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Who then are these, who affirm that there is no incorporeal creature? and to whom do they object with these, your arguments’ fictitious inventions devoid of truth? And how is it that those who are not excessively contentious were not shamed by our argument, which is so far from any extremely contrary reasoning? And so that my discourse on this subject may proceed more smoothly, I will make your own wise and invincible argument the starting-point of my own, as an unconquerable ally of the truth; glorying in your arguments as provisions for the journey.

a. If the body by its own nature is motionless; and the soul is also a body, even if the most subtle, as they say, inasmuch as it is a body, it will not be moved. And if these things are so, whence is our motion? And this would go on to infinity, until we come to an incorporeal creature. But if they say that we are moved by God in the first instance; since I know that most of our movements are improper and shameful, they will necessarily declare the divine to be the cause of these things as well.

b. Another. And again, if every corporeal existence, however it may be, according to the true account, being defined by quantity and quality, in bulk and form, and surface and shape, terminates the consideration of itself, being defined by necessary limits. For he who investigates it could not imagine anything outside of these; and the soul, being a body, is certainly circumscribed either by these, or is these, or some of them, or one of them, or by them, or by some of them, or by one of them; but in fact it is circumscribed neither by these, nor is it these, nor some of them, nor one of them, nor by them, nor by some of them, nor by one of them; therefore the soul is not a body.

c. Another. If, then, it is not doubted by them that the soul exists; and existing, it is none of the things which the mind comprehends, from which, or which, bodies exist; not color, not shape, not resistance, not weight, not magnitude, not the three dimensions; and, simply, being absolutely none of the things comprehended in corporeal nature; that which is none of these, as the argument has shown, will certainly be incorporeal, if indeed it exists.

d. (428) Another. Further, if all contraction and expansion and division belong to bodies; t

and that which is free of all contraction and expansion and any division whatsoever is certainly incorporeal, the soul therefore is incorporeal, as being entirely unsusceptible of all these things.

e. Another. If all corporeal substance is divided into animate and inanimate; and the soul is also a body, it will certainly be either animate or inanimate. But if it is animate, it will be animated certainly by an animating substance, or power, or accident. But to say that a soul is animated, just as that light is illuminated, or fire is heated, is utterly ridiculous. And if we say that a substance animates the soul, we shall again say that it is either corporeal or incorporeal. And if it is a body, the argument concerning this will receive the same absurd attacks of reasoning from absurdities, until it is jointly agreed that the soul is incorporeal. But if we say that a power, that is, a quality, animates the soul, a life-giving and moving principle of the substance, it will be involuntary and insubstantial. In addition to the fact that the difference between ruling and being ruled will be alternating and contrary to nature; since the soul, created by nature to rule a body, as an incorporeal substance, would, as a body according to them, be ruled by that which is not a substance; by a qualitative power, I say, it will be ruled; it which is and subsists as a substance, and the common preconception of all. But if we say it is an inanimate body, it will be without sensation and without imagination, irrational and without thought. But indeed all these things are concerning the soul, and in the soul, and exist and are seen; therefore the soul is not a body. For that it has this body

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Τίνες δέ οὗτοι ὑπάρχουσιν, οἱ κτίσμα ἀσώματον μή εἶναι διαβεβαιούμενοι; καί τίσι τούτοις, ταῖς ὑμετέραις τῶν λόγων ἀληθείας ἀνυπάρκτοις ἀναπλασμοῖς ἀντιπίπτοντες; Πῶς δέ, οἱ μή τοῦ δέοντος εἰσι φιλονεικότεροι, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οὐκ ἐδυσωπήθησαν ἐπειχειρήματι, παντός εἰς ἄκρον οὕτως ἀντιπτωτικοῦ λόγου πόῤῥω τυγχάνοντι; Καί ἵνα μοι μᾶλλον καθ᾿ ὁδόν ὁ περί τούτου λόγος προΐῃ, αὐτό ὑμῶν ὡς τῆς ἀληθείας σύμμαχον ἀκαταγώνιστον σοφόν ἐπιχείρημα, τῶν οἰκείων ἀπαρχήν ποιήσομαι· ὡς ἐφοδικοῖς τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναβρυνόμενος.

α´. Εἰ τό σῶμα τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει ἀκίνητον· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, εἰ καί τό λεπτομερέστατον, ὥς φασι, καθό σῶμα, οὐ κινηθήσεται. Καί εἰ ταῦθ᾿ οὕτως ἔχει, πόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ κίνησις; Καί τοῦτο ἐπ᾿ ἄπειρον, ἕως οὗ ἔλθωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον κτίσμα. Εἰ δέ ἀπό τοῦ Θεοῦ φήσουσι κατά πρῶτον λόγον ἡμᾶς κινεῖσθαι· ἐπειδή τάς πλείους ἡμῶν κινήσεις ἀτόπους ἐπίσταμαι καί αἰσχράς, αἴτιον πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί τούτων ἀποφανοῦνται τό θεῖον.

β´. Ἄλλο. Καί πάλιν, εἰ πᾶσα καί ὁπωσδήποτε οὖσα σωματική ὕπαρξις κατά τόν ἀληθῆ λόγον, τῷ ποσῷ τε καί τῷ ποιῷ διειλημμένη, ἐν ὄγκῳ καί εἴδει, καί ἐπιφανείᾳ καί σχήματι, τήν περί ἑαυτῆς περατοῖ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἀναγκαίοις διειλημένη πέρασιν. Οὐ γάρ τι τούτων ἐκτός ἔχοι φαντάζεσθαι ὁ ταύτην διερευνώμενος· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, ἤ ἐκ τούτων , ἤ ταῦτα, ἤ τινα, ἤ τούτων τι, ἤ τούτοις, ἤ τισιν, ἤ τινι τούτων περιγραπτός πάντως ἐστί· ἀλλά μή οὔτε ἐκ τούτων, οὔτε ταῦτα, οὔτε τινά, οὔτε τι τούτων, οὔτε τούτοις, οὔτε τισίν, οὔτε τινί τούτων ἐστί περιγραπτός· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή.

γ´. Ἄλλο. Εἰ τοίνυν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μή ἀμφιβέβληται ἡ ψυχή· οὖσα δέ οὐδέν ὑπάρχειν ὧν καταλαμβάνει ἡ ἔννοια, ἐξ ὧν, ἤ ἅ ὑπάρχει τά σώματα· οὐ χρῶμα, οὐ σχῆμα, οὐκ ἀντιτυπία, οὐ βάρος, οὐ πηλικότης , οὐχ ἡ εῖς τρία διάστασις· καί ἁπλῶς ὅλως οὐδέν οὖσα τῶν περί τήν σωματικήν φύσιν καταλαμβανομένων· ἡ μηδέν οὖσα τούτων, ὡς ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, ἀσώματος ἔσται πάντως, εἴπερ ἐστίν.

δ´. (428) Ἄλλο. Ἔτι, εἰ πᾶσα συστολή καί διαστολή καί τομή τῶν σωμάτων ἐστί· τό

δέ πάσης συστολῆς καί διαστολῆς καί τῆς οἱασοῦν τομῆς ἐλεύθερον, πάντως ἀσώματον, ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀσώματος, ὡς τούτων πάντων παντελῶς ἀνεπίδεκτος.

ε´. Ἄλλο. Εἰ πάσης τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας, εἴς τε τό ἔμψυχον καί τό ἄψυχον διῃρημένης· σῶμα δέ καί ἡ ψυχή, ἤ ἔμψυχον, ἤ ἄψυχον ἔσται πάντως. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μέν ἔμψυχον, διά ψυχούσης πάντως, ἤ οὐσίας, ἤ δυνάμεως, ἤτη συμβεβηκότος ψυχωθήσεται. Ψυχήν δέ ψυχοῦσαθαι λέγειν, ὥσπερ καί φῶς φωτίζεσθαι, ἤ θερμαίνεσθαι τό πῦρ, παντελῶς καταγέλαστον. Καί εἰ μέν οὐσίαν ψυχοῦν τήν ψυχήν εἴπωμεν, ἤ σῶμα ἤ ἀσώματον αὐτήν πάλιν λέξομεν. Καί εἰ μέν σῶμα, τάς αὐτάς ἀεί τῶν λογισμῶν ἀτόπους ἐξ ἀτόπων ἐφόδους, ὁ πρί τούτου δέξεται λόγος, μέχρις οὗ ἀσώματον τήν ψυχήν εἶναι συνδιομολογηθῇ. Εἰ δέ δύναμιν, ἤτοι ποιότητα ψυχοῦν τήν ψυχήν εἴπωμεν, τῆς οὐσίας ζωοποιητικόν τε καί κινητικόν, τό ἀκούσιον ἔσται καί ἀνυπόστατον. Πρός τό, καί ἐναλλάξ καί παρά φύσιν τήν κατά τό ἄρχειν καί ἄρχεσθαι εἶναι διαφοράν· εἴπερ σώματος ἄρχειν κατά φύσιν δημιουργηθεῖσα ἡ ψυχή, ὡς ἀσώματος οὐσία, ὡς σῶμα κα᾿ αὐτούς ὑπό τοῦ μή κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ὄντος· τῆς κατά τό ποιόν λέγω δυνάμεως, ἀρχθήσεται· ἡ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν οὖσά τε καί ὑφεστῶσα, καί τήν κοινήν πάντων πρόληψιν. Εἰ δέ ἄψυχον εἴπωμεν σῶμα, ἀναίσθητον καί ἀφαντασίαστον, ἄλογόν τε καί ἀδιανόητον ἔσται. Ἀλλά μήν ταῦτα πάντα περί τήν ψυχήν, καί ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καί ἔστι καί ὁρᾶται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. Σῶμα μέν γάρ ἔχειν τοῦτο αὐτήν