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should pass beyond all perceptible and intelligible things in thought, it ceases, just as from all things that are understood, so also from the whole of thought and of relation to all relative and intelligible things, having nothing left to think at all, after the thinking of things naturally able to be thought, after which, beyond mind and reason and knowledge, without thought, without knowledge, and ineffably, by a simple approach it will be united to God, not thinking at all, nor indeed reasoning about God. For He is not one of the things that are understood, so that according to some relation the soul might be able to have a conception of Him, but according to the simple, as non-relative, and union beyond thought, and a certain reason, both unspoken and uninterpreted, which only He knows, God who bestows this ineffable grace on the worthy, and those who are later to experience this, when all things will be free of turning and of all alteration, with the motion of beings in any way concerning anything having completely received as its limit the infinity around God, in which all things that are moved receive rest. For around God, but not God, is the infinity, who is incomparably beyond even this. Rightly therefore, I think, he who dogmatizes about the pre-existence of souls is worthy of the greatest blame, and who decrees a completely motionless henad of rational beings, mixing in a Hellenic manner things that should not be mixed, and saying that rest exists simultaneously in subsistence with the generation of rational beings. For it does not follow in true reason that generation is conceived before rest, which is by nature motionless according to him, nor that rest is conceived after a motionless generation, nor indeed that rest is conceived simultaneously with generation. For rest is not a potentiality of generation, so that it might be conceived simultaneously with the generation of things that have been generated, but it is the end of the activity according to potentiality of the generation of things that have been generated, and simply, to speak concisely, rest being one of the relative terms, is spoken of not in relation to generation, but in relation to motion, to which it also admits of a contrast, having in no way a reference to generation, to which it does not admit of a distinction. Therefore, as long as I hear of rest, I understand only a cessation of motion. But if generation and rest (1221) are not among the things that exist simultaneously in subsistence, then he who decrees this clearly debases the word of truth, and dogmatizes about the motionless henad of rational beings pre-existing together with generation. But if someone should say, "And how is rest spoken of in the case of God, when it does not have motion conceived before it?"; I say, first, "Creator and creation are not the same, so that what is possible for one to possess, might of necessity be able to be observed in the other in the same way, since in that case the natural difference between them will in no way be apparent; then, to speak properly, God is neither moved at all nor does He stand still (for this is a property of things naturally finite and having a beginning of their being), nor indeed does He do anything at all, nor does He suffer any of the things that are conceived and said of Him for our sake, because He is by nature beyond all motion and rest, and in no way is subject to our ways." Let these things be said by way of digression concerning the fact that one must not say that any of the beings acts by nature in an absolute manner, lest we foolishly introduce something uncaused among the things after God, but that it is naturally actualized to act in that way which it is its nature to act when being actualized.

From the same discourse, on the text, "But if incorporeal, not even this is yet indicative of the substance, just as neither is 'unbegotten,' and 'without beginning,' and 'unchangeable,' and 'incorruptible,' and as many things as are said to be about God or concerning God."

Against those who wickedly introduce the Son as most unlike the Father, through the belief that 'unbegotten' is the substance of the Father, making his argument, as I think, and from similar things teaching them to recognize what is necessary, the teacher says these things, so that being driven toward piety by the truth they may obediently, with us, the not having of generation

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πάντων αἰσθητῶν τε καί νοητῶν κατά τήν νόησιν παρέλθῃ, παύεται, ὥσπερ τῶν νοουμένων ἁπάντων, οὕτω καί τῆς ὅλης νοήσεώς τε καί σχέσεως πρός τά σχετά πάντα καί νοητά, οὐκ ἔχουσα λοιπόν τί νοῆσαι τό παράπαν, μετά τήν τῶν νοηθῆναι φυσικῶς δυναμένων νόησιν, μεθ᾿ ἥν ὑπέρ νοῦν καί λόγον καί γνῶσιν ἀνοήτως, ἀγνώστως τε καί ἀφράστως κατά ἁπλῆν προσβολήν ἑνωθήσεται τῷ Θεῷ, οὐ νοοῦσα παντάπασιν, οὔτε μήν τόν Θεόν λογιζομένη. Οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι τῶν νοουμένων, ἵνα κατά τινα σχέσιν ἡ ψυχή τήν αὐτοῦ δύνηται νόησιν ἔχειν, ἀλλά κατά τήν ἁπλῆν, ὡς ἄσχετον, καί ὑπέρ νόησιν ἕνωσιν, καί τινα λόγον ἄῤῥητόν τε καί ἀνερμήνευτον, ὅν μόνος οἶδεν ὁ τήν ἄφατον ταύτην χάριν τοῖς ἀξίοις δωρούμενος Θεός, καί οἱ ταύτην ὕστερον πείσεσθαι μέλλοντες, ἡνίκα πάντα τροπῆς ἐλεύθερα καί ἀλλοιώσεως ἔσται πάσης, τῆς καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν περί τι κινήσεως τῶν ὄντων παντελῶς πέρας λαβούσης τήν περί Θεόν ἀπειρίαν, ἐν ᾗ τά κινούμενα πάντα δέχεται στάσιν. Περί Θεόν γάρ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ Θεός, ἡ ἀπειρία, ὅστις καί ταύτης ἀσυγκρίτως ὑπέρκειται. ∆ικαίως γοῦν, οἶμαι, μέμψεως ἄξιος πλείστης ὁ τήν προΰπαρξιν τῶν ψυχῶν δογματίζων ἐστί, καί τήν ἀκίνητον καθόλου τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα θεσπίζων, φύρων Ἑλληνικῶς τά μή φυρόμενα, καί λέγων ἅμα κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν εἶναι τῇ γενέσει τῶν λογικῶν τήν στάσιν. Οὐ γάρ συμβαίνει τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ τήν γένεσιν προεπινοεῖσθαι τῆς στάσεως, ἀκίνητον φύσει κατ᾿ αὐτόν ὑπάρχουσαν, οὔτε μετεπινοεῖσθαι στάσιν ἀκινήτου γενέσεως, οὔτε μήν συνεπινοεῖσθαι τῇ γενέσει τήν στάσιν. Οὐ γάρ δύναμις τῆς γενέσεως ἡ στάσις ἐστίν, ἵνα συνεπινοηθῇ τῇ γενέσει τῶν γεγενημένων, ἀλλά τῆς κατά δύναμιν ἐνεργείας τῆς τῶν γεγενημένων γενέσεως τέλος ὑπάρχει, καί ἁπλῶς, ἵνα συνελών εἴπω, τῶν πρός τι οὖσα ἡ στάσις, οὐ πρός γένεσιν, ἀλλά πρός κίνησιν λέγεται, πρός ἥν και ἀντιδιαστολήν ἐπιδέχεται, οὐδαμῶς τήν πρός γένεσιν ἀναφοράν ἔχουσα, πρός ἥν διαστολήν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται. Ἕως δ᾿ ἄν οὖν στάσιν ἀκούω, παῦλαν μόνον μανθάνω κινήσεως. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἅμα κατά τήν ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔστι (1221)γένεσις καί στάσις, ἄρα παραχαράττει, σαφῶς τόν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον ὁ τοῦτο θεσπίζων, καί τήν ἀκίνητον ἅμα τῇ γενέσει προϋπάρχουσαν ἑνάδα τῶν λογικῶν δογματίζων. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, Καί πῶς ἐπί Θεοῦ λέγεται στάσις, μή ἔχουσα προεπινοουμένην κίνησιν; φημί πρῶτον μέν, Οὐ ταὐτόν Κτίστης και κτίσις, ἵν᾿ ὅπερ ἑνί δυνατόν προσεῖναι, κατ᾿ ἀνάγκην τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὡσαύτως ἐπιθεωρηθῆναι δύνηται, ἐπεί οὕτωγε οὐδαμῶς το κατά φύσιν διάφορον τούτων ἔσται καταφανές· ἔπειτα κυρίως εἰπεῖν, ὁ Θεός οὔτε κινεῖται παντελῶς οὔτε ἵσταται (τοῦτο γάρ τῶν κατά φύσιν πεπερασμένων καί ἀρχήν τοῦ εἶναι ἐχόντων ἐστίν ἴδιον), οὔτε μήν τι ποιεῖ παντάπασιν, οὔτε πάσχει τῶν ὅσα ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ δι᾿ ἡμᾶς καί νοεῖται καί λέγεται, διά τό κατά φύσιν ὑπέρ πᾶσαν εἶναι κίνησίν τε καί στάσιν, καί μηδενί λόγῳ τοῖς καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ὑποβάλλεσθαι τρόποις. Ταῦτα παρεκβατικῶς εἰρήσθω περί τοῦ μηδέν χρῆναι λέγειν τῶν ὄντων κατά φύσιν ἀπολελυμένως ἐνεργεῖν, ἵνα μή ἀναίτιόν τι τῶν μετά Θεόν ἀφρόνως εἰσάγωμεν, ἐνεργεῖσθαι δέ φυσικῶς τό ἐνεργεῖν τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ ἐνεργούμενον πέφυκεν ἐνεργεῖν.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου εἰς τό, " Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματον, οὔπω μέν οὐδέ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας παραστατικόν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ τό ἀγέννητον, καί τό ἄναρχον, καί τό ἀναλλοίωτον, καί ἄφθαρτον, καί ὅσα περί Θεοῦ ἤ περί Θεόν εἶναι λέγεται. "

Πρός τούς ἀνόμοιον μάλιστα τῷ Πατρί τόν Υἱόν κακούργως εἰσάγοντας, διά τοῦ νομίζειν οὐσίαν εἶναι τοῦ Πατρός τό ἀγέννητον, ὡς οἶμαι, τόν λόγον ποιούμενος, καί ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων τό δέον αὐτούς ἐπιγνῶναι διδάσκων, ταῦτά φησιν ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἵν' ὑπό τῆς ἀληθείας πρός τήν εὐσέβειαν συνελαυνόμενοι εὐπειθῶς σύν ἡμῖν τό μή ἔχειν γένεσιν