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of a return to the truth that rightly guides, putting it forward for themselves. For if universals subsist in particulars, which in no way at all admit of the principle of being and subsisting in themselves, it is surely clear to everyone that when the particulars are destroyed, the universals will not stand either. For the parts are in the wholes, and the wholes both are and subsist in the parts. And no argument will contradict this; except that, as if bound by the truth, they themselves also unwillingly proclaim the power of providence and prove that it extends through all things by the very means they have used to earnestly oppose it. For in saying that only universals are guided by providence, they are unaware that they are also saying that there is providence for particulars, being led by necessity to the truth which they are eager to flee. For if they say that universals are deemed worthy of providence for the sake of (1192) permanence, they introduce the idea that particulars are much more worthy of it, in which is the permanence and subsistence of the universals. For these are introduced together because of their naturally indissoluble relation to one another, and with one of them being preserved for permanence, the other is not alien to this preservation; and again, if one falls away from the preservation for permanence, it follows to say that the other does not attain it either. And besides, it is said in three ways that God does not have providence for all beings. For they say that either He is ignorant of the method of providence, or is unwilling, or is unable. But surely, according to the common notions of all, God, being good and supremely good, always and in every way wills good things, and for all; and being wise and supremely wise, or rather the fount of all wisdom, He certainly knows what is expedient; and being powerful, or rather infinitely powerful, He certainly acts in a manner befitting God in all things, performing those things known by Him and willed as good and expedient, being shown as good and wise and powerful through all things, both visible and invisible, both universal and particular, both small and great, and of all things that have their being in any essence whatsoever, yielding in nothing of the infinity of His goodness and wisdom and power, and preserving all things according to the principle of being of each, both in relation to themselves and to one another, according to the indissoluble relational harmony and permanence of all things. And what of this? Do we not perceive nature in and of itself to be a clear teacher concerning the existence of God’s providence over all things? For nature itself gives no small proof that the knowledge of providence has been naturally sown in us, whenever, in sudden circumstances, it prepares us, as if untaught, by pushing us toward God through prayers to seek salvation from there. For having been seized suddenly by necessity, without deliberation, before even considering anything, we cry out to God, as if providence itself were drawing us to itself even without reasoning, and overcoming the speed of the intellectual power within us, and showing the divine assistance to be stronger than all things. But nature would not lead us involuntarily to that which is unnatural. And anything whatsoever that follows naturally, though its way is unclear to all, has a strong and invincible power for the demonstration of the truth. But if, because the principle of providence for particulars is incomprehensible to us, as indeed it is according to the saying, "Oh, unsearchable are His judgments and inscrutable His ways," they should say for this reason that there is no providence, they will not, in my judgment, be speaking correctly. For if the difference of each person from another is great and incomprehensible, as is the variation of each within himself, in lives and characters and opinions and choices and desires, and in knowledge and (1193) needs and pursuits, and in the very thoughts of the soul, which are almost infinite, being changed along with all the things that happen every day and hour (for this creature is quick-to-change

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ἀντιστροφῆς πρός τήν ἀλήθειαν ὀρθῶς ποδηγοῦσαν, ἑαυτοῖς προβαλλόμενοι. Εἰ γάρ τά καθόλου ἐν τοῖς κατά μέρος ὑφέστηκεν, οὐδαμῶς τό παράπαν τόν τοῦ καθ᾿ αὐτά εἶναί τε καί ὑφεστάναι λόγον ἐπιδεχόμενα τῶν κατά μέρος διαφθειρομένων παντί που δῆλόν ἐστιν ὡς οὐδέ τά καθόλου στήσεται. Τά μέρη γάρ ἐν ταῖς ὁλόγησι, καί αἱ ὁλότητες ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι καί εἰσί καί ὑφεστήκασι. Καί οὐδείς ἀντερεῖ λόγος· πλήν ὅτι ὑπό τῆς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ δεσμούμενοι ἄκοντες καί αὐτοί τῆς προνοίας τήν δύναμιν ἐξαγγέλλουσι καί διά πάντων διήκειν κατασκευάζουσι δι᾿ ὧν αὐτοῖς κατεσπούδασαν. Λέγοντες γάρ ὑπό τῆς προνοίας ἄγεσθαι μόνα τά καθόλου, λελήθασιν ἑαυτούς καί τῶν κατα μέρος εἶναι πρόνοιαν λέγοντες, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πρός τήν ἀλήθειαν, ἥν φεύγειν σπουδάζουσιν, ὑπαγόμενοι. Εἰ γάρ χάριν (1192) διαμονῆς τά καθόλου προνοίας ἀξιοῦσθαί φασι, ταύτης πολλῷ πρότερον ἀξιοῦσθαι τά κατά μέρος εἰσάγουσιν, ἐν οἶς ἡ τῶν καθόλου διαμονή καί ὑπόστασις. Συνεισάγεται γάρ ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα διά τήν κατά φύσιν ἀδιάλυτον πρός ἄλληλα σχέσιν, καί θατέρου πρός διαμονήν συντητουμένου, μηδέ τό ἕτερον ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φυλακῆς ἀλλότριον, καί ἑνός πάλιν τῆς πρός διαμονήν φυλακῆς διαπίπτοντες μηδέ τό ἄλλο ταύτης τυγχάνειν λέγει ἀκόλουθον. Ἄλλως τε δέ κατά τρεῖς τρόπους τό μή πάντων τῶν ὄντων προνοεῖν τόν Θεόν λέγεται. Ἤ γάρ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτόν λέγουσι τῆς προνοίας τήν μέθοδον, ἤ μή βούλεσθαι, ἤ μή δύνασθαι. Ἀλλά μήν κατά τάς κοινάς πάντων ἐννοίας ἀγαθός ὤν καί ὑπεράγαθος ὁ Θεός ἀεί πάντως τά καλά βούλεται καί πᾶσι, καί σοφός ὑπάρχων καί ὑπέρσοφος, μᾶλλον δέ πάσης σοφίας πηγή, γινώσκει πάντως τά συμφέροντα, καί δυνατός ὤν, μᾶλλον δέ ἀπειροδύναμος, ἐνεργεῖ πάντως θεοπρεπῶς ἐν πᾶσι τά ἐγνωσμένα αὐτῷ καί βεβουλημένα καλῶς καί συμφέροντα, ὡς ἀγαθός καί σοφός καί δυνατός, δεικνούμενος διά πάντων τῶν τε ὁρατῶν καί τῶν ἀοράτων, καί τῶν καθόλου καί τῶν μερικῶν, καί τῶν μικρῶν καί τῶν μεγάλων, καί πάντων τῶν κατά πᾶσαν τήν οἱανοῦν οὐσίαν τό εἶναι ἐχόντων, μηδέν ὑφιείς τῆς κατά τήν ἀγαθότητα καί τήν σοφίαν καί τήν δύναμιν ἀπειρίας, καί πάντα κατά τόν ἑκάστων τοῦ εἶναι λόγον πρός τε ἑαυτά καί ἄλληλα κατά τήν ἀδιάλυτον πάντων σχετικήν ἁρμονίαν τε καί διαμονήν συντηρῶν. Τί δέ, αὐτήν καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν οὐ κατανοοῦμεν τήν φύσιν περί τοῦ εἶναι τήν ἐπί πάντα τοῦ Θεοῦ πρόνοιαν σαφῶς οὖσαν διδάσκαλον; Τεκμήριον γάρ οὐ μικρόν τοῦ φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐνεσπάρθαι τήν τῆς προνοίας γνῶσιν ἡ φύσις αὐτή δίδωσιν, ὁπηνίκα ἄν ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ὥσπερ ὠθοῦσα πρός τόν Θεόν διά τῶν εὐχῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξαίφνης περιστάσεσιν ἐκεῖθεν ζητεῖν τήν σωτηρίαν παρασκευάζει. Ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης γάρ ἄφνω συλληφθέντες ἀπροαιρέτως, πρίς τινα καί σκέψασθαι, τόν Θεόν ἐπιβοώμεθα, ὡς ἄν τῆς προνοίας αὐτῆς πρός ἑαυτήν καί λογισμῶν χωρίς ἑλκούσης ἡμᾶς, καί τό τάχος τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν νοερᾶς νικώσης δυνάμεως, καί πάντων ἰσχυροτέραν τήν θείαν προδεικνυούσης βοήθειαν. Οὐκ ἄν δέ ἡμᾶς ἦγεν ἀπροαιρέτως ἡ φύσις ἐπί τό μή φύσιν ἔχον γίνεσθαι. Πᾶν δέ τό ὁτῳοῦν φυσικῶς ἑπόμενον, ὡς πᾶσιν ἄδηλον, ἰσχυράν ἔχει καί ἀκαταμάχητον κατά τήν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀληθείας τήν δύναμιν. Εἰ δέ ὅτι ἀκατάληπτος ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν κατά μέρος προνοίας ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὖν καί ἔστι κατά τό, Ὦ ἀνεξερεύνητα τά κρίματα αὐτοῦ καί ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοί αὐτοῦ, διά τοῦτο φαῖεν μηδέ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐροῦσι κατά τόν ἐμόν λόγον. Εἰ γάρ πολλή τίς ἐστιν ἡ διαφορά καί ἀκατάληπτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑκάστου πρός ἕκαστον καί ἡ πρός ἑαυτόν ἑκάστου ἑναλλαγή, ἔν τε βίοις καί ἤθεσι καί γνώμαις καί προαιρέσεσι καί ἐπιθυμίαις, ἐπιστήμαις τε καί (1193) χρείαις καί ἐπιτηδεύμασι καί αὐτοῖς τοῖς κατά ψυχήν λογισμοῖς ἀπείροις οὖσι σχεδόν, καί πᾶσι τοῖς καθ᾿ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν καί ὥραν ἐπισυμβαίνουσι συμμεταβαλλομένου (ἀγχίστροφον γάρ τοῦτο τό ζῶον