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and he will readily reject his own error (1177) about the world being without beginning, reasoning truly that everything that is moved certainly also began its motion. But every motion is not without beginning, since it is not without a cause either. For it has as a beginning that which moves it, and it has as a cause and end that which calls and draws it, towards which it is also moved. And if that which moves is the beginning of every motion of everything that is moved, and the end towards which the moved thing is borne is the cause (for nothing is moved without a cause), and none of the beings is unmoved, except the first mover (for the first mover is entirely unmoved, because it is also without beginning), therefore none of the beings is without beginning, unless it is also unmoved. For all things that exist in any way are moved, apart from the sole and unmoved cause that is above all; intellectual and rational things are moved by way of knowledge and science, because they are not self-knowledge or self-science. For their knowledge and their science are not their substance, but habits observed in their substance, arising from correct judgment according to mind and reason (I mean their constitutive powers).

A contemplation concerning the contraction and expansion of substance, quality, and quantity, according to which they cannot be without beginning.

But also this very substance, so-called simply, not only that of things in generation and corruption, is moved according to generation and corruption, but also that of all beings both has been moved and is moved by the principle and mode of expansion and contraction. For it is moved from the most general genus through the more general genera to the species through which and into which it is naturally divided, proceeding unto the most specific species by which its expansion is terminated, circumscribing its being downwards; and is gathered together again from the most specific species, retracing its steps through the more general ones unto the most general genus, by which its contraction is terminated, defining its being upwards; and thus being circumscribed from both sides, from above, I say, and from below, it is shown to have a beginning and an end, being entirely unable to admit the principle of infinitude. And likewise quantity, not only that of things in generation and corruption in every way in which it is naturally considered, is moved according to increase and decrease, but also the whole quantity of all things, being moved by the principle of relaxation and intensification and being specified in its expansion by its particular differences, is circumscribed, not being able to be poured out into the infinite, and is gathered together again, retracing its steps, casting off their particular, but not their connatural, form. And similarly quality, not only that of things in generation and corruption is moved according to alteration, but also the whole quality of all things, being moved by the mutable and dispersible nature of its own difference, admits of expansion and contraction. And no one (1180) being of sound mind would say that that which is naturally disposed to be both dispersed and gathered, in principle or in act, is entirely unmoved. And if it is not unmoved, neither is it without beginning; and if it is not without beginning, clearly it is not ungenerated, but just as that which is moved knows it has begun its motion, so also that which has been generated knows that it has begun its generation towards being, having received both its being and its being moved from the law and one ungenerated and unmoved cause. And that which has begun according to the generation of its being can in no way be without beginning.

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καί τήν περί τοῦ ἄναρχον εἶναι τόν κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ πλάνην (1177) ἑτοίμως ἀπώσεται, λογιζόμενος ἀληθῶς ὅτι πᾶν κινούμενον πάντως καί ἤρξατο τῆς κινήσεως. Πᾶσα δέ κίνησις οὐκ ἄναρχος, ἐπειδή οὐδέ ἀναίτιος. Ἀρχήν γάρ ἔχει τό κινοῦν, καί αἰτίαν ἔχει τό καλοῦν τε καί ἕλκον πρός ὅ καί κινεῖται τέλος. Εἰ δέ πάσης κινήσεως παντός κινουμένου τό κινοῦν ἐστιν ἀρχή, καί τέλος ἡ πρός ἥν φέρεται τό κινούμενον αἰτία (οὐδέν γάρ ἀναιτίως κινεῖται), οὐδέν δέ τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον, εἰ μή τό πρώτως κινοῦν (τό γάρ πρώτως κινοῦν πάντως ἀκίνητον, ὅτι καί ἄναρχον), οὐδέν ἄρα τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν ἄναρχον, ὅτι μή καί ἀκίνητον. Πάντα γάρ κινεῖται τά ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα, δίχα τῆς μόνης καί ἀκινήτου καί ὑπέρ πάντα αἰτίας, τά μέν νοερά τε καί λογικά, γνωστικῶς τε καί ἐπιστημονικῶς, ὅτι μή αὐτογνῶσις ἤ αὐτοεπιστήμη ἐστίν. Οὔτε γάρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἐστι καί ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾿ ἕξεις τῇ αὐτῶν οὐσίᾳ ἐπιθεωρούμεναι, ἐκ τῆς κατά νοῦν καί λόγον (τάς συστατικάς αὐτῶν λέγω δυνάμεις) ὀρθῆς κρίσεως ἐπιγενόμεναι.

Θεωρία περί συστολῆς καί διαστολῆς οὐσίας, ποιότητός τε καί ποσότητος, καθ᾿ ἥν ἄναρχοι εἶναι οὐ δύνανται.

Ἀλλά καί αὐτή ἡ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη οὐσία οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καί φθορᾷ κατά γένεσιν κινεῖται καί φθοράν, ἀλλά καί ἡ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων καί κεκίνηται καί κινεῖται τῷ κατά διαστολήν καί συστολήν λόγῳ τε καί τρόπῳ. Κινεῖται γάρ ἀπό τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους διά τῶν γενικωτέρων γενῶν εἰς τά εἴδη δι᾿ ὧν καί εἰς ἅ διαιρεῖσθαι πέφυκε, προ«οῦσα μέχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν οἷς περατοῦται ἡ κατ᾿ αὐτήν διαστολή, τό εἶναι αὐτῆς πρός τά κάτω περιγράφουσα, καί συνάγεται πάλιν ἀπό τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν διά τῶν γενικωτέρων ἀναποδίζουσα μέχρι τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους, ᾧ περατοῦται ἡ κατ᾿ αὐτήν συστολή, πρός τό ἄνω τό εἶναι αὐτῆς ὁρίζουσα, καί λοιπόν διχόθεν περιγραφομένη, ἄνωθέν τε λέγω καί κάτωθεν, ἀρχήν καί τέλος ἔχουσα δείκνυται, τόν τῆς ἀπειρίας οὐδ᾿ ὅλως ἐπιδέξασθαι δυναμένη λόγον. Ὡσαύτως δέ καί ἡ ποσότης, οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καί φθορᾷ παντί τρόπῳ ᾧ πέφυκε θεωρεῖσθαι κατ᾿ αὔξησιν κινεῖται καί μείωσιν, ἀλλά καί ἡ πᾶσα καί πάντων τῷ κατ' ἄνεσιν καί ἐπίτασιν λόγῳ κινουμένη καί ταῖς κατά μέρος διαφοραῖς κατά διαστολήν εἰδοποιουμένη περιγράφεται, τό ἄπειρον χεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔχουσα, καί συνάγεται πάλιν ἀναποδίζουσα, τό κατ' αὐτάς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τό συμφυές εἶδος ἀπολύουσα. Ὁμοίως δέ καί ἡ ποιότης, οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καί φθορᾷ κινεῖται κατ᾿ ἀλλοίωσιν, ἀλλά καί ἡ πᾶσα καί πάντων, τῷ τρεπτῷ τε καί σκεδαστῷ τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτήν διαφορᾶς κινουμένη, διαστολήν καί συστολήν ἐπιδέχεται. Οὐδείς δέ (1180) τό πεφυκός σκεδάννυσθαί τε καί συνάγεσθαι λόγῳ ἤ ἐνεργείᾳ εἴποι ἄν εὐφρονῶν ἀκίνητον εἶναι παντάπασιν. Εἰ δέ μή ἀκίνητον, οὐδέ ἄναρχον· εἰ δέ μή ἄναρχον, οὐδέ ἀγένητον δηλονότι, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ οἶδεν ἠργμένον κινήσεως τό κινούμενον, οὕτως καί τῆς πρός τό εἶναι γενέσεως ἦρχθαι τό γεγενημένον ἐπίσταται, καί ἐκ τοῦ νόμου καί ἑνός ἀγενήτου τε καί ἀκινήτου τό εἶναί τε καί τό κινεῖσθαι λαβόν. Τό δέ κατά τήν τοῦ εἶναι γένεσιν ἠργμένον οὐδαμῶς ἄναρχον εἶναι δύναται.