470

(1225) For if they examine for us some element, say, for instance, a man or a horse or an ox, it is not sufficient for a complete comprehension to say the element is body, or that the man or the ox or the horse is only generable or perishable, but it is necessary to present also the subject underlying these things, which is generated and perishes and is qualified. But body or generation or corruption, in no way being this subject, since according to this it would follow of necessity, if something is a body, that it is also an element, and if something is generable or perishable, that it is a man or an ox or a horse. For if something is a body, it is not in every case by necessity also an element or a man or an ox or a horse. For if something is an element, it is in every case by necessity also a body, but if something is a body, it is not in every case by necessity also an element. Nor, if something is a body or generable or perishable, is it in every case by necessity also a man, since in that case a man would also be in every case by necessity everything that is a body, and everything that is generated or perishes. For if something is a man, it is in every case by necessity also a body and generated and perishing, but if something is a body or generable or perishable, it is not in every case by necessity also a man. For it does not follow in every case, since man would be, by necessity, also an element and an ox and a horse, and everything else that is corporeal and generated and perishing. For particulars are never predicated of universals, nor species of genera, nor the contained of the containing, and for this reason universals are not convertible with particulars, nor genera with species, nor common things with particular ones, nor, to speak concisely, the containing with the contained. Thus therefore according to the given argument, it must be understood also in the case of an ox and a horse and any other thing whatsoever. If, then, it is not sufficient for a perfect knowledge of things to state the multitude of properties observed concerning them, I mean, that is, body and being generated and perishing, and such things as concern the subject, but it is in every case necessary also to indicate what the subject underlying these things is, in the manner of a foundation upon which these things are established, if we are to present what is understood perfectly and without omission. For we can say man or ox or horse, these things, that is, which are not body itself, but corporeal, and are not generations and corruptions themselves, but are generated and perish, so that these things, I mean body and generation and corruption, are certainly about the living creatures, but the living creatures are not these things, I mean body and generation and corruption.

If, then, absolutely nothing of existing things is, in its very being, that which the collection of what is thought and said by us about it is and is called, but something other besides these, that about which these things are, holding these things together, but itself in no way held together by them (for that about which these things both are and are said is not from them, or them, or any of them, or from some of them, or from one of them, or in them, or in some, or in one of them), let every soul accustomed to rashly leap with every argument upon the things concerning God cease from its empty impiety, and having learned its own (1228) weakness in small matters, let it in silence only revere the ineffable and supramental reality of the divine essence, which is beyond all knowledge. "For not even the precise understanding of creation itself, in the least," as the saint taught beforehand, "is comprehended by our knowledge according to the true account," so that I too may dwell a little on the argument, and marvel at the inscrutable nature of the wisdom that is beyond all things. For who of the exceedingly wise, trusting in logical methods and bold in non-existent proofs, having approached the majesty of existing things with reason, will be able to know, to speak, and to demonstrate it? What are the logoi first implanted in the existence of each of the beings, according to which each of the beings both exists and has its nature, and has been given its form, and has been shaped, and has been composed, and has potential, and acts, and is acted upon, not to mention that which is in quantity and in quality, and in relation, and in place, and

470

(1225) Εἰ γάρ ἐξετάζουσιν ἡμῖν στοιχεῖόν τι, φέρε εἰπεῖν ἤ ἄνθρωπον ἤ ἵππον ἤ βοῦν, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρός τελείαν κατάληψιν τό σῶμα λέγειν τό στοιχεῖον, ἤ γεννητόν μόνον ἤ φθαρτόν τόν ἄνθρωπον ἤ τόν βοῦν ἤ τόν ἵππον, ἀλλά δεῖ παραστῆσαι καί τό τούτοις ὑποκείμενον, ὅπερ γεννᾶται καί φθείρεται καί πεποίωται. Σῶμα δέ ἤ γέννησις ἤ φθορά, οὐδαμῶς ὑπάρχον, ἐπεί ἔσται κατά τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθία, εἴ τι σῶμα, καί στοιχεῖον εἶναι, καί εἴ τι γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, ἤ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἤ βοῦς ἤ ἵππος. Οὐ γάρ εἴ τι σῶμα, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον ἤ ἄνθρωπος ἤ βοῦς ἤ ἵππος. Εἴ τι μέν γάρ στοιχεῖον, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί σῶμα, οὐκ εἴ τι δέ σῶμα, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον. Οὔτε εἴ τι σῶμα ἤ γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεί οὕτω γε καί ἄνθρωπος ἔσται πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης πᾶν εἴ τι σῶμα, καί πᾶν εἴ τι γεννώμενόν ἐστιν ἤ φθειρόμενον. Εἴ τι μέν γάρ ἄνθρωπος, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί σῶμα καί γεννώμενον καί φθειρόμενον, οὐκ εἴ τι δέ σῶμα ἤ γεννητόν ἤ φθαρτόν, πάντως ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί ἄνθρωπος. Οὔτε γάρ ἕπεται πάντως, ἐπεί ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καί στοιχεῖον καί βοῦς καί ἵππος, καί πᾶν εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐνσώματον καί γεννώμενον καί φθειρόμενον. Οὐ γάρ κατηγορεῖταί ποτε τά μερικά κατά τῶν καθόλου, οὔτε τά εἴδη τῶν γενῶν, οὔτε τῶν περιεχόντων τά περιεχόμενα, καί διά τοῦτο οὐδέ ἀντιστρέφει τά καθόλου τοῖς ἐπί μέρους, οὐδέ τά γένη τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οὐδέ τά κοινά τοῖς ἰδιάζουσιν, οὐδέ συνελόντα φάναι, τοῖς περιεχομένοις τά περιέχοντα. Οὕτως οὖν κατά τόν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον καί ἐπί βοός καί ἵππου καί παντός τοῦ ὁτιοῦν ἑτέρου ληπτέον. Εἰ τοίνυν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρός τελείαν γνῶσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τό πλῆθος τῶν περί αὐτά θεωρουμένων εἰπεῖν, λέγω δή τό σῶμα καί τό γεννᾶσθαι καί τό φθείρεσθαι, καί ὅσα τοιαῦτα περί τό ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν, ἀλλά δεῖ πάντως καί τό ὑποκείμενον τούτοις, θεμελίου τρόπον ἐφ᾿ ᾧ ταῦτα βέβηκε, τί ἐστιν ἐνδείξασθαι, εἰ μέλλοιμεν τελείως καί ἀπαραλείπτως τό νοούμενον παριστάναι. Ἤ γάρ ἄνθρωπον ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ἤ βοῦν ἤ ἵππον, ταῦτα δή τά μή ὄντα αὐτό τοῦτο σῶμα, ἀλλ᾿ ἐνσώματα, καί μή ὄντα αὐτό τοῦτο γεννήσεις καί φθοράς, ἀλλά γεννώμενα καί φθειρόμενα, ὡς εἶναι ταῦτα, σῶμά φημι καί γέννησιν καί φθοράν, δηλαδή περί τά ζῶα, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τά ζῶα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν, σῶμα λέγω καί γέννησιν καί φθοράν.

Εἰ τοίνυν οὐδέν τό σύνολον τῶν ὄντων ἐστί κατ᾿ αὐτό τό εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστί καί λέγεται τό ἄθροισμα τῶν ἡμῖν περί αὐτό νοουμένων τε καί λεγομένων, ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερόν τι παρά ταῦτα, τό περί ὅ ταῦτά ἐστι, συνεκτικόν μέν τούτων, αὐτό δέ τούτοις οὐδαμῶς συνεχόμενον (οὐδέ γάρ ἐστιν ἐκ τούτων, ἤ ταῦτα, ἤ τι τούτων, ἤ ἔκ τινων, ἤ τινος αὐτῶν, ἤ ἐν τούτοις, ἤ τισιν, ἤ τινι τούτων, τό περί ὅ ταῦτα καί ἔστι καί λέγεται), παυσάσθω πάσα ψυχή παντί λόγῳ τῶν περί Θεοῦ θρασέως ἐπιπηδᾷν εἰθισμένη τοῦ διακενῆς ἀσεβεῖν, καί ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς μαθοῦσα τήν οἰκείαν (1228) ἀσθένειαν, καί σιγῇ σεβέσθω μόνον τήν ἄῤῥητόν τε καί ὑπέρ νόησιν καί πάσης ἐπέκεινα γνώσεως τῆς θείας οὐσίας ὀντότητα. "Οὐδέ αὐτή γάρ κατά μικρόν, ὡς προλαβών ἐδίδαξεν ὁ ἅγιος, ἡ τῆς κτίσεως ἀκριβής κατανόησις" κατά τόν ἀληθῆ λόγον ὑπό τῆς ἡμῶν περιέχεται γνώσεως, ἵνα κἀγώ μικρόν τι προσδιατρίψω τῷ λόγῳ, καί τῆς ὑπέρ πάντα σοφίας θαυμάσω τό ἀνεξιχνίαστον. Τίς γάρ τῶν ἄγαν σοφῶν ταῖς λογικαῖς πιστεύων ἐφόδοις καί ταῖς οὐκ οὔσαις θαῤῥῶν ἀποδείξεσι μετά λόγου τήν τῶν ὄντων ἐπελθών μεγαλειότητα δυνήσεται γνῶναι, εἰπεῖν τε καί παραστῆσαι; Τίνες οἱ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων τῇ ὑπάρξει πρώτως ἐγκαταβληθέντες λόγοι, καθ᾿ οὕς καί ἔστι καί πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, καί εἰδοπεποίηται, καί ἐσχημάτισται, καί συντέθειται, καί δύναται, καί ἐνεργεῖ, καί πάσχει, ἵνα μή λέγω τήν ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τε καί τῷ ποιῷ, καί τῇ σχέσει, καί τῷ τόπῳ, καί