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MAX. Do we then choose while willing and deliberating, or unwillingly and without deliberation? PYR. Admittedly, while willing and deliberating. MAX. Therefore, a judgement is nothing other than a certain kind of will, holding fast to something that is either an actual or

a supposed good. PYR. You have rightly made the explanation of the patristic definition. MAX. If the patristic definition has been correctly unfolded, then first of all it is not

possible to speak of a gnomic will. For how is it possible for a will to proceed from a will? Furthermore, by speaking of a judgement in Christ's case, as the inquiry about it has shown, they dogmatize that He is a mere man, disposed to deliberation like us, being ignorant and doubting, and having contradictory thoughts; if indeed one deliberates about things that are doubted, and not about what is indubitable. For we simply have by nature a natural appetite for the good, but experience of how something is good through inquiry and counsel. And for this reason judgement is properly spoken of in our case, being a mode of use, not a principle of nature; since nature has also changed countless times. But in the case of the Lord's humanity, which subsisted not merely as ours, but divinely—for He was God (309) who for our sake appeared in the flesh from among us—judgement cannot be spoken of. For His very [by His very] being, that is, His divine subsistence, naturally had an affinity for the good and an aversion for evil, just as Basil, the great eye of the Church, teaching in his interpretation of Psalm 44, said: "In this sense you will also take what was said by Isaiah about Him, that 'Before the child knows, or prefers evil things, he will choose the good.' Because before the child knows good or evil, he disobeys wickedness in order to choose the good. For 'before' indicates that He did not inquire and deliberate as we do, but subsisting divinely, He had the good by His very being from nature."

PYR. What then? Are the virtues natural? MAX. Yes, natural. PYR. And if they are natural, why do they not exist equally in all who are of the same nature? [MAX. They do exist equally in all who are of the same nature.] PYR. And from where does such inequality among us come? MAX. From not equally energizing the things of nature. For if we all equally, for which we also

were made, energized the things of nature, then one virtue would be shown in all, just like nature, not admitting of more and less.

PYR. If natural things do not proceed for us from ascetic practice, but from creation, and virtue is natural, how do we acquire the virtues, being natural, by labor and ascetic practice?

MAX. Ascetic practice, and the labors that follow it, were devised by the lovers of virtue for the sole purpose of separating the deceit mixed into the soul through sense-perception; not for newly introducing the virtues from without; for they are ours from creation, as has been said; whence, as soon as the deceit is completely distinguished, the soul at the same time displays the radiance of virtue according to nature. For he who is not foolish, is prudent; and he who is not cowardly or rash, is courageous; and he who is not (312) licentious, is temperate; and he who is not unjust, is just. And according to nature, reason is prudence; and judgement, justice; and spiritedness, courage; and desire, temperance. Therefore, by the removal of what is contrary to nature, the things according to nature alone are accustomed to appear; just as by the removal of rust, the natural gleam and radiance of iron.

PYR. The greatest blasphemy has from this been demonstrated for those who speak of a judgement in Christ's case.

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ΜΑΞ. Θέλοντες οὖν καί βουλευόμενοι ἐπιλεγόμεθα, ἤ ἀθελήτως καί ἀβουλεύτως; ΠΥΡ. Ὁμολογουμένως θέλοντες καί βουλευόμενοι. ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ γνώμη οὐδέ ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἤ ποιά θέλησις, σχετικῶς τινος ἤ ὄντος ἤ

νομιζομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἀντεχομένη. ΠΥΡ. Ὀρθῶς τήν τοῦ πατρικοῦ ὅρου ἐποιήσω ἐξήγησιν. ΜΑΞ. Εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡ τοῦ πατρικοῦ ὅρου ἐκ ἐξάπλωσις γεγένηται, πρῶτον μέν οὐ

δυνατόν γνωμικόν λέγειν θέλημα. Πῶς γάρ ἐκ θελήματος θέλημα προελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται; Ἔπειτα δέ καί γνώμην λέγοντες ἐπί Χριστοῦ, ὡς ἡ περί αὐτῆς ἔδειξε ζήτησις, ψιλόν αὐτόν δογματίζουσιν ἄνθρωπον, βουλευτικῶς διατιθέμενον καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς, ἀγνοῦντά τε καί ἀμφιβάλλοντα, καί ἀντικείμενα ἔχοντα· εἴπερ τις περί τῶν ἀμφιβαλλομένων, καί οὐ περί τοῦ ἀναμφιβόλου βουλεύεται. Ἡμεῖς μέν γάρ ἁπλῶς φύσει καλοῦ φυσικῶς ἔχομεν τήν ὄρεξιν· τοῦ δέ πῶς καλοῦ πεῖραν διά ζητήσεως καί βουλῆς. Καί διά τοῦτο ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν καί γνώμη προσφυῶς λέγεται, τρόπος οὖσα χρήσεως, οὐ λόγος φύσεως· ἐπεί καί ἀπειράκις μετέβαλεν ἡ φύσις. Ἐπί δέ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου τοῦ Κυρίου, οὐ ψιλῶς καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ὑποστάντος, ἀλλά θεϊκῶς· Θεός γάρ ἦν (309) ὁ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκί πεφηνώς, γνώμη λέγεσθαι οὐ δύναται. Αὐτό γάρ [αὐτῷ τῷ] τό εἶναι, ἤγουν, τό θεϊκῶς ὑποστῆναι, φυσικῶς καί τήν πρός τό καλόν εἶχεν οἰκείωσιν, καί τήν πρός τό κακόν ἀλλοτρίωσιν, καθώς καί ὁ μέγας τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ὀφθαλμός Βασίλειος ἐν τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ τοῦ μδ' ψαλμοῦ διδάσκων, ἔφη· "Κατά τοῦτο δέ ἐκλήψῃ καί τό Ἡσαΐᾳ περί αὐτοῦ εἰρημένον, ὅτι Πρίν ἤ γνῶναι τό παιδίον, ἤ προελέσθαι πονηρά, ἐκλέξεται τό ἀγαθόν. ∆ιότι πρίν ἤ γνῶναι τό παιδίον ἀγαθόν ἤ κακόν, ἀπειθεῖ πονηρίᾳ τοῦ ἐκλέξασθαι τό ἀγαθόν. Τό γάρ, πρίν ἤ, δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ζητήσας καί βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλά θεϊκῶς ὑποστάς, αὐτῷ εἶναι, τό ἐκ φύσεως εἶχεν ἀγαθόν."

ΠΥΡ. Τί οὖν; φυσικαί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί; ΜΑΞ. Ναί, φυσικαί. ΠΥΡ. Καί εἰ φυσικαί, διά τί μή ἐπίσης πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι; [ΜΑΞ. Πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσιν ἐπίσης ἐνυπάρχουσι.] ΠΥΡ. Καί πόθεν ἐν ἡμῖν τοσαύτη ἀνισότης; ΜΑΞ. Ἐκ τοῦ μή ἐπίσης ἐνεργεῖν τά τῆς φύσεως. Ὡς. εἴπερ πάντες ἴσως, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ καί

γεγόναμεν, ἐνηργοῦμεν τά φυσικά, μία ἄρα ἐδείκνυτο ἐν πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ φύσις, οὕτω καί ἀρετή, τό μᾶλλον καί ἦττον οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένη.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ οὐκ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἡμῖν τά φυσικά πρόεισιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ δημιουργίας, ἡ δέ ἀρετή φυσική, πῶς πόνῳ καί ἀσκήσει τάς ἀρετάς, φυσικάς οὔσας, κτώμεθα;

ΜΑΞ. Ἡ ἄσκησις, καί οἱ ταύτῃ ἑπόμενοι πόνοι, πρός τό μόνον διαχωρίσαι τήν ἐμφυρεῖσαν δι᾿ αἰσθήσεως ἀπάτην τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπενοήθησαν τοῖς φιλαρέτοις· οὐ πρός τό ἔξωθεν προσφάτως ἐπεισαγαγεῖν τάς ἀρετάς· ἔκγειται γάρ ἡμῖν ἐκ δημιουργίας, ὡς εἴρηται· ὅθεν καί ἅμα τελείως διακριθῇ ἡ ἀπάτη, ἅμα καί τῆς κατά φύσιν ἀρετῆς τήν λαμπρότητα ἐνδείκνυται ἡ ψυχή. Ὁ γάρ μή ἄφρων, φρόνιμος· καί ὁ μή δειλός ἤ θρασύς, ἀνδρεῖος· καί ὁ μή (312) ἀκόλαστος, σώφρων· καί ὁ μή ἄδικος, δίκαιος. Κατά φύσιν δέ ὁ λόγος, φρόνησίς ἐστι· καί τό κριτήριον, δικαιοσύνη, καί ὁ θυμός, ἀνδρεία· καί ἡ ἐπιθυμία, σωφροσύνη. Ἄρα τῇ ἀφαιρέσει τῶν παρά φύσιν, τά κατά φύσιν καί μόνα διαφαίνεσθαι εἴωθεν· ὥσπερ καί τῇ τοῦ ἰοῦ ἀποβολῇ, ἡ τοῦ σιδήρου κατά φύσιν αὐγή καί λαμπρότης.

ΠΥΡ. Μεγίστη ἐντεῦθεν ἀναδέδεικται βλασφημία τοῖς γνώμην ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγουσιν.