμάρτητον κυρίως ἐπήρτηται. Τό δέ ἡμέτερον προδήλως ψιλόν, καί οὐδαμῶς ἀναμάρτητον, διά τήν τῇδε κἀκεῖσε γινομένην παρέγκλησιν· οὐ φύσιν μέν παραλλάττουσαν, κίνησιν δέ παρατρέπουσαν, ἤ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, τόν ταύτης τρόπον ἀμείβουσαν. Καί δῆλον, ἐκ τοῦ πολλά παραλόγως ποιεῖν, καί μηδαμῶς εἰς ἄλογον μεταπίπτειν οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς ἑνούσης ἐμφύτου λογικῆς.

(237)) Οὐν ἔστι οὖν ἄλλο τό καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, καί ἄλλο τό κατά τόν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρώπινον· οὐδέ τό θέλειν ἄλλο, κατά γε τόν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, εἰ καί ἄλλως ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς· θε«κῶς γάρ, ὁ μέν ὑπέστη, τό δέ ἐτυπώθη, διά τῆς πρός τό θεῖον ἄκρας ἑνώσεως. Το προσαρμόζειν δέ πάλιν μάλιτα προσφυῶς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν διαβεβλημένων ἕκαστον, οἷον τήν ἐναντίωσιν, ἤ τήν ἀντίταξιν, καί ὅσα τοῦδε τοῦ καταλόγου τυγχάνει, κἀν ἐπινοίᾳ τάς φύσεις ἀχωρίστως χωρίζοντες τῇ ἑξῆς φύσει προσέρχονται, συμπαραλαμβάνειν, οὐ μή θέμις ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τήν κατά Χριστόν ἀνθρωπότητα. Εἰ γάρ οὔτε ἐν ἡμῖν προσφυῶς, ἀλλά παρά φύσιν θεωρεῖται καί λόγον, πῶς ἐν ἐκείνῃ κἄν δι᾿ ἐπινοίας ἤ προσεπινοίας, ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω, προσάπτειν ἔστιν; ἀλλ᾿ οἰκειώσει μόνον, δι᾿ οἶκτον ὡς κεφαλῇ τοῦ παντός σώματος, καθάπερ καί ἰατρῷ τά πάθη τοῦ κάμνοντος, ἕως ἄν τούτων ἡμᾶς ὁ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσας ἐλευθερώσῃ Θεός. Πλήν τελείως ἡμῶν δαπανῶν καί ἐξαφανίζων τῇ δυνάμει τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτόν σωματώσεως. ∆ιττός γάρ ὁ περί παθῶν λόγος· ὁ μέν τῆς ἐπιτιμίας· ὁ δέ τῆς ἀτιμίας· καί ὁ μέν φύσιν τήν ἡμετέραν χαρακτηρίζων, ὁ δέ δι᾿ ὅλου παραχαράττων. Ἐκεῖνο μέν οὖν ὡς ἄνθρωπος δι᾿ ἡμᾶς θέλων οὐσιωδῶς κατεδέξατο, ὁμοῦ τε τήν φύσιν πιστούμενος, καί τό καθ᾿ ἡμῶν λύων κατάκριμα· τοῦτον δέ πάλιν, ὡς φιλάνθρωπος, οἰκονομικῶς ᾠκειώσατο, ἐν ἡμῖν τε καί τῷ ἡμετέρω ἀνυποτάκτῳ γνωριζόμενον τρόπῳ, ἵν᾿ ὡς κηρόν πῦρ, ἤ ὡς ἀτμίδα γῆς ἥλιος, πάμπαν ἡμῶν ἐξαναλώσας, τῶν οἰκείων ποιήσηται τήν μετάδοσιν, καί ἀπαθεῖς μέν ἐντεῦθεν, ἀφθάρτους δέ κατά τήν ὑπόσχεσιν ἡμᾶς παρασκευάσῃ. ∆εῖ τοίνυν τόν τε ζῆλον ὁμοῦ καί τόν πόνον τοῦ τά τοιαῦτα σπουδάζοντος ὑπέρ εὐσεβείας μάλιστα κατά τό εἰκός ἀποδέξασθαι, προτρέπειν δέ πρός ἀκριβεστέραν τῶν πατρικῶν λόγων ἐμμέλειαν, διά τούς ἐπηρεαστάς τῶν καλῶν, οὐδ᾿ αὐτό συγχωροῦντας ἐκ περιττῆς ἀνοίας, ὅ μή δέ βουλομένοις αὐτοῖς ἑλεῖν δυνατόν.

Τόν δέ γε τῆςῬωμαίων πάπαν Ὀνώριον, οὐ καταγορεύειν οἶμαι τῆς τῶν ἐμφύτων θελημάτων ἐπί Χριστοῦ δυάδος, ἐν τῇ γραφείσῃ πρός Σέργιον ἐπιστολῇ διά τό ἕν θέλημα φάναι, συναγορεύειν δέ μᾶλλον, καί ταύτην ὡς εἰκός συνιστᾷν, οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀθετήσει τοῦτό γε λέγοντα τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου καί φυσικοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος θελήματος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπί τοῦ μηδαμῶς τῆς ἀσπόρου συλλήψεως αὐτοῦ καί τῆς ἀφθόρου γεννήσεως προκαθηγεῖσθαι θέλημα σαρκός, ἤ λογισμόν ἐμπαθῆ. Μόνη γάρ θέλησις θεία καί Πατρική, δι᾿ Υἱοῦ μονογενοῦς