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to say, but on the contrary, their true judgment and activity concerning beings is separated from practice, which indeed I, having dared, define as the only truly most complete philosophy, I suppose that he introduces it very clearly, having declared that it is accomplished by reason and contemplation, since practice is certainly joined to reason, and the judgment upon it is contained in contemplation, if indeed it is the work of reason to order the movement of the body, as if by some bridle with right reasoning, holding back the impulse towards what is absurd with knowledge, and of contemplation to choose and decide prudently upon what is well understood and judged, as if by a most brilliant light through true knowledge showing the truth itself; by both of which especially all philosophic virtue is both created and preserved, by which also it is revealed through the body, though not entirely. For it is not contained by the body, being an impress of divine power, but certain shadows of it, and this not for its own sake, but so that those who are naked of its grace might come to an imitation of the godlike conduct of God-loving men, in order that by partaking of the good they too, having cast off the shame of wickedness, might become of the portion of those worthy of God, or so that those who need some assistance might receive it from those who are able, so that, having accepted the virtuous disposition hidden in the depth of the soul, which has been made manifest through the body in action, they too might hymn the providence of God which becomes all things to all men and is present to all through all things. So that if there were no one who needed to be treated well, or who ought to be formed to virtue by an example, each person would surely be sufficient for himself, exulting in the graces of the virtues in the soul. And it is not absurd to say, without the visible demonstration of these things through the body. He, therefore, who has piously understood through contemplation how beings are, and has determined the account of them both thoughtfully and correctly through rational counsel, and keeps the judgment for himself, or rather keeps himself unswerving in judgment, has comprehended and possesses all virtue together, being no longer moved toward anything else after the known truth, and has passed through all things with haste, taking no account at all of whatever is and is said to be of the flesh and the world, having the practice already invincibly contained inwardly in reason, as one who, being in control of himself, brings to himself all the best dispassionate principles of the intellectual faculty, according to which all virtue and knowledge is and has its substance, being powers of a rational soul, needing a body not at all for being, but for appearing (1109), for the reasons mentioned, not refusing to use it at the proper time. For they say that of the intellectual faculty are, specifically, the concepts of intelligible things, the virtues, the sciences, the principles of the arts, the faculty of choice, the faculty of deliberation, and generally, the judgments, the assents, the avoidances, the impulses, and that some belong only to contemplation according to the intellect, and others to the scientific power according to reason. But if the saints preserved their own life, guarded by these things, then this blessed man comprehensively introduced through reason and contemplation all the principles according to virtue and knowledge that are included for the saints, by which, attending gnostically to the understanding of God according to contemplation, they prudently, according to reason, through the virtues, stamped the divine form on themselves, thinking it surely not necessary to name the practice through the body, knowing that it is not productive of virtue, but declarative, and a servant only of divine concepts and reasonings. And so that what is said may become manifest in another way, those who have pursued with precision the principles of our affairs say that of the rational faculty, one part is contemplative, and the other practical; and the contemplative is that according to the intellect, as it pertains to beings, while the practical is the deliberative, which determines for practical matters the right reason. And they call the one

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εἰπεῖν, τοὐναντίον δέ διηρμένην τῇ πράξει τήν ἀληθῆ περί τά ὄντα κρίσιν αὐτῶν καί ἐνέργειαν, ἥν δή φιλοσοφίαν ὄντως πληρεστάτην ἔγωγε τολμήσας μόνην ὁρίζομαι, μάλα σαφῶς εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐτόν ὑπολαμβάνω, λόγῳ καί θεωρίᾳ κατορθοῦσθαι αὐτήν ἀποφηνάμενον, ὡς τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένης πάντως τῆς πράξεως, καί τῆς ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ κρίσεως τῇ θεωρίᾳ περιεχομένης, εἴπερ λόγου μέν τό τάσσειν τήν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν, οἷον χαλινῷ τινι τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ τῆς πρός ἀτοπίαν φορᾶς ἐπιστημόνων ἀναχαιτίζοντος, θεωρίας δέ τό τά καλῶς νοηθέντα τε καί κριθέντα ἐμφρόνως αἱρεῖσθαι ψηφίζεσθαι, οἱονεί φῶς παμφαέστατον δι᾿ ἀληθοῦς γνώσεως τήν ἀλήθειαν αὐτήν δεικνυούσης· οἷς ἀμφοτέροις μάλιστα καί δημιουργεῖται πᾶσα φιλόσοφος ἀρετή καί φυλάττεται, ὑφ᾿ ὧν καί ἐκφαίνεται διά σώματος οὐχ ὅλη. Οὐ γάρ χωρεῖται σώματι, χαρακτήρ ὑπάρχουσα θείας δυνάμεως, ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτῆς σκιάσματα, καί τοῦτο οὐ δι᾿ ἑαυτήν, διά δέ τό τούς γυμνούς τῆς κατ' αὐτήν χάριτος εἰς μίμησιν ἐλθεῖν τῆς θεοειδοῦς τῶν φιλοθέων ἀνδρῶν ἀναστροφῆς, ἐφ' ᾧ τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ καλοῦ καί αὐτούς τό τῆς κακίας αἶσχος ἀποθεμένους τῆς τῶν ἀξίων Θεοῦ γενέσθαι μοίρας, ἤ τούς δεομένους ἐπικουρίας τινός ὑπό τῶν δυναμένων τυχεῖν, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ τήν κρυπτομένην τῷ βάθει τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἐναρέτων διάθεσιν διά τοῦ σώματος κατά τήν πρᾶξιν φανεῖσαν ἀποδεξαμένους, τήν πᾶσι πάντα γινομένην καί διά πάντων πᾶσι παροῦσαν τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, καί αὐτούς ἀνυμνῆσαι. Ὡς εἴγε μηδείς ἦν ὁ εὖ παθεῖν δεόμενος, ἤ ὁ πρός ἀρετήν παραδείγματι τυπωθῆναι ὀφείλων, αὐτόν ἕκαστον ἀρκεῖν ἑαυτῷ πάντως, ταῖς κατά ψυχήν τῶν ἀρετῶν χάρισιν ἀβρυνόμενον. Καί δίχα τῆς τούτων διά τοῦ σώματος πρός τό ἐμφανές ἀποδείξεως λέγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον. Ὁ τοίνυν εὐσεβῶς διά θεωρίας κατανοήσας ὡς ἔχει τά ὄντα, καί διά βουλῆς λογικῆς ἐστοχασμένως τε καί ὀρθῶς τόν περί αὐτῶν ὁρισάμενος λόγον, καί φυλάττων ἑαυτῷ τήν κρίσιν, μᾶλλον δέ ἑαυτόν τῇ κρίσει ἀπαρέγκλιτον, πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ συλλαβών ἔχει τήν ἀρετήν, πρός οὐδέν ἄλλο μετά τήν ἐγνωσμένην ἀλήθειαν ἔτι κινούμενος, καί πάντα παρῆλθε διά σπουδῆς, οὐδενός τό παράπαν λόγον ποιούμενος τῶν ὅσα σαρκός καί κόσμου ἐστί καί λέγεται, ἐνδιαθέτως ἔχων ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ περιεχομένην ἀμάχως τήν πρᾶξιν, οἷα τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πάντας ἑαυτῷ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ τούς κρατίστους ἀπαθεῖς ἐπικομιζομένους λόγους, καθ᾿ οὕς πᾶσα ἀρετή καί γνῶσίς ἐστι καί ὑφέστηκεν, ὡς δυνάμεις ὄντας ψυχῆς λογικῆς, πρός μέν τό εἶναι σώματος οὐδ᾿ ὅλως χρῄζοντας, πρός δέ τό φανῆναι (1109) διά τάς εἰρημένας αἰτίας κατά καιρόν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἀναινομένους. Φασί γάρ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ εἶναι, ἰδικῶς μέν τάς νοήσεις τῶν νοητῶν, τάς ἀρετάς, τάς ἐπιστήμας τούς τῶν τεχνῶν λόγους, τό προαιρετικόν, τό βουλευτικόν, γενικῶς δέ τάς κρίσεις, τάς συγκαταθέσεις, τάς ἀποφυγάς, τάς ὁρμάς, καί τάς μέν εἶναι μόνης τῆς κατά νοῦν θεωρίας, τάς δέ τῆς κατά τόν λόγον ἐπιστημονικῆς δυνάμεως. Εἰ δέ τούτοις φρουρουμένην οἱ ἅγιοι τήν οἰκείαν ζωήν συνετήρησαν, ἄρα περιληπτικῶς διά τοῦ λόγου καί τῆς θεωρίας ὁ μακάριος οὗτος ἀνήρ πάντας τούς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν καί γνῶσιν εἰσηγήσατο λόγους τοῖς ἁγίοις συνηνειλημμένους, δι᾿ ὧν τῇ κατανοήσει τοῦ Θεοῦ κατά θεωρίαν γνωστικῶς προσανέχοντες ἐμφρόνως κατά λόγον διά τῶν ἀρετῶν τήν θείαν ἑαυτοῖς μορφήν ἐντυπώσαντο, πάντως οὐκ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον οἰηθείς τήν διά τοῦ σώματος ὀνομάσαι πρᾶξιν, γινώσκων μή ἀρετῆς αὐτήν εἶναι ποιητικήν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκφαντικήν, καί μόνων τῶν θείων νοημάτων τε καί λογισμῶν ὑπουργόν. Ὡς ἄν δέ καί δι᾿ ἑτέρου τρόπου φανερόν γένηται τό λεγόμενον, φασίν οἱ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων δι᾿ ἀκριβείας μετελθόντες τούς λόγους τοῦ λογικοῦ τό μέν εἶναι θεωρητικόν, τό δέ πρακτικόν· καί θεωρητικόν μέν τό κατά νοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τά ὄντα, πρακτικόν δέ τό βουλευτικόν, τό ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τόν ὀρθόν λόγον. Καί καλοῦσι τό μέν