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difference and particularity in time, and in position, and in motion and state, to which our rational faculty is by nature magnificently disposed to expand in equal number into mind, and thought, and concept, and understanding, and conception, and the internal word, both the spoken and the uttered, that is voice and cry, and again to be contracted, apart from its difference and particularity according to science and art, as in quantity and quality and the rest, as has been enumerated? Who knows the principles of beings just as they are, as I said, and as they differ, and have a motionless stability according to nature and a movement that in no way falls away from one another, having stability in motion and, most paradoxically, motion in stability? what is the bond of opposites to each other for the constitution of one world, and what is the mode of its well-ordered and unconfused motion and governance? again, what is the intertwining of opposites in our bodies according to mixture through composition, which brings things that are separate by nature into a friendly cohabitation, and by means of a middle term tames the harshness in the extremes, and prepares them to pass through one another harmlessly, and makes this the preservation of composite things, namely the perichoresis of the extremes into one another according to the mixture, and how each of these things is, and what it is, and where it bears or is borne, and for what it has come to be or bears or is borne, not only, as has been said, by the principles by which these things primarily exist, but also by the myriad ways in which, according to concept and activity, they are divided and united with themselves and with one another? and again, what is the principle of each thing's substance, nature, form, shape, composition, power, activity, passion? And again, what is the universal principle that effects the connection of the extremes to each other according to the limit of each through the middle, so that both the mind and the object of thought, through the middle term of intellection, which is a unifying relation of the separated things concerning the thought derived from both, might be connected and embraced by one another, and that absolutely nothing (1229) after God might be shown to be free from circumscription in this respect? just as also all sensible things and things that sense, that is, faculties of sense, through the middle term of sensation, which is a common relation of the separated extremes—the latter apprehending the sensible objects through it, the former falling under the perception of the sensing faculties through it—around the sense organ, in which the limit of the power of each according to the relation is established, and around which the extremes are by nature united to one another through the middle relation.

When we attempt to investigate the principles of these things, or of any one of them, we remain completely weak and speechless concerning the word, not having anything on which to rest our mind with precision, except the divine power. And this is what was said, I think, by the saint, training our mind toward piety, "In short, not even the precise comprehension of creation." But the phrase, "But far before these, the nature that is beyond them and from which they come, is both incomprehensible and uncircumscribable," must be applied in common to creation and to the nature that is beyond these things and from which these things, that is, created things, come—the "incomprehensible and uncircumscribable." And the phrase, "Not that it is, but what" it is, having been introduced, is an anticipation of a counter-argument. For lest the one to whom the argument is addressed should attack him, saying, "If then our object of worship is in every way incomprehensible, then the preaching of the Christians is in vain, and our faith is also in vain, being supported by nothing," he says these things, anticipating the abusive argument or person. I did not say that this nature, about which the argument is, is incomprehensible with respect to *that* it exists, but with respect to *what* it exists, and he adds for the confirmation of the argument, "For there is a great difference between being persuaded that something is and knowing what this thing is," that is, there is a great difference between being persuaded about something that it exists and knowing the precise substance of it

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τῷ χρόνῳ, καί τῇ θέσει, τῇ τε κινήσει καί ἕξει, διαφοράν καί ἰδιότητα, πρός ἅ καί ἡ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς μεγαλοφυῶς λογική πέφυκεν ἰσαρίθμως πλατύνεσθαι δύναμις εἰς νοῦν, καί νόησιν, καί ἔννοιαν, καί διάνοιαν, καί σύννοιαν, καί τόν ἐνδιάθετον λόγον, τόν τε κατά προφοράν καί τόν γεγωνότα, τουτέστι φωνήν καί κραυγήν, καί αὖθις συνάγεσθαι, χωρίς τῆς κατ' ἐπιστήμην καί τέχνην, ὥσπερ ἐν ποσῷ τε καί ποιῷ καί τοῖς λοιποῖς, καθώς ἀπηρίθμηται, τούτου διαφορᾶς τε καί ἰδιότητος ; Τίς ὁ γινώσκων τούς λόγους τῶν ὄντων καθώς καί εἰσίν, ὡς εἶπον, καί διαφέρουσι, καί στάσιν ἔχουσιν ἀκίνητον τήν κατά φύσιν καί πρός ἄλληλα μηδαμῶς μεταπίπτουσαν κίνησιν, ἐν τῇ κινήσει τήν στάσιν, καί ἐν τῇ στάσει τό παραδοξότατον τήν κίνησιν ἔχοντα ; τίς πρός ἄλληλα τῶν ἐναντίων εἰς ἑνός κόσμου σύστασιν ὁ δεσμός, καί τῆς εὐτάκτου τε καί ἀφύρτου κινήσεώς τε καί διοικήσεως ὁ τρόπος; τίς πάλιν τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς σωμάτων ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων κατά τήν κρᾶσιν διά συνθέσεως συμπλοκή, τά διεστῶτα κατά τήν φύσιν εἰς φιλικήν συνοικίαν ἐνάγουσα καί τῇ μεσότητι τό ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις αὐστηρόν τιθασσεύουσα, καί χωρεῖν δι᾿ ἀλλήλων ἀλυμάντως παρασκευάζουσα καί ταύτην ποιουμένη τῶν συνθέτων συντήρησιν, τήν τῶν ἄκρων κατά τήν κρᾶσιν εἰς ἄλληλα περιχώρησιν, καί πῶς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστί, καί τί ἐστι, καί ποῦ φέρον ἤ φερόμενον καί ἐπί τίνι γεγένηται ἤ φέρει ἤ φέρεται, οὐ μόνον, ὡς εἴρηται, οἷς προηγουμένως ὑπάρχουσι ταῦτα λόγοις, ἀλλά καί οἷς πρός ἑαυτά τε καί πρός ἄλληλα μυρίοις κατ᾿ ἐπίνοιάν τε καί ἐνέργειαν διαιροῦνταί τε καί ἑνοῦνται τρόποις; καί αὖθις τίς ὁ λόγος τῆς τοῦ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον οὐσίας, φύσεως, εἴδους, σχήματος, συνθέσεως, δυνάμεως, ἐνεργείας, πάθους; τίς δέ πάλιν ὁ καθόλου τοῖς ἄκροις κατά τό ἑκάστου πέρας διά τοῦ μέσου τήν πρός ἄλληλα συνάφειαν ἐνεργῶν λόγος, ἵνα τόν τε νοῦν καί τό νοούμενον διά τῆς μέσης νοήσεως, σχέσεως οὔσης ἑνωτικῆς τῶν διῃρημένων περί τό ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νόημα, συναφθῇ καί περιληφθῇ ἀλλήλοις ἑκάτερα, καί μηδέν τό παράπαν (1229) κατά τοῦτο δειχθῆ τῶν μετά Θεόν περιγραφῆς ὑπάρχον ἐλεύθερον; ὥσπερ καί τά αἰσθητά πάντα καί τά αἰσθανόμενα, ἤγουν αἰσθητικά, διά τῆς μέσης αἰσθήσεως, σχέσεως οὔσης κοινῆς τῶν διῃρημένων ἄκρων, τῶν μέν ὡς δι᾿ αὐτῆς ἀντιλαμβανομένων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῶν δέ δι᾿ αὐτῆς ὑποπιπτόντων τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, περί τό αἰσθητήριον, ἐν ᾧ τό πέρας τῆς ἑκάστου κατά τήν σχέσιν δυνάμεως ὑπάρχον καθέστηκε, καί περί ὅ ἀλλήλοις τά ἄκρα διά τῆς μέσης σχέσεως ἑνοῦσθαι πέφυκε.

Τούτων, ἤ τινος τούτων ἐρευνᾷν ἐπιχειροῦντες τούς λόγους, ἄτονοι παντελῶς καί ἄφωνοι περί τόν λόγον μένομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ᾧ τινι τόν νοῦν ἀκριβῶς ἐπερεισόμεθα, πλήν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως. Καί τοῦτό ἐστι τό εἰρημένον, ὡς οἶμαι, τῷ ἁγίῳ, γυμνάζοντι τόν ἡμέτερον νοῦν πρός εὐσέβειαν, " Κατά μικρόν γοῦν, οὐδέ ἡ τῆς κτίσεως ἀκριβής κατανόησις." Τό δέ, " Ἀλλά πολύ πρό τούτων ἡ ὑπέρ ταῦτα καί ἐξ ἧς ταῦτα φύσις, ἄληπτός τε καί ἀπερίληπτος," κατά κοινοῦ θετέον τῆς κτίσεως καί τῆς ὑπέρ ταῦτα καί ἀφ᾿ ἧστινος ταῦτα, δηλαδή τά κτίσματα, φύσεως τό " Ἄληπτός τε καί ἀπερίληπτος." Τό δέ, "Οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἥτις" ἐστίν, ἐνεχθέν προκατάληψίς ἐστιν ἀνθυποφορᾶς. Ἵνα γάρ μή καταδράμῃ αὐτοῦ πρός ὅν ὁ λόγος, φάσκων, Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄληπτον πάντη τό σέβας ἡμῶν, κενόν ἄρα τό Χτιστιανῶν κήρυγμα, κενή δέ καί ἡ πίστις, κατ᾿ οὐδενός στηριζομένη, ταῦτά φησι προλαμβάνων τόν ἐπηρεαστήν λόγον ἤ ἄνθρωπον. Οὐκ ἔφην ἄληπτον εἶναι ταύτην τήν φύσιν, περί ἧς ὁ λόγος, ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλά τί ὑπάρχει, καί προσεπάγει πρός τἤν τοῦ λόγου βεβαίωσιν τό, "Πολύ γάρ διαφέρει τοῦ εἶναί τι πεπεῖσθαι τό τί ποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο εἰδέναι," τουτέστι, πολλή πρόσεστιν ἡ διαφορά τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι περί τινος ὅτιπερ ὑπάρχει πρός τό εἰδέναι τήν ἀκριβῆ τῆς οὐσίας τούτου