466

But it is also possible to understand the passage in another way, I do not think it is out of place, and to add that of Jesus Sirach to what has been said. And it is this: "Music in a time of mourning is an untimely tale." Since, therefore, music comprises all disciplines, of which those who have devoted themselves to these matters say geometry is one, for this reason, I think, agreeing with the one who set forth the aforementioned saying, the teacher said that geometry is inappropriate for mourning. But if someone were to say. Why indeed, having passed over the other disciplines, has he included this one alone as inappropriate for mourning? We say that he considered this one to be suitable for all the aforementioned undertakings. Then also, through this one, the others were also included synecdochically. Let these things, so to speak, have been said according to me. But if someone should find something better, I will acknowledge my gratitude, having received from him the knowledge of what I had been ignorant of.

(1216) By the same, from the great theological work, on the text, "For that God exists and is the creative and sustaining cause of all things, both sight and the natural law are a teacher, the former engaging with the things seen, both those that are well fixed and those that are in motion, and those that are moved and borne along, motionlessly, so to speak, while the latter, through things seen and ordered, reasons to their author."

He who has comprehended the magnitude of things seen, in their beauty and nature, through perception joined with reason, not allowing it to operate at all by itself, in any way separated from the reason that drives it, nor reason itself to be free from the simplicity of the intellect—by which the forms and shapes of perception are naturally led through the intermediate power of reason into various principles, while the diverse variety, according to difference, of the power of reason concerning the various principles in existing things is gathered into a uniform, simple, and undifferentiated intellection, through which the so-called partless, unquantified, and unified knowledge is constituted—this one, truly, through the things seen and the good order within them, has, as is possible for a human, formed an image of their maker and sustainer and author, and has known God, not according to what His essence and hypostasis might be (for this is impossible and not to be attempted), but having learned only that He is. And this, after every passage of perception in the shape of position and form and impression and imagination, and, if I do not seem to be superfluous, having gone completely outside the very difference in the principles of beings, and having placed himself as a kind of boundary between God and all things after God—perceiving Him on the one hand as transcendent and remaining wholly untouchable and having no intellection that reaches Him, and on the other hand the things left behind and traversed by the abundance of intellectual knowledge and appearing lower than the conception one has by firmly and truly understanding that what they are is beyond them—these things, it seems to me, the teacher alludes to through sight and the natural law according to the reason given, but not positing sight and the natural law as the same thing, as some have thought. For both, having their activity concerning the same things, can admit of a conceptual distinction from one another, in that the one is irrationally supported only by contact with visible things, being unable to go further, while the other both investigates these things with its attendant reason and transcends them well and wisely with the intellect, in which way especially the natural law has introduced, through sight, the concept and faith concerning the existence of God. Therefore, he called sight the simple, but not the qualified, application of perception to perceptible things (for it is not the property of perception simply to infer one thing from another), but natural law the natural activity which comes about through perception according to intellect and reason, (1217) by which there is a methodical ascent from lesser things to the better with harmonious examination

466

δέ καί ἄλλως ἔστιν ἐκλαβεῖν τόν τόπον, οὐκ ἄκαιρον εἶναι νομίζω, καί τό τοῦ Σιράχ Ἰησοῦ προσθεῖναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Ἔστι δέ τοῦτο· Μουσικά ἐν πένθει, ἄκαιρος διήγησις. Ὡς οὖν τῆς μουσικῆς πάσας περιεχούσης τάς παιδεύσεις, ὧν μίαν φασί τήν γεωμετρίαν οἱ περί ταῦτα τήν σπουδήν ἐσχηκότες, τούτου χάριν, ὡς οἶμαι, συμφερόμενος τῷ τήν προῤῥηθεῖσαν ἐκθεμένῳ ῥῆσιν ὁ διδάσκαλος ἀνάρμοστον ἔφη τῷ πένθει τήν γεωμετρίαν. Εἰ δέ τις φαίη. Τί δήποτε τάς λοιπάς παρείς παιδεύσεις ταύτην μόνην ὡς ἀνάρμοστον τῷ πένθει παρείληφε; φαμέν ὅτι ταύτην ἐσκόπησε κατάλληλον εἶναι πάσαις ταῖς προλεχθείσαις ἐπιβολαῖς. Ἔπειτα δέ καί διά ταύτης τῆς μιᾶς καί αἱ λοιπαί συνεκδοχικῶς συμπαρελήφθησαν. Ταῦτα μέν, κατ᾿ ἐμέ φάναι, λελέχθω. Εἰ δέ τις τό κρεῖττον ἐξεύροι, ὁμολογήσω χάριν τῶν ἠγνοημένων παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τήν γνῶσιν λαβών.

(1216) Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου θεολογικοῦ, εἰς τό, "τοῦ μέν γάρ εἶναι Θεόν καί τῶν πάντων ποιητικήν τε καί συνεκτικήν αἰτίαν, καί ὄψις διδάσκαλος καί ὁ φυσικός νόμος, ἡ μέν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις προσβάλλουσα καί πεπηγόσι καλῶς καί ὁδεύουσι, καί ἀκινήτως, ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω, κινουμένοις τε καί φερομένοις, ὁ δέ διά τῶν ὁρωμένων καί τεταγμένων τόν ἀρχηγόν τούτων συλλογιζόμενος."

Ὁ τό μέγεθος τῶν ὁρωμένων ὡς ἔχει κάλλους καί φύσεως, σύν λόγῳ κατά τήν αἴσθησιν ἐπελθών, μή συγχωρῶν αὐτῇ παντελῶς καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν γενομένην ἐνεργεῖν τοῦ ἡνιοχοῦντος αὐτήν λόγου ἐχωρισμένην οὐδέν, μηδέ τόν λόγον αὐτόν τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ἁπλότητος ἄφετον, καθ᾿ ὅν τῆς μέν αἰσθήσεως τά τε εἴδη καί τά σχήματα διά μέσης τῆς κατά τόν λόγον δυνάμεως εἰς λόγους παντοδαπούς ἄγεσθαι πέφυκε, τῆς δέ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεως ἡ κατά τήν διαφοράν ποικιλία τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι παντοδαπῶν λόγων εἰς ἑνοειδῆ καί ἁπλῆν καί ἀδιάφορον συνάγεσθαι νόησιν, καθ᾿ ἥν ἡ ἀμερής λεγομένη καί ἄποσος καί ἑνιαία γνῶσις συνέστηκεν, οὗτος ἀληθῶς διά τῶν ὁρωμένων καί τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐταξίας τόν ποιητήν τούτων καί συνοχέα καί ἀρχηγόν, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν, ἀνετυπώσατο, καί ἔγνω Θεόν, οὐ κατά τό τί ποτε τήν οὐσίαν εἶναι καί τήν ὑπόστασιν (τοῦτο γάρ ἀμήχανον καί ἀνεπιχείρητον), ἀλλά κατ᾿ αὐτό τό μόνον εἶναι μαθών. Καί ταῦτα μετά πᾶσαν τήν κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν ἐν σχήματι θέσεώς τε καί μορφῆς καί τυπώσεως καί φαντασίας διάβασιν, καί εἰ μή τῷ περιττός εἶναι δοκῶ, καί αὐτῆς ἔξω παντελῶς τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τῶν ὄντων διαφορᾶς γενόμενος, καί οἷον μεθόριον ἑαυτόν παρενθείς Θεοῦ τε καί πάντων τῶν μετά Θεόν, τόν μέν ὡς ὑπερέχοντος καί ἀψαύστου δι᾿ ὅλου μένοντος καί μηδεμίαν φθάνουσαν αὐτόν ἔχοντος νόησιν, τῶν δέ καταλελειμμένων καί τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῆς κατά νοῦν γνώσεως διαβαθέντων καί κατωτέρων ἐννοίας φανέντων τῷ τί ποτε εἶναι βεβαίως ὑπέρ αὐτά καί ἀληθῶς ἐννοῆσαι, ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ διά τῆς ὄψεως καί τοῦ φυσικοῦ νόμου κατά τήν ἀποδοθεῖσαν αἰτίαν ὁ διδάσκαλος παραινίττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ ταὐτόν τίθεσθαι, καθώς τινες ᾠήθησαν, τήν ὄψιν τε καί τόν φυσικόν νόμον. Ἄμφω γάρ περί τά αὐτά τήν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα τήν ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων δύναται κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιαν δέχεσθαι διάκρισιν, τῷ τήν μέν ἀλόγως τῇ προσψαύσει τῶν ὁρατῶν μόνον στηρίζεσθαι περαιτέρω βαίνειν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, τόν δέ τῷ τε συνημμένῳ λόγῳ ταῦτα πολυπραγμονεῖν καί τῷ νῷ καλῶς τε καί σοφῶς ὑπερβαίνειν, καθ᾿ ὅ μάλιστα τήν περί τοῦ εἶναι Θεόν ἔννοιάν τε καί πίστιν ὁ φυσικός διά τῆς ὄψεως εἰσαγήοχε νόμος. Ὄψιν οὖν ἐκάλεσε τήν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τήν πῶς, πρός τά αἰσθητά τῆς αἰσθήσεως προσβολήν (οὐ γάρ αἰσθήσεως ἀπλῶς τό ἔκ τινος ἕτερόν τι συλλογίζεσθαι καθέστηκεν ἴδιον) , νόμον δέ φυσικόν τήν διά τῆς αἰσθήσεως γινομένην κατά νοῦν καί λόγον φυσικήν ἐνέργειαν, (1217) καθ᾿ ἥν ἡ πρός τό κρεῖττον μετ᾿ ἐμμελοῦς ἐξετάσεως καθ᾿ ὁδόν ἀπό τῶν ἡττόνων ἀνάβασις