119

of things made manifest, the argument showed the very nature of beings testifying, that the same one was willing in a manner appropriate to his own natures, consenting as God, obeying as man, and that the natural wills are in every way appropriate to the natures. Unoriginate, that of the unoriginate, and originated, that of the originated; and that it is not possible for them ever to coincide into one will, even if they belong to one and the same, just as the natures, the unoriginate and the originated, the uncreated and the created, the maker and the made, the (304) infinite and the finite, the deifying and the deified. But those in Byzantium, still resisting the natural wills, say that the Fathers spoke of the Lord having the human will by way of appropriation.

MAX. Since you yourself are the guide of this wondrous and brilliant teaching of theirs; according to what kind of appropriation do they say this? Is it the essential one, according to which each person, having what is naturally present, appropriates it by reason of nature; or the relative one, according to which we appropriate and cherish the things of others in a friendly way, while we ourselves neither suffer nor do any of these things?

PYR. The relative one, clearly. MAX. Therefore, before showing the absurdity of this, it would be more just more accurately

to examine whether man is volitional by nature, or not. For when this is demonstrated, the blasphemy of such a heresy will become clearer.

PYR. If it seems good, let us examine this. MAX. That natural things are unteachable was stated not only by those who have investigated nature with reason and stand out from the crowd, but also by the common experience of ordinary people. And if natural things are unteachable, and we have the act of willing as something unteachable—for no one is ever taught how to will—therefore man is volitional by nature. And again, if man is rational by nature; and that which is rational by nature is also self-determining by nature; for self-determination, according to the Fathers, is will; therefore man is volitional by nature. And again, if in irrational creatures nature leads; but in man it is led, as he is moved with authority according to will; therefore man is volitional by nature. And again, if man has come to be in the image of the blessed and super-essential Godhead; and the divine nature is self-determining by nature; therefore man also, as being truly its image, happens to be self-determining by nature; and if he is self-determining by nature, therefore man is volitional by nature; for it has already been said that the Fathers defined self-determination as will. Furthermore, does not the act of willing exist in all men; and it is not the case that it exists in some but not in others; and that which is commonly observed in all characterizes a nature in the individuals under it; therefore man is volitional by nature.

PYR. It has been demonstrated through many proofs that man is volitional by nature. MAX. Since this, then, has been clearly demonstrated, let us consider, as we proposed above,

the absurdity of their proposition as well. PYR. Let us consider it. MAX. If man is volitional by nature, as has been shown, (305) but according to them Christ had the human will according to an appropriation in mere relation, it is necessary for them, if indeed they adhere to their own principles, also our other natural things with it—I mean, of course, the natural will—to say are by mere appropriation; and for them the contemplation and mystery of the whole economy will be found to be understood as a fantasy. Then, if the Psephos of Sergius anathematized not those who said two wills in a certain way, but those who simply said two wills; and these men say two, even if erroneously, on account of appropriation; therefore the proponents of this view support the anathema against themselves. And again, if, according to the proposition championed by them, persons are introduced along with wills; therefore, by saying two wills, even if

119

ἐκπεφασμένων, αὐτήν τῶν ὄντων τήν φύσιν ὁ λόγος μαρτυροῦσαν ἔδειξε, ὡς καταλλήλως ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεσιν ὁ αὐτός θέλων ἦν, εὐδοκῶν μέν ὡς θεός, ὑπακούων ὡς ἄνθρωπος, καί ὅτι κατάλληλα πάντως τά φυσικά θελήματα ταῖς φύσεσιν. Ἄναρχον μέν τῆς ἀνάρχου, καί τῆς ἠργμένης ἠργμένον· καί ὅτι οὐ δυνατόν εἰς ἕν θέλημά ποτε συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις, κἄν ἑνός καί τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ καί αἱ φύσεις, τό ἄναρχον καί τό ἠργμένον, τό ἄκτιστον καί τό κτιστόν, τό ποιῆσαν καί τό ποιηθέν, τό (304) ἄπειρον καί τό πεπερασμένον, τό θεῶσαν καί τό θεωθέν. Οἱ δέ ἐν τῷ Βυζαντίῳ, ἔτι πρός τά φυσικά θελήματα ἀντιστατοῦντες, κατ᾿ οἰκείωσίν φασιν εἰρηκέναι τούς Πατέρας ἔχειν τόν Κύριον τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα.

ΜΑΞ. Ἐπειδή αὐτός τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν θαυμαστῆς καί λαμπρᾶς καθηγήσω παιδεύσεως· κατά ποίαν οἰκείωσιν τοῦτό φασιν; Ἆρα τήν οὐσιώδη, καθ᾿ ἥν τά φυσικῶς προσόντα ἕκαστος ἔχων, διά τήν φύσιν οἰκειοῦται· ἤ τήν σχετικήν, καθ ἥν φιλικῶς τά ἀλλήλων οἰκειούμεθα καί στέργομεν, μηδέν τούτων αὐτοί ἤ πάσχοντες, ἤ ἐνεργοῦντες;

ΠΥΡ. Τήν σχετικήν δολονότι. ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν πρίν τούτου δεῖξαι τό ἄτοπον, δικαιότερον ἄν εἴη ἀκριβέστερον

ἐξετάσει, εἴ τε φύσει θελητικός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἴ τε καί μή. Τούτου γάρ δεικνυμένου, σαφέστερον γενήσεται τῆς τοιαύτης αἱρέσεως τό βλάσφημον.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦτο ἐξετάσωμεν. ΜΑΞ. Ἀδίδακτα εἶναι τά φυσικά, οὐ μόνον οἱ λόγῳ τήν φύσιν διασκεψάμενοι, καί

τῶν πολλῶν διαφέροντες ἔφασαν, ἀλλά καί ἡ τῶν χυδαιοτέρων συνήθεια. Εἰ δέ τά φυικά ἀδίδακτα, ἀδίδακτον δέ ἔχομεν τό θέλειν· οὐδείς γάρ ποτε θέλειν διαδάσκεται· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ φύσει λογικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τό δέ φύσει λογικόν καί φύσει αὐτεξούσιον· τό γάρ αὐτεξούσιον, κατά τούς Πατέρας, θέλησίς ἐστιν· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἄγει μέν ἡ φύσις· ἄγεται δέ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατά θέλησιν κινουμένῳ· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καί πάλιν, εἰ κα᾿ εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καί ὑπερουσίου Θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται· αὐτεξούσιος δέ φύσει ἡ θεία φύσις· ἄρα καί ἄνθρωπος, ὡς αὐτῆς ὄντως εἰκών, αὐτεξούσιος τυγχάνει φύσει· εἰ δέ αὐτεξούσιος φύσει, θελητικός ἄρα φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· εἴρηται γάρ ἤδη, ὡς τό αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσατο οἱ Πατέρες. Ἔτι τε, οὐ πᾶσιν ἐνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τό θέλειν· καί οὐ τοῖς μέν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς δέ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει· τό δέ κοινῶς πᾶιν ἐνθεωρούμενον φύσιν χαρακτηρίζει ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτό ἀτόμοις· ἄρα φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

ΠΥΡ. ∆έδεικται διά πλειόνων φύσει θελητικός ὤν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ΜΑΞ. Τούτου οὖν περιφανῶς δειχθέντος, διασκεψώμεθα, ὡς ἀνωτέρω ὑπεθέμεθα,

καί τῆς αὐτῶν προτάσεως τό ἄτοπον. ΠΥΡ. ∆ιασκεψώμεθα. ΜΑΞ. Εἰ φύσει θελητικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς δέδεικται, (305) κατ᾿ αὐτούς δέ κατά τήν

ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει οἰκείωσιν τό ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα εἶχεν ὁ Χριστός, ἀνάγκη αὐτούς, εἴπερ ταῖς οἰκείαις ἀρχαῖς στοιχοῦσι, καί τά ἄλλα ἡμῖν φυσικά μετ᾿ αὐτοῦ· φημί δή τοῦ κατά φύσιν θελήματος· κατ᾿ οἰκείωσιν ψιλήν λέγειν· καί εὑρεθήσεται αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς ὅλης οἰκονομίας θεωρία καί μύησις, κατά φαντασίαν λαμβανομένη. Ἔπειτα, εἰ ἡ ψῆφος Σεργίου, οὐ τούς πῶς, ἀλλά τούς ἁπλῶς δύο θελήματα εἰπόντας ἀνεθεμάτισε· λέγουσι δέ οὗτοι δύο, κἄν εἰ ἐσφαλμένως, διά τήν οἰκείωσιν· ἄρα οἱ ταύτης προϊστάμενοι, τῷ κατ᾿ αὐτῶν συνηγοροῦσιν ἀναθέματι. Καί πάλιν, εἰ, κατά τήν ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν διεκδικουμένην πρότασιν, τοῖς θελήμασι πρόσωπα συνεισάγονται· ἄρα δύο θελήματα λέγοντες, καί εἰ