114

MAX. If it is not possible for two wills to be in one and the same person without opposition, then with opposition, according to you, it is possible. But if this is so, then you have at least confessed that there are two; and you do not differ as to the number, but only as to the opposition. Therefore, it remains to seek the cause that produces the conflict. What, then, do you say this cause is? Is it the will according to nature, or sin? But if you should say the will according to nature, we know no other cause of this than God; therefore, according to you, God is the creator of the conflict. But if you say sin; the incarnate God did not commit sin, nor did he have any opposition whatsoever in his natural wills. For if the cause does not exist, clearly the effect will not exist either.

PYR. Is willing, then, of nature? MAX. Yes, to will simply, is of nature. PYR. If willing is of nature, but the more prominent of the Fathers have said that there is one will of God and

of the saints, then in this way there will be one nature of the saints and of God. MAX. And it was said above that one who is making a discourse about the truth must distinguish the meanings of what is said, because of the error that arises from homonymy. For I myself will ask you in turn: did the saints who spoke of one will of God and of the saints say this looking to the essential and creative will of God, or to the thing willed? For the will of the one willing is not the same as the thing willed, just as the sight of the one seeing is not the same as the thing seen; for the one belongs to him essentially, while the other happens to be external. But if they spoke looking to the essential will, they will be found not only introducing the saints as consubstantial and co-creators with God, but also contradicting themselves, having stated that things of different essence cannot have a common will. But if they spoke with respect to the thing willed, then it was aetiologically, or, as some are fond of saying, catachrestically, that the Fathers called the thing willed a will; and nothing absurd will follow for those who define that to will simply is of nature.

PYR. If we differ by our wills both with respect to ourselves and to one another, now willing this, and now not willing the same thing; and if this is of nature and of its characteristic principle, we shall be found not only differing from one another in nature, but also changing it countless times.

MAX. To will is not the same as how to will; (293) just as to see is not the same as how to see. For to will, just as to see, is of nature, and belongs to all who are of the same nature and the same kind; but how to will, just as how to see, that is, to will to walk, and not to will to walk, and to see to the right, or to the left, or up, or down, or for the sake of desire, or for the understanding of the principles in existing things, is a mode of the use of willing and seeing, belonging only to the user, and separating him from others, according to the commonly spoken of difference. And if we have nature bearing witness to this, then to will to eat, or not to will to eat, or to will to walk, or not to will, is not an abolition of having been created to will, but of how to will, that is, it is a generation and passing away of the things willed. For neither, if we were to suppose that the things that have come into being from God, being things willed by Him, pass away, will His pre-conceived, essential, and creative will pass away along with them.

PYR. If you say the will is natural, and what is natural is in every way also necessary, how is it not necessary, when we speak of the wills in Christ as natural, to abolish all voluntary motion in him.

114

ΜΑΞ. Εἰ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως δύο θελήματα ἐν ἑνί καί τῷ αὐτῷ προσώπῳ εἶναι οὐ δυνατόν, ἄρα μετά ἐναντιώσεως, κατά σέ, δυνατόν. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, τέως τά δύο εἶναι ὡμολογήσας· καί πρός τόν ἀριθμόν οὐ διαφέρῃ, ἀλλ᾿ ἤ μόνον πρός τήν ἐναντιότητα. Οὐκοῦν λείπεται ζητεῖν τήν ποιητικήν τῆς μάχης αἰτίαν. Ποίαν οὖν ταύτην φῆς; Ἆρα τήν κατά φύσιν θέλησιν, ἤ τήν ἁμαρτίαν; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν τήν κατά φύσιν εἴπῃς θέλησιν, ταύτης δέ οὐκ ἄλλον ἤ τόν Θεόν γινώσκομεν αἴτιον· ἄρα, κατά σέ, τῆς μάχης δημιουργός ὁ Θεός. Εἰ δέ τήν ἁμαρτίαν· ἁμαρτίαν δέ οὐκ ἐποίησε, οὐδέ τήν οἱανοῦν ἐναντίωσιν ἐν τοῖς κατά φύσιν αὐτοῦ ὁ σαρκωθείς Θεός εἶχε θελήμασι. Τοῦ αἰτίου γάρ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐδέ τό αἰτιατόν προδήλως ἔσται.

ΠΥΡ. Φύσεως οὖν τό θέλειν; ΜΑΞ. Ναί, τό ἁπλῶς θέλειν, φύσεως. ΠΥΡ. Εἰ φύσεως τό θέλειν· οἱ ἐμφανέστεροι δέ τῶν Πατέρων ἕν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καί

τῶν ἁγίων εἶπον· καί μία φύσις ἔσται οὕτω γε τῶν ἁγίων καί τοῦ Θεοῦ. ΜΑΞ. Καί ἀνωτέρω ἐῤῥέθη, ὅτι δεῖ, τόν περί ἀληθείας λόγον ποιούμενον

διαστέλλεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων τά σημαινόμενα, διά τήν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας πλάνην. Ἀντερήσομαι γάρ σε καί αὐτός, ὅτι, οἱ ἕν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τῶν ἁγίων εἰπόντες ἅγιοι, πρός τό οὐσιῶδες τοῦ Θεοῦ καί δημιουργικόν θέλημα ἀποβλέποντες τοῦτο εἶπον,ἤ πρός τό θελητόν; Οὐ ταὐτόν γάρ τό τοῦ θέλοντος θέλημα, καί τό θελητόν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ τό τοῦ ὁρῶντος ὀπτικόν, καί τό ὁρατόν· τό μέν γάρ οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῷ προσέστι, τό δέ ἐκτός τυγχάνει. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν πρός τό οὐσιῶδες ἀπιδόντες εἶπον, οὐ μόνον ὁμοφυεῖς καί συνδημιουργούς εἰσάγοντες εὑρεθήσονται τῷ Θεῷ τούς ἁγίους, ἀλλά καί ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντιούμενοι, φύσαντες μή δύνασθαι τά ἑτερούσια κοινόν ἔχειν θέλημα. Εἰ δέ πρός τό θελητόν, ἄρα αἰτιολογικῶς· ἤ, ὥς τισι φίλον λέγειν, καταχρηστικῶς, τό θεληθέν θέλημα προσηγόρευσαν οἱ Πατέρες· καί οὐδέν ἕψεται ἄτοπον, τῶν φύσεως εἶναι τό ἁπλῶς θέλειν ὁριζομένων.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ τοῖς θελήμασι πρός τε ἑαυτούς καί ἀλλήλους διαφέρομεν· νῦν μέν, τοῦτο θέλοντες· νῦν δέ, τό αὐτό οὐ θέλοντες· φύσεως δέ τοῦτο, καί τοῦ αὐτῆς χαρακτηριστικοῦ λόγου, οὐ μόνον τῇ φύσει ἀλλήλων διαφέροντες εὑρεθησόμεθα, ἀλλά καί ἀπειράκις ταύτην μεταβάλλοντες.

ΜΑΞ. Οὐ ταὐτόν τό θέλειν καί τό πῶς θέλειν· (293) ὥσπερ οὐδέ τό ὁρᾷν καί τό πῶς ὁρᾷν. Τό μέν γάρ θέλειν, ὥσπερ καί τό ὁρᾷν, φύσεως· καί πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι καί ὁμογενέσι προσόν· τό δέ πῶς θέλειν, ὥσπερ καί τό πῶς ὁρᾷν, τουτέστι θέλειν πεεριπατῇσαι, καί μή θέλειν περιπατῇσαι, καί δεξιά ὁρᾷν, ἤ ἀριστερά, ἤ ἄνω , ἤ κάτω, ἤ πρός ἐπιθυμίαν, ἤ κατανόησιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι λόγων, τρόπος ἐστί τῆς τοῦ θέλειν καί ὁρᾷν χρήσεως, μόνῳ τῷ κεχριμένῳ προσόν, καί τῶν ἄλλων αὐτόν χωρίζον, κατά τήν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφοράν. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο μαρτυροῦσαν τήν φύσιν ἔχομεν, ἄρα τό θέλειν φαγεῖν, ἤ μή θέλειν φαγεῖν· ἤ τό θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, ἤ μή θέλειν· οὐ τοῦ πεφυκέναι θέλειν ἐστίν ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλά τοῦ πῶς θέλειν, τουτέστι, τῶν θελητῶν ἐστι γένεσις καί ἀπογένεσις. Οὔτε γάρ, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα τά ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γενόμενα, θελητά αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀπογενέσθαι, τούτοις καί τό προεπινοούμενον αὐτῶν, οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ καί ποιητικόν θέλημα συναπογενήσεται.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ φυσικόν λέγεις τό θέλημα, τό δέ φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη, φυσικά λέγοντας ἐπί Χριστοῦ τά θελήματα, πᾶσαν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἑκούσιον ἀναιρεῖν κίνησιν.