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meaning, and it would be a long task to unfold their divisions in these matters, and to draw out the argument, as these things do not fit the measure of a letter, nor do we have the leisure for writing. But for the divine Fathers, the explanation of these things is continuous and brief, not being taken in respect to some underlying subject, that is, of essence and nature, but of things contemplated in the essence, and indeed of things contemplated in the hypostasis. For they say that quality is essential, as in man the rational, or in a horse the neighing; but hypostatic, as in a particular man being hook-nosed, or snub-nosed; or in a particular horse being dappled or chestnut. And so it is also for all other created essences and hypostases, contemplated in beings both commonly and particularly, that is, both universally and individually, according to which also the difference of the species (249) and individuals from one another is known, clarifying the truth of things.

But in the case of the unbegotten and monarchical nature, quality would not be spoken of at all or in a proper sense. For the Divine is not from some essence and accidents, since it would then certainly be created, as being composite and put together from these. But improperly, and insofar as one might be able to conjecture things beyond us from things among us; since indeed not otherwise than thus and with difficulty are we able to receive a dim knowledge of them, and to make it clear by word at least somehow, even if not perfectly; natural quality is the all-holy, the all-powerful, the all-perfect, the super-perfect, the self-perfect, the self-ruling, the all-overseeing, and whatever else of this sort is said to be natural and divine, and befitting God alone as super-essential. But hypostatic quality is, of the Father, the unbegotten; of the Son, the begotten; and of the Holy Spirit, the proceeding; that is, unbegottenness, and the generation, and the procession, which they also call properties, because these belong to Him alone and to no other (this is said concerning God) either naturally or hypostatically. From which both the essential and the hypostatic differences are constituted, improperly, as I said, in the case of God, but properly according to nature in the case of all created things. Whence they say these are the same as each other, I mean quality and property and difference, and that they hold the place of accidents, but not of some underlying subject, that is, of an essence. But they differ in that quality is more universal, and applies to all things simply, since nothing among beings except God is without quality, just as nothing is without relation or without form. And property is particular, in relation to that, and is not said of all, but simply and in a certain way (of some quantity and simply, but in a certain way) and of this essence, and not another; and difference as constitutive and determinative of beings. Whence they also name this thus, calling it a constitutive difference which distinguishes, as I said, beings according to essence and nature, according to person and hypostasis, and which drives away all change and confusion of all things.

This then, being so, according to the teaching of the Fathers, is the conception and explanation, to speak in summary, concerning quality and property and difference. And it is impossible for any of these ever to be or to be conceived of apart from the underlying essence, of which each of these is and is said; (252) for quality and property and difference are said of an essence, but not of themselves; and he who does not say this has acted irrationally, departing unreasonably from the natural logos. Concerning which, alone and contrary to all, Severus the mad sophist, as if conceiving for himself and fabricating things that are nowhere in any way, speaks of a difference of essenceless qualities in Christ, in order that he might declare Him non-existent, by the rejection of the natures from which and in which He is constituted, and again, by the simultaneous rejection of the qualities themselves. For they could not, if the natures were done away with, since not even in these...

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σημασίαν, καί μακρόν ἄν εἴη τάς ἐν τούτοις ἐκείνων διαιρέσεις ἐξαπλοῦν, λόγον τε διατείνειν, ὡς οὐ μᾶλλον ἐπιστολικῆς ταῦτα συμμετρίας, ἤ γραφικῆς ἀσχολίας τυγχάνοντες. Τοῖς δέ θείοις Πατράσιν, συνεχής τε καί σύντομος ἡ τούτων καθέστηκε δήλωσις, οὐκ ἐπί τινος ὑποκειμένου λαμβανομένη, τουτέστιν οὐσίας καί φύσεως, ἀλλά τῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καί μέντοι γε τῶν τῇ ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένων. Ποιότητα γοῦν εἶναί φασιν, οὐσιώδη μέν ὡς ἐπ᾿ ἀνθρώπου τό λογικόν, ἤ ἵππου τό χρεμετιστικόν· ὑποστατικήν δέ τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου γρυπόν, ἤ σιμόν· ἤ τοῦ τινος ἵππου τό ψαρόν ἤ ξανθόν. Οὕτω δέ καί ἐπί τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει γενητῶν ἁπάντων οὐσιῶν καί ὑποστάσεων, κοινῶς τε καί ἰδικῶς, ἤγουν καθολικῶς τε καί μερικῶς τοῖς οὖσιν ἐνθεωρουμένην, καθ᾿ ἥν καί πρός ἄλληλα διαφορά τῶν τε εἰδῶν (249) καί ἀτόμων γνωρίζεται, διευκρινοῦσα τήν τῶν πράγματων ἀλήθειαν.

Ἐπί δέ τῆς ἀγεννήτου καί μοναρχικῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν μέν ὅλως ἤ κυρίως λεχθείη ποιότης. Οὐ γάρ ἐξ οὐσίας τινός καί συμβεβηκότων τό Θεῖον, ἐπεί καί κτιστόν ἔσται πάντως, ὡς ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον καί συγκείμενον. Καταχρηστικῶς δέ, καί ὅσον ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς δύναιτ᾿ ἄν τά ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς εἰκάζειν· ἅτε δή μήτ᾿ ἄλλως ἤ οὕτως καί μόγις ἱκανούντων ἡμῶν τήν ἐκείνων ἀμυδρῶς εἰσδέξασθαι γνῶσιν, καί λόγῳ κἄν ποσῶς γοῦν, εἰ καί μή τελείως, διατρανοῦν· φυσική μέν ποιότης ἐστί τό πανάγιον, τό πανσθενές, τό παντέλειον, τό ὑπερτελές, τό αὐτοτελές, τό αὐτοκρατορικόν, τό παντέφορον καί εἴτι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο λέγεται φυσικόν τε καί θεῖον, καί Θεῷ μόνον συμπρέπον ὡς ὑπερούσιον. Ὑποστατική δέ ποιότης, Πατρός μέν τό ἀγέννητον, Υἱοῦ δέ τό γεννητόν, καί Πνεύματος ἁγίου τό ἐκπορευτόν, ἤγουν ἀγεννησία, καί ἡ γέννησις καί ἡ ἐκπόρευσις, ἅπερ καί ἰδιότητας ὀνομάζουσι, διά τῷ μόνον αὐτῷ καί οὐκ ἄλλῳ (περί Θεοῦ λέγεται) προσεῖναι ταῦτα φυσικῶς ἤ ὑποστατικῶς. Ἐξ ὧν αἵ τε οὐσιώδεις καί ὑποστατικαί συνίστανται διαφοραί, καταχρησικῶς μέν, ὡς ἔφην, ἐπί Θεοῦ, κατά φύσιν δέ κυρίως ἐπί τῶν γενητῶν ἁπάντων. Ὅθεν ταὐτόν μέν ἀλλήλοις ὑπάρχειν ταῦτά φασι, ποιότητά φημι καί ἰδιότητα καί διαφοράν, καί τῶν τε συμβεβηκότων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὑποκειμένου τινός, ἤγουν οὐσίας λόγον ἐπέχειν. ∆ιαφέρειν μέν τῷ τήν ποιότητα καθολικωτέραν εἶναι, καί ἐπί πάντων ἁπλῶς, εἴπερ οὐδέν παρέξ Θεοῦ τῶν ὄντων ἄποιον, ὡς οὐκ ἄσχετον, οὐδέ ἀνείδεον. Τήν ἰδιότητα δέ μερικήν, ὡς πρός ἐκείνην, καί μή ἁπασῶν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς καί τοιῶσδε (ὁποσοῦν καί ἁπλῶς, ἀλλά τοιῶσδε ) λέγεσθαι, καί ἐπί τῆσδε τῆς οὐσίας, καί οὐκ ἄλλης· τήν δέ διαφοράν ὡς συστατικήν τῶν ὄντων καί ἀφοριστικήν. Ὅθεν καί οὕτω ταύτην κατονομάζουσι, συστατικήν καλοῦντες διαφοράν διευκρίνουσαν, ὡς ἔφην, τά ὄντα κατά τε οὐσίαν καί φύσιν, κατά τε πρόσωπον καί ὑπόστασιν, καί πᾶσαν πασῶν ἐλαύνουσαν τροπήν τε καί σύγχυσιν.

Αὕτη οὖν καί οὕτως ἔχουσα, κατά τήν τῶν Πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἡ περί ποιότητος καί ἰδιότητος καί διαφορᾶς, ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ φάναι, διάληψίς τε καί διασάφησις. Ἀμήχανον δέ τι τούτων εἶναί ποτ᾿ ἄν ἤ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύνασθαι χωρίς τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας, ἧς καί ἔστι καί λέγεται τούτων ἕκαστον· (252) οὐσίας γάρ ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑαυτῆς ἤ τε ποιότης λέγεται καί ἰδιότης καί διαφορά· καί ὁ μή τοῦτο λέγων, ἠλόγησε, τοῦ κατά φύσιν λόγου παρά λόγον ἐκστάς. Οὗπερ μόνος καί παρά πάντας Σεβῆρος ὁ παράφρων σοφιστής, ὡς τά μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς περινοῶν ἑαυτῷ καί πλαττόμενος, καί ποιοτήτων ἀνουσίων ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγων διαφοράν, ἵν᾿ ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτόν ἀποφήνῃ, τῇ τῶν ἐξ ὧν καί ἐν αἷς συνέστηκε φύσεων ἀποσκευῇ, καί αὐτῶν γε πάλιν συναποσκευῇ τῶν ποιοτήτων. Οὐ γάρ δύναιντ᾿ ἄν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν φύσεων, ·ὡς μηδέ κἄν ταύταις