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it becomes. But it is said by the teacher that visible things are moved and borne immovably, in respect to the logos by which these things came to be, having unchangeably their nature and power and activity, order and permanence, and they do not depart in any way from their natural property, nor change into another, nor are they confounded, but are moved again according to the logos of flux and reflux, by increase and decrease in respect to quantity, and by alteration in respect to quality, and properly speaking, by succession from one another, as those that have come before always yield to those that come after. And simply, to speak concisely, all existing things, according to the logos by which they subsist and are, are completely stationary and immovable, but according to the logos of the things contemplated around them, by which the economy of this universe is clearly constituted and conducted, all things are manifestly moved and are unstable. They say that movement is not the same as locomotion. For they say that movement belongs rather to things subject to generation and corruption, since they admit of the more and the less in what is contemplated about them (although it can be properly said of all created things together), but locomotion belongs to the unwearying revolution of the substance which is moved in a circle. I do not know whether it is safe for one to dare to speak of the universe as naturally acting or being acted upon, except that to be borne is, properly speaking, to be acted upon. For none of existing things is completely self-acting, because none is without a cause, and that which is not without a cause is certainly moved by a cause, clearly being acted upon so as to be moved naturally by the cause, because of which and towards which it makes its movement. For none of the things that are moved is in any way moved without a cause in any manner whatsoever. And the beginning of all natural movement is the generation of the things that are moved, and the beginning of the generation of the things that are moved is God, as the Creator. But the end of the natural generation of things that have come to be is rest, which infinity certainly brings about after the passage through finite things, in which, because there is no interval, every movement of things naturally moved comes to a halt, having no longer where or how or towards what to be moved, since it has as its end, as its cause, God, who defines even infinity itself which is definitive of all movement. Therefore, of all generation and movement of existing things, God is the beginning and the end, as they have been generated from him and are moved through him, and will make their rest in him. Generation is preconceived before all natural movement of existing things, and movement is naturally preconceived before all rest. If, then, generation is naturally preconceived before movement, and rest is naturally conceived after movement, it is clearly impossible for generation and rest to exist at the same time, since they have movement naturally separating them in the middle. For rest is not a natural activity of the generation of things that are moved, but the end of the power or activity corresponding to it, or however one may wish to say this.

(1220) For things that have come into being have done so for an activity, and every activity is towards some end, lest it be incomplete. For that which does not have an end among natural activities is not perfect, and the end of natural activities is the cessation of the movement of generated things towards their cause. For example, so that we may understand from one instance the mode of movement in all existing things, the soul, being an intellectual and rational substance, both thinks and reasons, having the intellect as its power, intellection as its movement, and the concept as its activity. For this is the limit of the intellection of both the thinker and the thing thought, being what defines the relationship of the extremities to one another. For when the soul thinks, it ceases from thinking that which was thought after the intellection of it. For that which has been properly thought once, no longer calls forth the soul's power to be thought again, and so with each concept it receives a cessation of the particular intellection upon the concept of the thing thought. When, therefore, all the concepts of things thought

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γίνεται. Ἀκινήτως δέ κινεῖσθαί τε καί φέρεσθαι τά ὁρώμενα εἴρηται τῷ διδασκάλῳ τῷ μέν λόγῳ, ᾧ γέγονε ταῦτα, κατά τε φύσιν καί δύναμιν καί ἐνέργειαν, τάξιν τε καί διαμονήν ἀμεταστάτως ἔχειν, καί μή ἐξίστασθαι καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν τῆς φυσικῆς ἰδιότητος καί μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλλο καί φύρεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι δέ πάλιν τῷ κατά ῥοήν καί ἀποῤῥοήν λόγῳ, αὐξήσει τε τῇ περί τό ποσόν καί μειώσει καί τῇ περί τό ποιόν ἀλλοιώσει, καί κυρίως εἰπεῖν, τῇ ἐξ ἀλλήλων διαδοχῇ, ὑπεξισταμένων ἀεί τοῖς ἐπιγνομένοις τῶν προειληφότων. Καί ἁπλῶς ἵνα συνελών εἴπω, πάντα τά ὄντα καθ᾿ ὅν μέν ὑπέστησάν τε καί εἰσί λόγον, στάσιμά τε παντελῶς εἰσι καί ἀκίνητα, τῷ δέ τῶν περί αὐτά θεωρουμένων λόγῳ, καθ᾿ ὅν ἡ τοῦ παντός τούτου σαφῶς οἰκονομία συνέστηκέ τε καί διεξάγεται, πάντα κινεῖται δηλονότι καί ἀστατεῖ. Οὐ ταὐτόν δέ φασιν εἶναι τῇ φορᾷ τήν κίνησιν. Τήν μέν γάρ κίνησιν μᾶλλον εἶναί φασι τῶν ὑπό γένεσιν καί φθοράν, ὡς ἐπιδεχομένων τοῖς περί αὐτά θεωρουμένοις τό μᾶλλον καί τό ἧττον (κἄν ἐπί πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν γενητῶν κυρίως λέγεσθαι δυνατόν), τήν δέ φοράν τῆς κατά κύκλον κινουμένης οὐσίας καί ἀκαμάτως τήν περιδίνησιν. Οὐκ οἶδα πότερον θαῤῤήσαντι περί τό πᾶν φυσικῶς ἐνεργούσης λέγειν ἐστίν ἀσφαλές ἤ ἐνεργουμένης, πλήν ὅτι κυρίως εἰπεῖν ἐστιν ἐνεργουμένης τό φέρεσθαι. Οὐδέν γάρ τῶν ὄντων παντελῶς ἐστιν αὐτενέργητον, ὅτι μηδέ ἀναίτιον, τό δέ μή ἀναίτιον, κινεῖται πάντως δι᾿ αἰτίαν, ἐνεργούμενον δηλονότι τό κινεῖσθαι φυσικῶς ὑπό τῆς αἰτίας, δι᾿ ἥν καί πρός ἥν ποιεῖται τήν κίνησιν. Ἀναιτίως γάρ οὐδαμῶς κινεῖται καθ᾿ οἱονδήτινα τρόπον τῶν κινουμένων οὐδέν. Ἀρχή δέ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν κινουμένων γένεσις, ἀρχή δέ τῆς τῶν κινουμένων γενέσεως ὁ Θεός, ὡς γενεσιουργός. Τῆς δέ τῶν γεγενημένων φυσικῆς γενέσεως τέλος ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἥν ποιεῖ πάντως μετά τήν διάβασιν τῶν πεπερασμένων ἡ ἀπειρία, ἐν ᾗ διά τό μή εἶναι διάστημα πᾶσα ποιεῖται κίνησις τῶν φυσικῶν κινουμένων, οὐκ ἔχουσα λοιπόν ὅποι τε καί πῶς καί πρός τί κινηθῆναι, ὡς τόν ὁρίζοντα καί αὐτήν τήν πάσης ὁριστικήν κινήσεως ἀπειρίαν Θεόν τέλος ὡς αἴτιον ἔχουσα. Πάσης οὖν γενέσεώς τε καί κινήσεως τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχή καί τέλος ἐστίν ὁ Θεός, ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων καί δι᾿ αὐτοῦ κινουμένων, καί εἰς αὐτόν τήν στάσιν ποιησομένων. Πάσης δέ φυσικῆς τῶν ὄντων κινήσεως προεπινοεῖται ἡ γένεσις, πάσης δέ στάσεως προεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ κίνησις. Εἰ οὖν κινήσεως προεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ γένεσις, κινήσεως δέ μετεπινοεῖται κατά φύσιν ἡ στάσις, γένεσις δηλονότι καί στάσις εἶναι τῶν ἅμα κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν ἀμήχανον, ἀλλήλων αὐτάς φυσικῶς διείργουσαν ἔχουσαι κατά τό μέσον τήν κίνησιν. Οὐ γάρ φυσική ἐνέργεια τῆς γενέσεως τῶν κινουμένων ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἀλλά τέλος τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτήν δυνάμεως ἤ ἐνεργείας, ἤ ὅπως ἄν τις ἐθέλει τοῦτο λέγειν.

(1220) Ἐπ᾿ ἐνεργείᾳ γάρ τά γενόμενα γέγονε, πᾶσα δέ ἐνέργεια πρός τι τέλος ἐστίν, ἵνα μή ἀτελής. Τό γάρ τέλος μή ἔχον τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐνεργειῶν οὐδέ τέλειόν ἐστι, τέλος δέ τῶν κατά φύσιν ἐνεργειῶν, ἡ τῆς πρός τό αἴτιον τῶν γεγενημένων κινήσεως στάσις. Οἷον ἵνα ἐξ ἑνός τόν ἐπί πάντων τῶν ὄντων κατανοήσωμεν τῆς κινήσεως τρόπον, ἡ ψυχή, οὐσία νοερά τε καί λογική ὑπάρχουσα, καί νοεῖ καί λογίζεται, δύναμιν ἔχουσα τόν νοῦν, κίνησιν δέ τήν νόησιν, ἐνέργειαν δέ τό νόημα. Πέρας γάρ τοῦτο τῆς τε τοῦ νοοῦντος καί τοῦ νουμένου νοήσεώς ἐστιν, ὡς περιοριστικόν τῆς πρός ἄλληλα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάρχον σχέσεως. Νοοῦσα γάρ ἡ ψυχή ἴσταται τοῦ νοεῖν ἐκεῖνο τό νοηθέν μετά τήν αὐτοῦ νόησιν. Τό γάρ νοηθέν κυρίως ἅπαξ, οὐκ ἔτι τήν πρός τό νοηθῆναι πάλιν ἐκκαλεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, καί καθ᾿ ἕκαστον νόημα οὕτω στάσιν δέχεται τῆς ποίας ἐπί τῷ νοήματι τοῦ νοηθέντος νοήσεως. Ἡνίκα οὖν πάντα τά νοήματα τῶν νοουμένων