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That number neither divides, nor is divided; nor does it introduce division, according to its own principle, at all to those things to which it is applied.

But if some, preferring opinion to the truth, say that number is divisive or divisible, or introduces division; and because of this, fearing a non-existent fear, refuse to say that the two natures that came together in Christ are preserved after the union, lest a cutting and division be introduced into the mystery of the incarnation, I do not see what is the reason for their sagacity in this matter. For either they show themselves wiser in this than the holy Fathers who used such an expression and suspected no division; being deceived as if they could penetrate more spiritually into divine things than they did, or, when they consider the principles of things in themselves, being puffed up by their conceit for opinion, they have not recognized the truth that has escaped them. For who of those in any way versed in the divine teachings of the Fathers is ignorant that all number, according to the great and God-bearing Gregory, is indicative of the quantity of the subjects, but not of the division of the things, as it seems to these people? For how could it divide, I would gladly ask them, that which does not subsist in essence? For it is of a subsisting essence to be able by nature to do something to another thing. And how will it be divided, that which according to its own principle cannot be acted upon? For the experts in these matters have declared that this is proper to an accident, that is to a quality, of those things said to be in a subject. But if number, according to its own principle, can neither divide nor be divided. For it is not its nature to act, for that belongs to essence; nor to be acted upon, for that belongs to an accident; nor will it be able by necessity (476) to introduce division into things, since their nature and position and relation to one another, as they have them before being numbered, remain fixed, and after being numbered, they have suffered nothing new at all on account of the number. For let us say ten men, or if we speak of anything else of those things that subsist in themselves, signifying a discrete quantity: we do not understand that they have received their existence in themselves and their distinction from one another in their hypostases through the number at that time; but that they are this and so many through themselves and not through the number, we have indicated not by division, but by quantity through the number. And again, when we speak of a two-colored or a five-colored stone, and whatever things are of a continuous quantity, we do not divide the one stone into two or five stones; nor do we cut the colors in it from one another, but we signify that so many exist unconfusedly about it and in it as in a subject; with no cutting or division having occurred to the stone, or being able to occur, from the continuous quantity of the colors numbered about it; just as there is no confusion or mingling for the colors from the one subject of the stone. For the stone is shown having the monadic quality in its subject, and possessing the quantity of colors about it indivisibly. And likewise the colors of the stone itself, differing from one another in quality, possessing a quantity that contributes again to the one subject by composition of the stone, have the monadic quality unconfusedly, and it is one and the same stone, neither divided by the quantity of colors, nor confused by the monadic quality of the subject. But having its existence possessing different principles, according to one, it admits number; but according to another, it does not accept it. Therefore every number is not indicative of the relation itself of things—I mean of division and continuity—but of the quantity of the things of which it happens to be; introducing the principle of what it is to be a quantity, but not of how it exists. For how could it introduce along with itself the relations of things, which both exist before it and can be known without it, and which has no indication of affinity towards them, being separated by their quantity? For a multitude of men

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Ὅτι ἀριθμός οὔτε διαιρεῖ, οὔτε διαιρεῖται· οὔτε διαίρεσιν εἰσάγει κατά τόν ἴδιον λόγον τό σύνολον οἷς ἐπιλέγεται.

Εἰ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τό δόξαν προτιμῶντες, φασί τόν ἀριθμόν διαιρετικόν εἶναι ἤ διαιρετόν, ἤ διαιρέσεως εἰσαγωγικόν· καί τοῦτο τόν οὐκ ὄντα φοβούμενοι φόβον, δύο φύσεις ἐπί Χριστοῦ τάς συνελθούσας σώζεσθαι λέγειν παραιτοῦνται μετά τήν ἕνωσιν, ἵνα μή τομή καί μερισμός τῷ μυστηρίῳ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως παρεισκρίνηται, οὐ συνορῶ τίς ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς τῆς περί τοῦτο συνέσεως. Ἤ γάρ σοφωτέρους ἐν τούτῳ τῶν χρησαμένων τῇ τοιαύτῃ φωνῇ ἁγίων Πατέρων, καί διαίρεσιν οὐδεμίαν ὑποπτευσάντων ἑαυτούς ἀποφαίνουσιν· ὡς δή τι πνευματικώτερον αὐτῶν τοῖς θείοις ἐμβατεύειν δύνασθαι ἀπατώμενοι, ἤ τούς τῶν ὄντων καθ᾿ ἑαυτούς διασκεπτόμενοι λόγους, τῇ περί τό δόξαν οἰήσει φυσώμενοι, τό ἀληθές αὐτούς διαλαθόν οὐκ ἐπέγνωσαν. Ἐπεί τίς ἀγνοεῖ τῶν ὁποσοῦν τά θεῖα τῶν Πατέρων ἠσκημένων διδάγματα, ὅτι πᾶς ἀριθμός κατά τόν μέγαν καί θεοφόρον Γρηγόριον, τοῦ ποσοῦ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστί δηλωτικός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, καθά τούτοις δοκεῖ; Πῶς γάρ ἄν καί διαιρεῖν δυνήσηται, ἡδέως ἄν αὐτούς ἠρόμην, τό κατ᾿ οὐσίαν μή ὑφεστώς; οὐσίας γάρ ὑφεστώσης, τό, τί δρᾷν πεφυκέναι περί τι ἕτερον δύνασθαι. Πῶς δέ καί διαιρεθήσεται, τό πάσχειν μή δυνάμενον κατά τόν ἴδιον λόγον; Συμβεβηκότος γάρ, ἤτοι ποιότητος τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν ἴδιον, οἱ περί ταῦτα δεινοί ἀπεφήναντο, τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι λεγομένων. Εἰ δέ οὔτε διαιρεῖν, οὔτε διαιρεῖσθαι κατά τόν ἴδιον λόγον ὁ ἀριθμός δύναται. Οὔτε γάρ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, οὐσίας γάρ· οὔτε πάσχειν, συμβεβηκότος γάρ· οὔτε διαίρεσιν ἑαυτῷ συνεισάγειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης (476) δυνήσεται τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς ἔχουσι πρό τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ φύσεώς τε καί θέσεως, καί τῆς πρός ἄλληλα σχέσεως, μενόντων ἀραρότων, καί μετά τό ἀριθμηθῆναι, οὐδέν διά τόν ἀριθμόν τό σύνολον παθόντων καινοπρεπές. ∆έκα γάρ ἀνθρώπους φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἤ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν καθ᾿ αὐτά ὑφεστώτων λέγοντες, καί ποσόν διῃρημένον σημαίνοντες· οὐ τό καθ᾿ αὐτούς εἶναι , καί ἀλλήλων διωρίσθαι ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι διά τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τότε εἰληφέναι γινώσκομεν· ἀλλ᾿ αὐτούς δι᾿ ἑαυτούς καί οὐ διά τόν ἀριθμόν τοῦτο ὄντας, καί τοσούτους, οὐ τῇ διαιρέσει· τῷ δέ ποσῷ διά τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐδηλώσαμεν. Καί πάλιν λίθον λέγοντες δίχροον ἤ πετάχροον, καί ὅσα συνεχοῦς ὑπάρχει ποσοῦ, οὐ διαιροῦμεν εἰς λίθους δύο ἤ πέντε τόν ἕνα λίθον· οὔτε ἀλλήλων τά ἐν αὐτῷ χρώματα τέμνομεν, ἀλλά περί αὐτόν καί ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ ἀσυγχύτως τοσαῦτα ὄντα σημαίνομεν· μηδεμιᾶς γενομένης, ἤ συμβῆναι δυναμένης τῷ λίθῳ τομῆς ἤ διαιρέσεως, ἐκ τοῦ περί αὐτόν ἀριθμηθέντος συνεχοῦς τῶν χρωμάτων ποσοῦ· ὥσπερ οὐδέ τοῖς χρώμασι συγχύσεως ἤ φύρσεως ἐκ τοῦ περί τόν λίθον ὑποκειμένου ἑνός. Καί γάρ τό μοναδικόν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἔχων ὁ λίθος, καί τό περί αὐτόν τῶν χρωμάτων ἀδιαιρέτως κεκτημένος δείκνυται ποσόν. Ὁμοίως δέ καί τά αὐτοῦ τοῦ λίθου χρώματα, ὡς τῷ ποιῷ ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, τό ποσόν κεκτημένα τό πρός ἕν πάλιν συντελεῖν κατά σύνθεσιν τοῦ λίθου ὑποκείμενον, τό μοναδικόν ἀσυγχύτως ἔχουσι, καί ἔστιν εἷς καί ὁ αὐτός λίθος, μήτε τῷ ποσῷ τῶν χρωμάτων διῃρημένος, μήτε τῷ μοναδικῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου συγκεχυμένος. ∆ιαφόρους δέ λόγους κεκτημένην ἔχων τήν ὕπαρξιν, κατ' ἄλλον μέν, ἀριθμόν ἐπιδέχεται· κατ' ἄλλον δέ, τοῦτον οὐ προσίεται. Πᾶς οὖν ἀριθμός οὐ τῆς σχέσεως αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· διαιρέσεώς φημι καί συνεχείας· ἀλλά τῆς ποσότητος ὧν τυγχάνει δηλωτικός, τόν τοῦ ποσόν εἶναι τό ποσόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν λόγον εἰσάγων. Πῶς γάρ ἄν καί συνεισάγειν ἑαυτῷ δυνήσηται τάς σχέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων, καί πρό αὐτοῦ οὔσας, καί ἄνευ αὐτοῦ γνωσθῆναι δυναμένας, καί μηδεμίαν πρός αὐτάς ἔχων οἰκειότητος ἔμφασιν, μέσῳ τῷ ποσῷ αὐτῶν διειργόμενος; Πλῆθος γάρ ἀνθρώπων