115

MAX.. Not only does the divine and divine and uncreated nature have nothing natural that is compelled, but neither does the intelligent and created nature. For that which is rational by nature has a natural power, the rational appetite, which is also called the will of the intelligent soul; according to which we reason while willing; and while reasoning, we resolve while willing. And while willing we seek, and we consider and we deliberate, and we judge, and we are disposed, and we choose, and we are moved, and we make use of things. Since, as has been said, rationally desiring, that is, to will, and to reason, belongs to us by nature; and to deliberate and to seek, and to consider, and to resolve, and to judge, and to be disposed, and to choose, and to be moved, and to make use of things; then the natural properties of intelligent beings are not compelled. And how, even if this is granted, will such a proposition not be shown to be more absurd than any absurdity? For if according to it what is natural is entirely also compelled, and God is God by nature, good by nature, creator by nature, then God will be God by necessity, and good and creator; which even to think, let alone to say, is the utmost blasphemy. For who is it that imposes the necessity? But consider, if you please, my friend, the blasphemy of such a proposition in this way also. For if he who says the wills in Christ are natural things, according to you, does away with all voluntary motion in him, it is necessary for those things that will naturally to have involuntary motion, and those that do not will naturally, to have voluntary motion. Therefore, not only God, who is above all beings, but also all intelligent and rational things, being volitional by nature, will have involuntary motion; while inanimate things, not being volitional, will have voluntary motion. Except that the blessed Cyril, in the third chapter against the censures of Theodoret, has freed us from superfluous matters, by declaring expressly, that nothing natural (296) in an intelligent nature is involuntary. And it is possible for anyone who wishes to learn this, by taking up that very chapter.

PYRR. Since it is necessary to accept with good judgment the truths that appear from the examination; and the argument has shown with great clarity that the wills in Christ are natural; is it possible, just as we speak of one composite reality from the two natures, so also to speak of one composite reality from the two natural wills; so that both those who speak of two wills, on account of the natural difference of the natures in Christ, and those who speak of one, on account of the extreme union, may no longer differ with one another for the sake of mere words; since, as Gregory, great in theology, says, truth for us lies not in names, but in realities.

MAX. You see that you are led astray by this, by being completely ignorant that compositions are of things that exist in the hypostasis, and not of things that are contemplated in another and not in their own principle. And this is the common opinion of all, both of the philosophers outside and of the God-wise mystagogues of the Church. But if you speak of a composition of wills, you will also be forced to speak of a composition of the other natural properties; if indeed you wish to show that the principle of your own dogma is coherent, that is, of the created and the uncreated, of the infinite and the finite, of the undefined and the defined, of the mortal and the immortal, of the corruptible and the incorruptible, and you will be carried away into absurd suppositions. And how will that which is from the wills be called a will? For it is not possible for the composite to be called by the name of the things composed. Or in this way also that which is from the natures will be called nature, according to the ancient heretics. And in addition to this, you again separate him from the wills of the Father, having characterized a composite and single nature by a composite will.

PYRR. So then, did their natural properties have nothing in common, just as the natures did? MAX. Nothing, except the hypostasis of their natures. For just as a hypostasis was the

same one unconfusedly of their natural properties.

115

ΜΑΞ.. Οὐ μόνον ἡ θεία καί θεία καί ἄκτιστος φύσις οὐδέν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει φυσικόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ ἡ νοερά καί κτιστή. Τό γάρ φύσει λογικόν, δύναμιν ἔχει φυσικήν τήν λογικήν ὄρεξιν, ἥτις καί θέλησις καλεῖται τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς· καθ᾿ ἥν θέλοντες λογιζόμεθα· καί λογιζόμενοι, θέλοντες βουλόμεθα. Καί θέλοντες ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτόμεθά τε καί βουλευόμεθα, καί κρίνομεν, καί διατιθέμεθα, καί προαιρούμεθα, καί ὁρῶμεν, καί κεχρήμεθα. Κατά φύσιν δέ ἡμῖν, ὡς εἴρηται, προσόντος τοῦ λογικῶς ὀρέγεσθαι, ἤγουν θέλειν, καί λογίζεσθαι· βουλεύεσθαί τε καί ζητεῖν, καί σκέπτεσθαι, καί βούλεσθαι, καί κρίνειν, καί διατίθεσθαι, καί αἱρεῖσθαι, καί ὁρμᾷν, καί κεχρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἠναγκασμένα τά τῶν νοερῶν φυσικά. Πῶς δέ καί τούτου δοθέντος, οὐ πάσης ἀτοπίας ἀτοπωτέρα ἡ τοιαύτη δειχθήσεται πρότασις; Εἰ γάρ κατ᾿ αὐτήν τό φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον· φύσει δέ ὁ Θεός Θεός, φύσει ἀγαθός, φύσει δημιουργός· ἀνάγκῃ ἔσται ὁ Θεός Θεός, καί ἀγαθός καί δημιουργός· ὅπερ καί ἐννοεῖν, μήτι γε λέγειν, ἐσχάτης ἐστί βλασφημίας. Τίς γάρ ὁ τήν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων; Σκόπει δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ φιλότης, καί οὕτω τῆς τοιαύτης προτάσεως τό βλάσφημον. Εἰ γάρ ὁ φυσικά ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγων τά θελήματα, πᾶσαν, κατά σέ, ἑκούσιον ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἀναιρεῖ κίνησιν, ἀνάγκη τά μέν φυσικῶς θέλοντα, ἀκούσιον ἔχειν κίνησιν· τά δέ φυσικῶς μή θέλοντα, ἑκούσιον. Οὐκοῦν οὐ μόνον Θεός, ὁ ὑπέρ τά ὄντα· ἀλλά καί νοερά πάντα καί λογικά, φύσει ὄντα θελητικά, ἀκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν· ἄψυχα δέ οὐ θελητικά, ἑκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν. Πλήν ὅτι ὁ μακάριος Κύριλλος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ κεφαλαίῳ πρός τάς τοῦ Θεοδωρήτου μέμψεις, ἀπήλλαξεν ἡμᾶς περιττῶν πραγμάτων, διαῤῥήδην ἀποφηνάμενος, Μηδέν φυσικόν (296) εἶναι ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει ἀκούσιον. Καί τοῦτο ἔξεστι τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν, μετά χεῖρας λαβόντι τό τοιοῦτο κεφάλαιον.

ΠΥΡ. Ἐπειδή χρή τά ἐκ τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἀναφαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, εὐγνωμόνως ἀποδέχεσθαι· μετά δέ πολλῆς εὐκρινείας ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, φυσικά εἶναι τά ἐπί Χριστοῦ θελήματα· δυνατόν δέ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν δύο φύσεων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγομεν, οὕτω καί ἐκ τῶν δύο φυσικῶν θελημάτων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγειν· ἵνα καί οἱ δύο λέγοντες θελήματα, διά τήν φυσικήν τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεων διαφοράν, καί οἱ ἕν λέγοντες, διά τήν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν, μηκέτι ψιλῶν λέξεων ἕνεκεν πρός ἀλλήλους διαφέρωνται· εἴπερ οὐκ ἐν ὀνόμασιν ἡμῖν, φησίν ὁ μέγας ἐν θεολογίᾳ Γρηγόριος, ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν πράγμασιν.

ΜΑΞ. Ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐκ τούτου πλανᾶσθε, ἐκ τοῦ πάντη ἀγνοῆσαι ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ὄντων, καί οὐ τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ, καί οὐκ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θεωρουμένων, εἰσί. Καί τοῦτο κοινόν φρόνημα πάντων, καί τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων, καί τῶν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας θεοσόφων μυσταγωγῶν. Εἰ δέ τῶν θελημάτων σύνθεσιν λέγετε, καί τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν τήν σύνθεσιν λέγειν ἐκβιασθήσεσθε· εἴπερ εὐσυνάρτητον τόν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος λόγον δεῖξαι βούλεσθε, τουτέστι, τοῦ κτιστοῦ καί ἀκτίστου, τοῦ ἀπείρου καί τοῦ πεπερασμένου, τοῦ ἀορίστου καί τοῦ ὡρισμένου, τοῦ θνητοῦ καί τοῦ ἀθανάτου, τοῦ φθαρτοῦ καί τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, καί εἰς ἀτόπους ἐξενεχθήσεσθε ὑπολήψεις. Πῶς δέ τό ἐκ τῶν θελημάτων, θέλημα προσαγορευθήσεται; Οὐ γάρ δυνατόν τό σύνθετον τῇ τῶν συντεθειμένων ὀνομάζεσθαι προσηγορίᾳ. Ἤ οὕτω γε καί τό ἐκ τῶν φύσεων, φύσις, κατά τούς πάλαι αἱρετικούς προσαγορευθήσεται. Προσεπιτούτοις δέ καί πάλιν αὐτόν θελήμασι τοῦ Πατρός χωρίζετε, συνθέτῳ θελήματι σύνθετον καί μόνην χαρακτηρίσαντες φύσιν.

ΠΥΡ. Οὐδέν οὖν, καθάπερ αἱ φύσεις, καί τά αὐτῶν φυσικά εἶχε κοινόν; ΜΑΞ. Οὐδέ, ἤ μόνην τήν τῶν αὐτῶν φύσεων ὑπόστασιν. Ὥσπερ γάρ ὑπόστασις ἦν ὁ

αὐτός ἀσυγχύτως τῶν αὐτῶν φυσικῶν.