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not only of union with the Holy Trinity, but also of the unity conceived in the Holy Trinity, since he has become simple and indivisible and single in form in his power, in relation to that which is simple and indivisible in its essence, and imitating, as far as possible, according to the state of his virtues, the goodness that is likewise constituted, and having laid aside the property of his naturally divisible powers through the grace of the God with whom he is united.

An explanation concerning the passible part of the soul, and its general divisions and subdivisions.

For, as they say, the passible part of the soul is divided into that which is obedient to reason, and that which is not obedient to reason. And that which is not obedient to reason they divide into the nutritive, which they call natural, and into the physical, which they call vital, neither of which is led by obedience to reason; it is called not obedient to reason, because it is not its nature to be led by reason. For to grow, or to be healthy, or to live, is not within our power. But that which is obedient to reason is divided into two, the desiderative and the irascible. And they call it obedient to reason, because it is its nature in the virtuous to be led and to be subjected to reason. Again, they divide the desiderative into pleasure and pain. For desire, when it attains its object, produces pleasure, but when it fails, pain. And again, in another way, they say that desire, being divided, makes four species in all, including itself: desire, pleasure, fear, and pain. And since of things that exist, some are good and some are bad, and these are either present or future, an expected good he called desire, a present one pleasure, and again, an expected evil fear, a present one pain; so that pleasure and desire exist and are considered (1197) concerning good things, whether truly existing or merely supposed, while pain and fear concern bad things. Again, they divide pain into four: into anguish, into burden, into envy, into pity. And anguish, they say, is a pain that causes speechlessness in those in whom it arises, because of the passage of the reasoning faculty into the depths; burden is a pain that weighs down and troubles over involuntary occurrences; envy is pain at another's evils. And they said that all pain is evil by its own nature. For even if the virtuous man is pained at another's evils, as being merciful, it is not primarily by intention, but consequently by circumstance. But the contemplative man remains passionless even in these things, having joined himself to God, and being alienated from present things here below. And fear, again, they divide into six: into hesitation, into reverence, into shame, into dismay, into terror, into agony. And hesitation, they say, is fear of a future action, reverence is fear in expectation of reproach, shame is fear over a shameful deed done, dismay is fear of a great apparition, terror is fear from great tidings that takes away sensation, agony is fear of falling, that is, of failure. For being afraid to fail, we are in agony. And some also call it cowardice. And anger, again, they say is a boiling of the blood around the heart out of a desire for retaliation. And they divide this also into three: into wrath, which some have called gall and choler, and into rage, and into rancor. And wrath, they say, is anger having a beginning and motion towards action, or anger being activated; gall is the defense of the one who was pained through another; choler is the proceeding out of the one who was pained himself against the one who pained him; rage is anger growing old (and it is so called from remaining and being held fast in memory), rancor is anger that watches for an opportunity for vengeance; and this is so called from lying in wait. And they divide each of these into many others. Which if

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μόνον ἑνώσεως τῆς πρός τήν ἁγίαν Τριάδα, ἀλλά καί ἑνότητος τῆς ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι νοουμένης, ὡς ἁπλοῦς καί ἀδιαίρετος καί μονοειδής κατά τήν δύναμιν πρός τήν ἁπλῆν καί ἀδιαίρετον κατά τήν οὐσίαν γεγενημένος, καί κατά τήν ἕξιν τῶν ἀρετῶν τήν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν ἀγαθότητα κατά τό ἐφικτόν ἐκμιμούμενος, καί τήν ἰδιότητα τῶν κατά φύσιν μεριστῶν δυνάμεων διά τήν τοῦ ἑνωθέντος Θεοῦ χάριν ἀποθέμενος.

Ἐξήγησις περί τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, καί τῶν αὐτοῦ καθολικῶν διαιρέσεών τε καί ὑποδιαιρέσεων.

∆ιαιρεῖται γάρ, ὡς φασι, τό παθητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς εἴς τε τό ἐπιπειθές λόγῳ, καί τό μή πειθόμενον λόγῳ. Καί τό μέν λόγῳ μή πειθόμενον διαιροῦσιν εἰς τό θρεπτικόν, ὅ καλοῦσι φυσικόν, καί εἰς τό φυσικόν, ὅ καλοῦσι ζωτικόν, ὧν οὐδέτερον λόγῳ πειθόμενον ἄγεται· οὐκ ἐπιπειθές δέ λόγῳ καλεῖται, ἐπειδή μή πέφυκεν ἄγεσθαι λόγῳ. Τό γάρ αὐξάνειν, ἤ ὑγιαίνειν, ἤ ζῇν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν. Τό δέ ἐπιπειθές λόγῳ διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, τό τε ἐπιθυμητικόν καί τό θυμικόν. Ἐπιπειθές δέ λόγῳ καλοῦσιν αὐτό, διότι λόγῳ πέφυκεν ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἄγεσθαί τε καί ὑποτάσσεσθαι. Πάλιν δέ τό ἐπιθυμητικόν διαιροῦσιν εἰς ἡδονήν καί λύπην. Ἐπιτυγχάνουσα γάρ ἐπιθυμία ἡδονήν ἐργάζεται, ἀποτυγχάνουσα δέ λύπην. Καί πάλιν καθ᾿ ἕτερον τρόπον φασί τήν ἐπιθυμίαν διαιρουμένην τέσσαρα σύν ἑαυτῇ τά πάντα εἴδη ποιεῖν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν, φόβον, καί λύπην. Καί ἐπειδή τῶν ὄντων τά μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τά δέ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δέ ἤ παρόντα ἤ μέλλοντά ἐστι, προσδοκώμενον μέν ἀγαθόν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκάλεσε, παρόν δέ ἡδονήν, καί πάλιν προσδοκώμενον κακόν φόβον, παρόν δέ λύπην· ὡς εἶναί τε καί θεωρεῖσθαι (1197) περί μέν τά καλά, εἴτε τά ὄντως ὄντα, εἴτε τά νομιζόμενα, τήν ἡδονήν καί τήν ἐπιθυμίαν, περί δέ τά φαῦλα τήν λύπην καί τό φόβον. Πάλιν δέ τήν λύπην διαιροῦσιν εἰς τέσσαρα, εἰς ἄχος, εἰς ἄχθος, εἰς φθόνον, εἰς ἔλεον. Καί τό μέν ἄχος εἶναί φασι λύπην ἀφωνίαν ἐμποιοῦσαν οἷς ἄν ἐγγένηται, διά τήν εἰς βάθος πάροδον τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· τό δέ ἄχθος λύπην βαροῦσάν τε καί διοχλοῦσαν ἐπ᾿ ἀβουλήτοις συμβάσεσι· τόν δέ φθόνον λύπην ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. Κακόν δέ πᾶσαν λύπην ἔφασαν τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει. Κἄν γάρ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις λυπῆται κακοῖς, ὡς ἐλεήμων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ προηγουμένως κατά πρόθεσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐφεπομένως κατά περίστασιν. Ὁ δέ θεωρητικός κἄν τούτοις ἀπαθής διαμένει, συνάψας ἑαυτόν τῷ Θεῷ, καί τῶν τῇδε παρόντων ἀλλοτριώσας. Τόν δέ φόβον πάλιν διαιροῦσιν εἰς ἕξ, εἰς ὄκνον, εἰς αἰδώ, εἰς αἰσχύνην, εἰς κατάπληξιν, εἰς ἔκπληξιν, εἰς ἀγωνίαν. Καί τόν μέν ὄκνον εἶναί φασι, φόβον μελλούσης ἐνεργείας, τήν αἰδώ δέ φόβον ἐπί ἐπί προσδοκίᾳ ψόγου, τήν δέ αἰσχύνην φόβον ἐπ᾿ αἰσχρῷ πεπραγμένῳ, τήν δέ κατάπληξιν, φόβον μεγάλης φαντασίας, τήν δέ ἔκπληξιν φόβον ἐκ μεγάλων ἀκουσμάτων τήν αἴσθησιν ἀφαιρούμενον, τήν ἀγωνίαν δέ φόβον διαπτώσεως, τουτέστιν ἀποτυχίας. Φοβούμενοι γάρ ἀποτυχεῖν ἀγωνιῶμεν. Καλοῦσι δέ τινες αὐτήν καί δειλίαν. Τόν δέ θυμόν πάλιν εἶναι λέγουσι ζέσιν τοῦ περικαρδίου αἵματος δι᾿ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως. ∆ιαιροῦσι δέ καί τοῦτον εἰς τρία, εἰς ὀργήν, ἥν τινες ἐκάλεσαν χολήν καί χόλον, καί εἰς μῆνιν, καί εἰς κότον. Καί τήν μέν ὀργήν εἶναί φασι θυμόν πρός ἐνέργειαν ἀρχήν καί κίνησιν ἔχοντα, ἤ θυμόν ἐνεργούμενον· τήν δέ χολήν τήν δι᾿ ἄλλου ἄμυναν τοῦ λυπήσαντος· τό δέ χόλον τήν δι᾿ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ λυπηθέντος ἐπεξέλευσιν εἰς τόν λυπήσαντα· τήν δέ μῆνιν θυμόν εἰς παλαίωσιν (εἴρηται δέ παρά τό μένειν καί τῇ μνήμῃ παρακατέχεσθαι), τόν δέ κότον θυμόν ἐπιτηροῦντα καιρόν εἰς τιμωρίαν· εἴρηται δέ παρά τό κεῖσθαι καί οὗτος. ∆ιαιροῦσι δέ καί τούτων ἕκαστον εἰς ἄλλα πολλά. Ἅπερ εἰ