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is undoubtedly a proof and fulfillment of what was presented in the forefather at the beginning of the age. Has the word "fate" then been usefully spoken by the teacher, according to the ways that have been given, and would every person noble both in soul and character accept the word (1100) spoken thus, generating for himself no dice-game of reasonings, knowing that in such matters "fate" is the same as "member." For if the member is a part of the body, and the member is the same as fate, then the member will be the same as fate. But if fate is the same as the member, and a collection and composition of members makes an organic body, and an organic body united with an intelligent soul shows a perfect human being, therefore he who says that a part of a human being is the soul or the body or a member of it will not err from the truth. But if the body exists as an instrument of the intelligent soul, as of a human being, and the whole soul, pervading the whole body, gives it life and motion—being simple in nature and incorporeal, not being cut apart with it or enclosed with it, but to the whole and to each of its members, as each is by nature able to receive it according to the capacity naturally underlying it for receiving its energy, being wholly present, it binds together the members that are variously receptive of it, in proportion to the preservation of the one body—let whoever still possesses an unfixed and easily swayed mind concerning these things be guided to the great and ineffable mystery of the blessed hope of Christians, taking from the small things that concern us not ignoble likenesses of the great things that are beyond us. and having abandoned the unreasonable opinion concerning the pre-existence of souls before bodies, he will believe with us the Lord who says concerning those who are raised in the resurrection that they cannot die, that is, on account of His clearer manifestation and participation of the ultimate object of desire. And again, "Everyone who lives and believes in me shall never die." Which if it had ever happened before, it would have been impossible, as has been previously shown, for one to receive any kind of death whatsoever by a turning. And let him not go outside of natural reasonings, decreeing in vain a non-existent opinion about the soul. For if body and soul happen to be parts of a human being, as has been previously shown, and parts by necessity admit of a relation to something (for they always have a "whole" predicated of them), and things so called "relatives" are among those things which are entirely and in every way simultaneous in their generation, as parts completing a whole species by their union, being divided from each other only by a concept for the purpose of discerning what each is in essence, it is therefore impossible for soul and body, as parts of a human being, to pre-exist or post-exist one another in time, since the principle of the so-called "relative" will be destroyed. And again: For if the soul or the body is a species in itself before the body, and each of these completes another species by the composition of the soul with the body, or of the body with the soul, it does this either by suffering something or by nature. And if by suffering, they have suffered by being changed into what they were not, and are destroyed; but if by nature, it will clearly always do this because of its nature, and the soul will never cease from being reincarnated, nor the body from being re-ensouled. But the fulfillment of the whole according to its species is not, (1001) as I think, from suffering or from the natural power of the parts in the union of one with the other, but from their simultaneous generation as a whole species. It is not therefore possible for any species whatsoever to change from species to species without destruction. But if they should say that because the soul exists and subsists after death and the dissolution of the body, it is also able to exist and subsist before the body, their argument, it seems to me, proceeds without due consideration. For the principle of generation and of substance is not the same. For the one is of being at some time and somewhere and in relation to something, while the other is indicative of being, and of being something, and of being in a certain way. But if this is so, it indeed exists always after it has come into being on account of its substance

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ἀναμφιβόλως τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ προπάτορι παρεθέντος ἀπόδειξις καί ἀποπλήρωσίς ἐστιν. Ἄρ᾿ οὖν χρησίμως εἴρηται τῷ διδασκάλῳ ἡ τῆς μοίρας φωνή, κατά τούς ἀποδοθέντας τρόπους, καί πᾶς εὐγενής καί ψυχήν καί τρόπον δέξαιτο ἄν οὕτω λεγομένην (1100) τήν φωνήν, μηδεμίαν ἑαυτῷ κυβείαν λογισμῶν παραγεννῶν, εἰδώς ταὐτόν εἶναι τῷ μέλει τήν μοῖραν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις. Εἰ γάρ μέρος τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει τό μέλος, τό δέ μέλος ταὐτόν ἐστι τῇ μοίρᾳ, ταὐτόν ἄρα τό μέλος τῇ μοίρᾳ ἔσται. Εἰ δέ ταὐτόν τῷ μέλει ἐστίν ἡ μοῖρα, μελῶν δέ ἀθροισμός καί σύνθεσις σῶμα ποιεῖ ὀργανικόν, σῶμα δέ ὀργανικόν ψυχῇ ἑνωθέν νοερᾷ ἄνθρωπον τέλειον δείκνυσιν, ἄρα μέρος ἀνθρώπου ὁ λέγων εἶναι ψυχήν ἤ τό σῶμα ἤ μέλος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται. Εἰ δέ τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς ὡς ἀνθρώπου ὑπάρχει τό σῶμα ὄργανον, δι᾿ ὅλου δέ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη χωροῦσα ἡ ψυχή τό ζῇν αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι δίδωσιν, ὡς ἁπλῆ τήν φύσιν καί ἀσώματος, μή συνδιατεμνομένη ἤ συναποκλειομένη αὐτῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὅλῳ καί ἑκάστῳ τῶν αὐτοῦ μελῶν, ὡς πέφυκεν αὐτήν ὑποδέχεσθαι κατά τήν φυσικῶς ὑποκειμένην αὐτῷ δεκτικήν τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ὅλη παροῦσα τά διαφόρως αὐτῆς δεκτικά μέλη ἀναλόγως πρός τήν τοῦ ἕν εἶναι σῶμα συντήρησιν ἐπισφίγγει, ὁδηγεῖσθω ἐπί τό μέγα καί ἄῤῥητον τῆς τῶν Χριστανῶν μακαρίας ἐλπίδος μυστήριον, ἐκ τῶν μικρῶν καί καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς τῶν μεγάλων καί ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀγεννῆ λαβών τά εἰκάσματα, ὅστις ἀπαγῆ καί εὐκράδαντον περί τούτων ἔτι τήν διάνοιαν κέκτηται. καί τήν περί τοῦ προϋπάρχειν τῶν σωμάτων τάς ψυχάς οὐκ εὔλογον δόξαν ἀφείς μεθ᾿ ἡμῶν πιστεύσει τῷ κυρίῳ λέγοντι περί τῶν εἰς τήν ἀνάστασιν ἐγειρομένων μή δύνασθαι ἀποθνήσκειν, διά τήν αὐτοῦ δηλαδή καθαρωτέραν ἐσχάτου ὀρεκτοῦ φανέρωσίν τε καί μετουσίαν. Καί πάλιν, Πᾶς ὁ ζῶν καί πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, οὐ μή ἀποθάνῃ εἰς τόν αἰῶνα. Ὅπερ εἰ προεγεγόνει ποτέ, ἀδύνατον ἦν, ὡς προαποδέδεικται, τόν κατά τροπήν τινα οἷον δήποτε δέξασθαι θάνατον. Καί τῶν φυσικῶν ἔξω μή βαινέτω λογισμῶν διακενῆς τήν οὐκ οὖσαν περί ψυχῆς δόξαν θεσπίζων. Εἰ γάρ ἀνθρώπου μέρη, καθώς προαποδέδοται τό σῶμα καί ἡ ψυχή τυγχάνουσι, τά δέ μέρη τήν εἰς τό πρός τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναφοράν δέχεται (ὅλον γάρ ἔχει πάντως κατηγορούμενον) , τά δέ οὕτω λεγόμενα πρός τι τῶν ἅμα πάντη τε καί πάντως κατά τήν γένεσίν ἐστιν, ὡς μέρη εἶδος ὅλον τῇ συνόδῳ ἀποτελοῦντα, ἐπινοίᾶ μόνη τῇ πρός διάγνωσιν τοῦ τί κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἕκαστον ἀλλήλων διαιρούμενα, ψυχήν ἄρα καί σῶμα, ὡς μέρη ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλήλων προϋπάρχειν χρονικῶς ἤ μεθυπάρχειν ἀμήχανον, ἐπεί ὁ τοῦ πρός τι οὕτω λεγόμενος λυθήσεται λόγος. Καί πάλιν· Εἰ γάρ καθ᾿ αὐτό εἶδος πρό τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή ἤ τό σῶμα, εἶδος δέ ἄλλο τούτων ἑκάτερον κατά τήν ψυχῆς πρός τό σῶμα σύνθεσιν, ἤ σώματος πρός ψυχήν, ἀποτελεῖ, ἤ πάσχοντα πάντως τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἤ πεφυκότα. Καί εἰ μέν πάσχοντα, πεπόνθασιν εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐξιστάμενα, καί φθείρεται, εἰ δέ πεφυκότα, ἀεί τοῦτο διά τό πεφυκός ἐργάσεται δηλονότι, καί οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἡ ψυχή τοῦ μετενσωματοῦσθαι, οὐδέ τοῦ μετεμψυχοῦσθαι τό σῶμα. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν, (1001) ὡς οἶμαι, τοῦ πάθους ἤ τῆς τῶν μερῶν φυσικῆς δυνάμεως κατά τήν πρός θάτερον θατέρου σύνοδον ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κατ᾿ εἶδος ἐκπλήρωσις, ἀλλά τῆς ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς ἅμα κατ᾿ εἶδος ὅλον γενέσεως. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν δυνατόν ἄνευ φθορᾶς ἐξ εἴδους εἰς εἶδος μεταβάλλειν τό οἱονοῦν εἶδος. Εἰ δέ ὅτι μετά τόν θάνατον καί τήν λύσιν τοῦ σώματος ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή καί ὑφέστηκε φήσουσι καί πρό τοῦ σώματος εἶναι αὐτήν δύνασθαι καί ὑφεστάναι, οὐκ ἐστοχασμένως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς προέρχεται. Οὐχ ὁ αὐτός γάρ γενέσεως καί οὐσίας λόγος. Ὁ μέν γάρ τοῦ ποτε καί που εἶναι καί πρός τι ἐστίν, ὁ δέ τοῦ εἶναι καί τι καί πως εἶναί ἐστι δηλωτικός. Εἰ δέ τοῦτο, ἐστί μέν ἀεί μετά τό γενέσθαι διά τήν οὐσίαν