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of a different substance, knowing well how to say it, we do not refuse; but to declare that it is a body, as something most rash and at the same time most uneducated, we completely avoid; not being ignorant that to be is very different from to have.

But if, because they say the Divine is incorporeal, fearing a non-existent fear, they do not condescend to call the soul incorporeal, so that they may not bring it to equality with God; let them also cut away the rest of our qualities, so that their struggle of folly may be complete, as many as we have been designated from God as participants; or God from us, as acting and giving, or imparting, we have been called, or God has been designated by us. What things, then, do I mean? To be, to live, to be enlightened, to be made good, to reason, to understand; some, on account of substance; others, on account of motion, that is, will and disposition. For we are called beings, and living, and lights, and good, and intelligent, and rational. And likewise we name God, as being and living, and light, and good, and mind and reason; whether as being (429) and being called these things from a cause; or as being acted upon, addressing the divine by these terms from our own. What then is their argument, that the soul is and is named all these things, along with many others; but no longer incorporeal, just as the Divine is? As if it were necessary, either that we should not be called these things, because the Divine is, or that God should not be named these things, just as we are. But indeed we both are these things, and are so named; not as being the same as God on account of these things, but as an effect to a cause, or a participant to that which is participated in, or an existence to a cause. Neither comparatively nor synonymously, as in the case of those of the same substance; but homonymously, and, so to speak, by participation; since the things are infinitely distant from each other in nature; unless someone should truly prefer to call the Divine also beyond nature and thing.

Where then, according to them again, if it were granted that the soul is a body, will the principle of our being 'in the image' be preserved, if we do not say that the soul has, in all respects, the likeness to the archetype? For just as we name the intelligent image of the intelligent, and of the immortal, incorruptible and invisible, the image known in these things; so too, saying the incorporeal image of the incorporeal, as escaping all bulk and likewise all dimensional measurement; we say that it is again something other than that, according to the property of its nature. Since it would no longer be an image, but an identical sameness. And in what things that is seen in the uncreated and immutable and unoriginate nature, in those same things the created rational nature; not in the same way, but as in the faintest echoes of a voice a word's meaning is shown, we clearly believe. And just as through the things accomplished among beings according to the order of the universe, the most philosophical mind, having transferred the powers of its thoughts to that which is pure and immaterial, distinguishes from things moved the mover, and apprehending it as one and only and simple, existing of itself, being in the same state and the productive cause, in the proper permanence of its identity, knows it to be by nature inaccessible to others; immutable, because it is unmoved; for there is nothing towards which that which both makes and fills beings, and is above all beings, will be moved; but comprehensive, as creator, and knowing all things before genesis by the infinity of its power. In the same manner of contemplation, and through the varied and artful motion of the members and parts of the microcosm—I mean, of man—he who reasons about the moving cause, knows it to be something else in substance besides the organic existence of the body; and not as a body in a body, which is the opinion of the new wise men, and of the dogmatists of the unproven; (432) but he beholds it as simple and unified in things scattered, and in things contracted, undefined; changeable, indeed, as being moved;

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ἑτερούσιον, καλῶς εἰδότες λέγειν οὐ παραιτούμεθα· σῶμα δέ αὐτήν εἶναι ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ὡς θρασύτατόν τε ἅμα καί ἀπαιδευτότατον, παντελῶς ἀποφεύγομεν· πολύ διαφέρειν τοῦ ἔχειν τό εἶναι οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες.

Εἰ δέ ὅτι ἀσώματον λέγουσι τό Θεῖον, τόν μή ὄντα φοβούμενοι φόβον, ἀσώματον εἰπεῖν τήν ψυχήν οὐ καταδέχονται, ἵνα μή εἰς ἴσον αὐτήν τῷ Θεῷ ἐνέγκωσι· καί τά λοιπά ἡμῶν περικοπτέτωσαν, ἵν᾿ ᾗ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀπονοίας τέλειον τό ἀγώνισμα, ὅσα ἐκ Θεοῦ ὡς μετέχοντες· ἤ Θεός ἐξ ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐνεργῶν καί διδούς, ἤ μεταδιδούς, προσηγορεύθημεν, ἤ παρ᾿ ἡμῶν προσηγορεύθη Θεός. Τίνα δή λέγω ταῦτα; Τό εἶναι, τό ζῇν, τό φωτίζεσθαι, τό ἀγαθύνεσθαι, τό λογίζεσθαι, τό νοεῖν· τά μέν, διά τήν οὐσίαν· τά δέ , διά τήν κίνησιν, ἤτοι γνώμην καί διάθεσιν. Ὄντες γάρ λεγόμεθα, καί ζῶντες, καί φῶτες, καί ἀγαθοί, καί νοεροί, καί λογικοί. Τόν τε Θεόν ὁμοίως, ὄντα καί ζῶντα, καί φῶς, καί ἀγαθόν, καί νοῦν καί λόγον ὀνομάζομεν· εἴτε ὡς ἐξ αἰτίου ὄντες ταῦτα (429) καί καλούμενοι· εἴτε ὡς ἐνεργούμενοι, ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ταῦτα τό θεῖον πρασαγορεύοντες. Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς, ταῦτα μέν πάντα πρς ἑτέροις πολλοῖς εἶναι τήν ψυχήν καί ὀνομάζεσθαι· ἀσώματον δέ, μηκέτι, ὅ τι περ τό Θεῖον; Ὡς δέον, ἤ μή λέγεσθαι ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, διότι τό Θεῖον, ἤ τόν Θεόν ταῦτα μή ὀνομάζεσθαι, ὅ τί περ καί ἡμεῖς. Ἀλλά μήν καί ἐσμέν ταῦτα· καί ὀνομαζόμεθα· οὐχ ὡς ταυτόν τῷ Θεῷ διά ταῦτα ὄντες· ἀλλ᾿ ὡς πρός αἴτιον αἰτιατόν, ἤ μέτοχον πρός μετεχόμενον, ἤ ὕπαρξιν πρός αἰτίαν. Οὐδέ συγκριτικῶς ἤ συνωνύμως, ὡς ἐπί τῶν ὁμοουσίων· ἀλλ᾿ ὁμονύμως, καί οἷον εἰπεῖν μεθεκτῶς· τῶν πραγμάτων κατά τό ἄπειρον ἀλλήλων τῇ φύσει διεστηκότων· εἰ μή τῷ φίλον, ὡς ἀληθῶς, τό Θεῖον εἰπεῖν, καί ὑπέρ φύσιν καί πρᾶγμα.

Ποῦ δέ λοιπόν κατ᾿ αὐτούς πάλιν, εἰ δοθείη τήν ψυχήν εἶναι σῶμα, ὁ τοῦ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα ἡμῖν διασωθήσεται λόγος, εἰ μή διά πάντων ἔχειν φαμέν τήν ψυχήν, τήν πρός τό ἀρχέτυπον ὁμοιότητα; Ὥσπερ γάρ τοῦ νοεροῦ νοεράν, καί τοῦ ἀθανάτου, ἀφθάρτου τε καί ἀοράτου, τήν ἐν τούτοις γνωριζομένην εἰκόνα ὀνομάζομεν· οὕτω δή καί τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, ἀσώματον λέγοντες, ὡς πάντα τε ὄγκον, καί πᾶσαν ὁμοίως διαφεύγουσαν διαστηματικήν καταμέτρησιν· ἄλλο τι πάλιν αὐτήν παρ᾿ ἐκεῖνο, κατά τήν τῆς φύσεως ἰδιότητα λέγομεν. Ἐπεί οὐκ ἔτι ἄν εἴη εἰκών, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπαράλλακτος ταυτότης. Ἐν οἷς δέ ἐν τῇ ἀκτίστῳ καί ἀτρέπτῳ καί ἀνάρχῳ φύσει ἐκεῖνο καθορᾶται, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τήν κτιστήν λογικήν φύσιν· οὐ κατά τό αὐτό δέ, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐν ἐσχάτοις ἀπηχήμασι φωνῆς λόγου δήλωσιν, δείκνυσθαι, ἐναργῶς νομίζομεν. Καί ὥσπερ διά τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι κατά τήν τοῦ παντός διακόσμησιν ἐπιτελουμένων ὁ φιλοσοφώτατος νοῦς, πρός τό καθαρόν τε καί ἄϋλον μετενεγκών τῶν νοημάτων αὐτοῦ τάς δυνάμεις, διακρίνει ἀπό τῶν κινουμένων τό κινοῦν, καί ἕν καί μόνον καί ἁπλοῦν αὐτό ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρχον, ὡσαύτως ἔχον καί ποιητικόν αἴτιον καταλαμβάνων ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τῆς ταυτότητος μονιμότητι, ἀπρόσιτον κατά τήν φύσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπίσταται· ἄτρεπτον μέν, ὅτι ἀκίνητον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι πρός ὅ κινηθήσεται τό, τά ὄντα καί ποιοῦν καί πληροῦν, καί ὑπερ πάντα ὄν τά ὄντα· περιεκτικόν δέ, ὡς δημιουργόν, καί πρό γενέσεως, τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῆς δυνάμεως τά πάντα γινῶσκον. Κατά τόν αὐτόν τῆς θεωρίας τρόπον, καί διά τῆς τῶν μελῶν καί μερῶν ποικίλης καί ἐντεχνοῦς κινήσεως τοῦ μικροῦ κόσμου· λέγω δή τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τό κινητικόν αἴτιον λογιζόμενος, ἄλλο τι οἶδε κατά τήν οὐσίαν παρά τήν ὀργανικήν τοῦ σώματος ὕπαρξιν· καί οὐχ ὡς σῶμα ἐν σώματι· ὅπερ δοκεῖ τοῖς νέοις σοφοῖς, καί τῶν ἀναποδείκτων δογματισταῖς· (432) ἀλλ᾿ ἁπλοῦν καί ἑνιαῖον ἐν τοῖς ἐσκεδασμένοις θεωρεῖ, καί ἐν τοῖς συνεσταλμένοις, ἀόριστον· τρεπόμενον μέν, ὡς κινούμενον·