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Whether the soul is a substance. That it is a substance is shown thus. First, that the definition of a substance could reasonably be said of it, since a substance is thus, that which is the same and one in number is receptive of contraries in turn. That the soul, without departing from its own nature, admits contraries in turn, is surely clear to everyone. For justice and injustice; and courage and cowardice; and temperance and intemperance, are observed in it as being contraries. If, therefore, it is a property of a substance to be receptive of contraries in turn; and the soul is also shown to admit this definition, then the soul is a substance. Then also, since the body is a substance, it is necessary for the soul to be a substance. For it is not possible for that which is given life to be substantial, but that which gives life to be unsubstantial; unless one should say that non-being is the cause of being; or again, some madman might say that what has its existence in something, and which cannot exist without it, is the cause of that in which it is.

Whether the soul is incorporeal. That the soul is in the body was shown above. It is necessary, therefore, to know how it is

in the body; and if it lies beside it as a pebble to a pebble, the soul will be a body; but the whole body will not be ensouled, for it will surround some part. But if it is mixed or blended, the soul would be called multipartite, and not simple, and cast out from the definition of a soul. For that which is multipartite is also divisible; and that which is divisible is also dissoluble; and that which is dissoluble is composite; and that which is composite is three-dimensionally extended; and that which is three-dimensionally extended is a body. And a body added to a body makes bulk. But the soul, being in the body, does not make bulk, (357) but rather gives life; therefore the soul will not be a body, but incorporeal.

Further, if the soul is a body, it is moved either from within or from without; but it is not moved from without, for it is not pushed or pulled like inanimate things; nor is it moved from within like ensouled things, for it is absurd to speak of a soul of a soul. It will not, therefore, be a body; thus it is incorporeal.

And again, if the soul is a body, it has sensible qualities and is nourished; but it is not nourished; and if it is nourished, it is not nourished corporeally as the body, but incorporeally, for it is nourished by reason. Therefore it does not have sensible qualities. For neither justice, nor courage, nor any of such things are seen. For these are qualities of the soul; therefore it is not a body; thus it is incorporeal.

Whether the soul is simple. It is shown therefore that the soul is simple, chiefly from those things by which it was also proved incorporeal. For if

it is not a body—for every body is composite; that which is composed is composed of parts—neither then will it be multipartite; but being incorporeal, it is simple, since it is also incomposite.

Whether the soul is immortal. I think it must follow from being simple, that it is immortal; and how, listen. None of the things that exist

is destructive of itself, since neither would it have been constituted from the beginning. For things that perish, perish from their contraries. Wherefore everything that perishes is dissoluble; and that which is dissoluble is composite; and that which is composite is multipartite; and that which is composed of parts, is clearly composed of different parts; and that which is different is not the same; therefore, the soul being simple, and not being composed of different parts, being incomposite and indissoluble, for this reason will be imperishable and immortal.

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Εἰ οὐσία ἐστίν ἡ ψυχή. Ὅτι μέν οὐσία ἐστί δείκνυται οὕτως. Πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ὅρος καί ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ

εἰκότως ἄν λεχθείη, ἐπειδή οὕτως οὐσία ἐστί, τό ταυτόν καί ἕν ἀριθμῷ τῶν ἐναντίως παρά μέρος εἶναι δεκτικόν. Ὅτι δέ ἡ ψυχή, αὐτή τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως μή ἐξισταμένη τά ἐνάντια ἐπιδέχεται πατά μέρος, παντί που δῆλον. ∆ικαιοσύνη γάρ καί ἀδικία· ἀνδρεία τε καί δειλία· σωφροσύνη τε καί ἀκολασία, ἐν αὐτῇ θεωροῦνται ἐναντία ὄντα. Εἰ τοίνυν ἰδίωμα οὐσίας τό τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι παρά μέρος δεκτικόν· δείκνυται δέ καί ἡ ψυχή τοῦτον ἐπιδεχομένη τόν ὅρον, οὐσία ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Ἔπειτα δέ καί τοῦ σώματος οὐσίας ὄντος, καί τήν ψυχήν ἀνάγκη οὐσίαν εἶναι. Οὐδέ γάρ οἷον τε τό μέν ζωοποιούμενον εἶναι ἐνούσιον· τό δέ ζωοποιοῦν, ἀνούσιον εἶναι· εἰ μή τις καί τό μή ὄν τοῦ ὄντος αἴτιον φήσειεν εἶναι· ἤ πάλιν τό ἐν ᾧ τήν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον, καί ὅ ἄνευ τοῦ εἶναι μή δυνάμενον, εἰτίαν ἐκείνου εἶναι ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μανείς τις εἴποι.

Εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχή. Ὅτι μέν ἐν τῷ σώματί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἀνωτέρω ἐδείχθη. ∆εῖ τοίνυν εἰδέναι πῶς ἐστιν

ἐν τῷ σώματι· καί εἰ μέν παράκειται αὐτῷ ὡς ψηφίς ψηφίδι, σῶμα μέν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή· ὅλον δέ τό σῶμα οὐκ ἔσται ἔμψυχον· μέρει γάρ τινι περικείσεται. Εἰ δέ μέμικται ἤ κέκραται, πολυμερής ἄν λέγοιτο ἡ ψυχή, καί οὐχ ἁπλῆ, τοῦ δέ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγου ἐκβεβλημένη. Τό γάρ πολυμερές, καί διαιρετέον ἐστι, τό δέ διαιρετόν, καί διαλυτόν· τό δέ διαλυτόν, σύνθετον· τό δέ σύνθετον, τριχῆ διαστατόν· τό δέ τριχῆ διαστατόν, σῶμα· σῶμα δέ σώμτι προστιθέμενον, ὄγκον ποιεῖ. Ἡ δέ ψυχή ἐν τῷ σώματι οὖσα οὐκ ὄγκον ποιεῖ, (357) ἀλλά μᾶλλον ζωοποιεῖ· οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται σῶμα ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλ᾿ ἀσώματος.

Ἔτι, εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή, ἤ ἔνδοθεν κινεῖται, ἤ ἔξωθεν· οὔτε δέ ἔξωθεν κινεῖται· οὐ γάρ ὠθεῖται, ἤ ἕλκεται ὡς τά ἄψυχα· οὔτε δέ ἔσωθεν κινεῖται ὡς τά ἔμψυχα· ἄτοπον γάρ ψυχῆς ψυχήν λέγειν. Οὐκ ἔσται οὖν σῶμα· ἀσώματος ἄρα.

Καί πάλιν, εἰ σῶμα ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, καί τάς ποιότητας αἰσθητάς ἔχει, καί τρέφεται· ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τρέφεται· καί εἰ τρέφεται οὐ σωματικῶς τρέφεται ὡς τό σῶμα, ἀλλ᾿ ἀσωμάτως· λόγῳ γάρ τρέφεται. Οὐ τοίνυν τάς ποιότητας αἰσθητάς ἔχει. Οὐ γάρ ὁρᾶται οὔτε δικαιοσύνη, οὔτε ἀνδρεία, οὔτε τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Τῆς γάρ ψυχῆς αἱ ποιότητες αὗται· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν σῶμα· ἀσώματος ἄρα.

Εἰ ἁπλῆ ἡ ψυχή. ∆είκνυται τοίνυν ὅτι ἁπλῆ ἡ ψυχή, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα καί ἀσώματος ἀπεδείχθη. Εἰ γάρ

σῶμα οὐκ ἔστι· σῶμα γάρ ἅπαν σύνθετόν ἐστι· τό συγκείμενον, ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται· οὐκ ἄν οὐδέ πολυμερής ἔσται· ἀσώματος δέ οὖσα, ἁπλῆ ἐστιν, ἐπειδή καί ἀσύνθετος.

Εἰ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. Ἀκολουθεῖν οἶμαι δεῖν τῷ ἁπλῷ, τό ἀθάνατον· καί ὅπως, ἄκουσον. Οὐδέ τῶν ὄντων

αὐτό ἑαυτοῦ φθαρτικόν ἐστιν, ἐπεί οὐκ ἄν οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνέστη. Τά γάρ φθειρόμενα, ἐκ τῶν ἀναντίων φθείρεται. ∆ιό πᾶν φθειρόμενον, διαλυτόν ἐστι· τό δέ διαλυτόν, σύνθετον· τό δέ σύνθετον, πολυμερές· τό δέ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενον, δηλονότι ἐκ διαφόρων σύγκειται μερῶν· τό δέ διάφορον, οὐ ταυτόν· οὐκοῦν, ἡ ψυχή ἁπλῆ οὖσα, καί μή ἐκ διαφόρων συγκειμένη μερῶν ἀσύνθετος καί ἀδιάλυτος οὖσα, διά τοῦτο ἄφθαρτος καί ἀθάνατος ἔσται.