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A proof that anything whatever without God is certainly in a place, and because of this is necessarily also in time, and that what is in a place is certainly according to time and has begun to be.

But to omit saying that the very being of existing things, having being in a certain way, but not simply—which is the first form of circumscription, both strong and great for proving that existing things have a beginning in essence and genesis—who does not know that for everything that exists in any way, except for the divine alone, which properly subsists even beyond being itself, the "where" is pre-conceived, with which the "when" is in every way and certainly of necessity co-conceived. For it is not possible to conceive of the "where" as defined by the privation of the "when" (for these are among the things that exist together, since they happen to be among those things that are not without each other) nor is the "when", which by nature is co-conceived with the "where", in any way defined by privation. But all things are shown to be under the "where," as being in a place. For the all is not beyond the all of the all (for it is somehow both illogical and impossible to declare the all to be beyond its own all), but having its circumscription from itself within itself, after the infinite power of the all-causative that circumscribes all things, it is its own outermost limit. Which is also the place of the all, just as some define place, saying, Place is the outer periphery of the all, or the outer position of the all, or the limit of the container in which the contained is contained. And it will be co-proven to be under the "when," as being certainly in time, since all things that have being after God do not have their being simply, but in a certain way. And for this reason they are not without beginning. For whatever admits in any way of the principle of "how," even if it is, yet it was not. Whence, when we speak of the Divine as being, we do not speak of it as being in a certain way; and for this reason we speak of "Is" and "Was" in its case simply and indefinitely and absolutely. For the Divine is unreceptive of any logos or thought, in that when we predicate being of it, we do not say that it is being. For being is from it, but it is not being itself. For it is beyond even being itself, both that which is spoken of and conceived of in a certain way and that which is spoken of and conceived of simply. But if existing things have their being in a certain way, but not simply, just as they are subject to the "where" on account of the position and limit (1181) of the principles of nature within them, so also they will certainly be subject to the "when" on account of their beginning.

A proof that it is not possible to be infinite, and for this reason no thing is without beginning, if it has its being according to a quantity in multitude.

And again, if the substance of all things, being many, certainly cannot be infinite (for the quantity in multitude of these many things has a limit, circumscribing its principle of both being and being in a certain way, for the substance of all things is not unconstrained), neither, clearly, will the hypostasis of each individual be without circumscription, being circumscribed in relation to one another by number and by substance according to a principle. But if none of existing things is free from circumscription, then all existing things have clearly received both their being "when" and their "being where" in proportion to themselves. For without these, absolutely nothing will be able to be: not substance, not quantity, not quality, not relation, not action, not passion, not motion, not state, nor any other of those things by which experts on these matters enclose the all. Therefore, none of existing things is without beginning, for which something else is pre-conceived, nor uncircumscribed, for which something else can be co-conceived. But if none of existing things is without beginning or uncircumscribed, as the argument has shown, following the nature of existing things, there was certainly a time when one of existing things was not; and if it was not, it certainly has come to be, given that it was not. For it is not possible to both be and come to be without change and alteration. For if it was and has come to be, it was changed, having passed over in its generation into that which it was not, or it was altered, having received an addition of the beauty of which it was deprived. But every

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Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ, Πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἄνευ Θεοῦ πάντως ἐν τόπῳ, καί διά τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἐν χρόνῳ, καί ὅτι τό ἐν τόπῳ πάντως κατά χρόνον καί ἦρκται τοῦ εἶναι.

Ἵνα δέ ἐάσω λέγειν ὅτι καί αὐτό τό εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, τό πῶς εἶναι ἔχον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὅπερ ἐστί πρῶτον εἶδος περιγραφῆς, ἰσχυρόν τε καί μέγα πρός ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἦρχθαι κατ᾿ οὐσίαν καί γένεσιν τά ὄντα, τίς ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι παντός τοῦ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντος, πλήν τοῦ θείου καί μόνου, τοῦ καί ὑπέρ αὐτό τό εἶναι κυρίως ὑπάρχοντος, προεπινοεῖται τό ποῦ, ᾧ πάντη τε καί πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεπινοεῖται τό πότε. Οὐ γάρ τοῦ ποτέ διωρισμένον κατά στέρησιν δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τό ποῦ (τῶν γάρ ἅμα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐπειδή καί τῶν οὐκ ἄνευ τυγχάνουσιν) ἤ δέ τοῦ ποῦ τό ποτέ, ᾧ συνεπινοεῖσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐδαμῶς διώρισται κατά στέρησιν. Ὑπό τό ποῦ δέ πάντα, ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα, δείκνυται. Οὐ γάρ ὑπέρ τό πᾶν αὐτό τό πᾶν τοῦ παντός (τοῦτο γάρ πως καί ἄλογον καί ἀδύνατον αὐτό τό πᾶν ὑπέρ τό ἑαυτοῦ πᾶν θεσπίζειν), ἀλλ᾿ ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τήν περιγραφήν ἔχον, μετά τήν πάντα περιγράφουσαν τοῦ παναιτίου ἄπειρον δύναμιν, αὐτό τό πέρας ἑαυτοῦ τό ἐξώτερον. Ὅπερ καί τόπος ἐστί τοῦ παντός, καθώς καί ὁρίζονταί τινες τόν τόπον λέγοντες, Τόπος ἐστίν ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντός περιφέρεια, ἤ ἡ ἔξω τοῦ παντός θέσις, ἤ τό πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν ᾧ περιέχεται τό περιεχόμενον. Καί ὑπό τό ποτέ, ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ πάντως ὄντα, συναποδειχθήσεται, ἐπειδή μή ἁπλῶς, ἀλλά πῶς τό εἶναι ἔχουσι, πάντα ὅσα μετά Θεόν τό εἶναι ἔχει. Καί διά τοῦτο οὐκ ἄναρχα. Πᾶν γάρ ὅπερ καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν τόν τοῦ πῶς ἐπιδέχεται λόγον, κἄν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἦν. Ὅθεν τό Θεῖον εἶναι λέγοντες οὐ τό πῶς εἶναι λέγομεν· καί διά τοῦτο καί τό " Ἔστι" καί τό " Ἦν" ἁπλῶς καί ἀορίστως καί ἀπολελυμένως ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν. Ἀνεπίδεκτον γάρ παντός λόγου καί νοήματος τό Θεῖόν ἐστι, καθ᾿ ὅ οὔτε κατηγοροῦντες αὐτοῦ τό εἶναι λέγομεν αὐτό εἶναι. Ἐξ αὐτοῦ γάρ τό εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὐτό τό εἶναι. Ὑπέρ γάρ ἐστι καί αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι, τοῦ τε πῶς καί ἁπλῶς λεγομένου τε καί νοουμένου. Εἰ δέ πῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἔχει τά ὄντα τό εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὑπό τοῦ ποῦ εἶναι διά τήν θέσιν καί τό πέρας (1181) τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς κατά φύσιν λόγων, καί ὑπό τό ποτέ πάντως εἶναι διά τήν ἀρχήν ἐπιδέξεται.

Ἀπόδειξις τοῦ μή δύνασθαι ἄπειρον εἶναι, καί διά τοῦτο οὔτε ἄναρχον πᾶν, εἴ τι κατά τήν ἐν πλήθει ποσότητα ἔχει τό εἶναι.

Καί πάλιν εἰ ἡ πάντων οὐσία πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν πάντως ἄπειρος εἶναι οὐ δύναται (πέρας γάρ ἔχει αὐτῶν τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων τήν ἐν πλήθει ποσότητα, περιγράφουσαν αὐτῆς τόν τε τοῦ εἶναι καί τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγον, οὐ γάρ ἄφετος ἡ πάντων οὐσία), οὐδέ ἡ τοῦ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὑπόστασις ἔσται δίχα περιγραφῆς, ἀλλήλαις τῷ ἀριθμῷ καί τῇ οὐσίᾳ κατά λόγον περιγεγραμμέναι. Εἰ δέ περιγραφῆς οὐδέν τῶν ὄντων ἐλεύθερον, πάντα τά ὄντα δηλονότι ἀναλόγως ἑαυτοῖς καί τό ποτέ εἶναι καί τό "ποῦ εἶναι" εἴληφε. Τούτων γάρ ἄνευ τό παράπαν οὐδέν εἶναι δυνήσεται, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐ ποσότης, οὐ ποιότης, οὐ σχέσις, οὐ ποίησις, οὐ πάθος, οὐ κίνησις, οὐχ ἕξις, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τῶν οἷς τό πᾶν περικλείουσιν οἱ περί ταῦτα δεινοί. Οὐδέν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἄναρχον, ᾧ τι ἕτερον προεπινοεῖσθαι, οὐδέ ἀπερίγραφον ᾧ τι ἕτερον συνεπινοεῖσθαι δύναται. Εἰ δέ τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν ἄναρχον ἤ ἀπερίγραφον, ὡς ἔδειξε ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἑπόμενος ὁ λόγος, ἦν πάντως ποτέ ὅτε τι τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἦν· εἰ δέ οὐκ ἦν, πάντως γέγονεν, εἴπερ οὐκ ἦν. Οὐ γάρ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καί εἶναι καί γίνεσθαι χωρίς τροπῆς καί ἀλλοιώσεως. Εἰ γάρ ἦν καί γέγονεν, ἐτράπη, εἰς ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν μεταχωρῆσαν κατά τήν γένεσιν, ἤ ἠλλοιώθη, προσθήκην οὖ ἐστέρητο κάλλους ἐπιδεξάμενον. Πᾶν δέ