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comprehension. Do not, then, he says, when we have honorably said that the divine substance is incomprehensible, maliciously transfer the argument, so as to pretend that we introduce it as incomprehensible in its very existence, and from this conclude that we in every way profess atheism. And after a little he says, For what will you suppose the Divine to be, if indeed you trust at all in logical approaches (that is, if you think that by running around with reason you can enclose with some knowledge what is sought)? "Is it a body (that is, Is it a body)? And how can it be infinite and indefinite and unformed and intangible and invisible?" so that it may be understood clearly, since the common notions have prevailed, that the Divine is infinite, which is to have no limit. For this is proper to that which is defined by four limits, by a point and a line, a surface and a solid, (1229) and in addition by three dimensions, length and breadth and depth, and by six defined limits themselves, each one clearly being described by two, for example, length by up and down, breadth by right and left, and depth by the limit in front and the one behind. And again, since the same common notions introduce God as indefinite, that is, not admitting a discursive development of what the subject is composed of, nor indeed a position in place, or a beginning or end in time, and moreover as unformed, for instance, that it is not spherical or square or upright or inclined downwards, and yes, indeed, intangible and invisible, as not falling under sense perception (for these things are properties of bodies), it is illogical from what has been refuted to suppose that the divine is a body and has a necessity to be divided into as many parts as it is again composed of as a body. For the Divine is in every way without parts, because it is also completely without quantity; and completely without quantity, because it is also in every way simple; and in every way simple, because it is also in every way without dimension; and in every way without dimension, because it is also in every way infinite; and in every way infinite, because it is also in every way immovable (for that which has no place to be moved in is never moved in any way); and in every way immovable, because it is also completely without beginning (for it has nothing before it and greater, nor anything with it and equal, nor anything after it, capable of being measured against it and containing it); and in every way without beginning, because it is also in every way unbegotten; and in every way unbegotten, because it is also completely one and most single; and in every way one and most single, because it is also completely without relation, and for this reason altogether ineffable and unknowable, and of all of the things toward it well and unknowable, and the unique limit of all knowledge of things moving toward it well and in a manner befitting God, having as its only true knowledge the fact of not being known.

From the same oration, on the text, "For if that which is not is nowhere, that which happens to be nowhere is also not, but if it is somewhere, it certainly is, since it exists, either in the universe, or above the universe."

For which reason, perhaps the hearer will say, The teacher made the converse ambiguous, by adding the adverb "perhaps," although it is clear to all, according to logical propositions, that what is nowhere is nothing, is rightly and altogether confessed. To whom, according to the poverty of our understanding, we will say, deficiently, that wishing to restrain Eunomius and his followers, who say they know God as he knows himself, from their great madness, he led them away to an absurd opinion by means of such arguments. For either it is entirely necessary for them, saying they know God as he knows himself, to add where the one known must be, for the perfect comprehension of the one known, and thus God, according to them, would differ in no way at all from any of the beings, (1233) being himself also circumscribed by place, than which what could be more absurd? or, not saying where, is to say that he does not exist at all, according to the proposition of the argument itself, than which what could be more godless? (for how and what could that be which does not have its being absolutely somewhere?) or the consequence of the argument of necessity them to be absolutely

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κατάληψιν. Μή οὖν, φησίν, εὐγνωμόνως ἡμῶν εἰπόντων ἄληπτον εἶναι τήν θείαν οὐσίαν, κακούργως τόν λόγον μεταβιβάσῃς, εἰς τό δῆθεν εἰσάγειν ἡμᾶς ἄληπτον αὐτήν, εἰς αὐτήν τήν ὕπαρξιν, κἀκ τούτου συνάξῃς ἀθεΐαν ἡμᾶς πάντη πρεσβεύειν. Καί μετά τινά φησιν, Τί γάρ ὑπολήψῃ τό Θεῖον, εἴπερ ὅλως ταῖς λογικαῖς πιστεύσεις ἐφόδοις (τουτέστιν, εἰ οἴει τῷ λόγῳ περιτρέχων ἐναποκλείειν γνώσει τινί δύνασθαι τό ζητούμενον); " Πότερον σῶμα (τουτέστιν, Ἆρα σῶμα); Καί πῶς τό ἄπειρον καί ἀόριστον καί ἀσχημάτιστον καί ἀναφές καί ἀόρατον;" ἵνα σαφηνιζόμενον νοηθῇ, οὕτως τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν κεκτρατηκυιῶν, ἄπειρον εἶναι τό Θεῖον, ὅπερ ἐστί πέρας μή ἔχειν. Τοῦτο γάρ τοῦ τέτρασι διειλημμένου πέρασιν ἴδιον, κέντρῳ καί γραμμῇ, ἐπιφανείᾳ καί στερῷ, (1229) προσέτι δέ καί διαστήμασι τρισί, μήκει καί πλάτει καί βάθει, καί αὐτοῖς ἕξ διειλημμένοις πέρασιν, ἑκάστου δηλονότι δυσί περιγραφομένου, οἶον τό μέν μῆκος τῷ ἄνῳ τε καί τῷ κάτῳ, τό δέ πλάτος τῷ δεξιῷ καί τῷ ἀριστερῷ, τό δέ βάθος τῷ ἐμπρός πέρατι καί τῷ ὀπίσῳ. Καί πάλιν, τῶν αὐτῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀόριστον τόν Θεόν εἰσαγουσῶν, τουτέστι μή ἐπιδεχόμενον διεξοδεύουσαν ἀνάπτυξιν, ἐκ τίνων συνέστηκε τό ὑποκείμενον, μήτε μήν τήν ἐν τόπῳ θέσιν, ἤ τήν ἐν χρόνῳ ἀρχήν ἤ τέλος, προσέτι καί ἀσχημάτιστον, οἶον ὅτι οὐ σφαιροειδές ἤ τετράγωνον ἤ ὄρθιον ἤ κάτω νενευκός, ναί μήν καί ἀναφές καί ἀόρατον, ὡς αἰσθήσει μή ὑποπίπτον (ταῦτα γάρ σωμάτων ἴδια), παράλογον ἐκ τῶν ἀνασκευασθέντων ὑπειληφέναι τό θεῖον εἶναι σῶμα καί ἀνάγκην ἔχειν εἰς τοσαῦτα μερίζεσθαι εἰς ὅσα πάλιν ὡς σῶμα συνάγεται. Ἀμερές γάρ πάντη τό Θεῖόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄποσον, ἄποσον δέ παντελῶς, ὅτι καί πάντη ἁπλοῦν, ἁπλοῦν δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί ἀδιάστατον πάντη, ἀδιάστατον δέ πάντη ὅτι καί πάντη ἄπειρον, ἄπειρον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί πάντη ἀκίνητον (οὐ κινεῖται γάρ πάντη πώποτε τό μή ἔχον τοῦ κινηθῆναι), ἀκίνητον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄναρχον (οὐ γάρ ἔχει τι πρό αὐτοῦ καί μεῖζον, οὔτε τι σύν αὐτῷ καί ἴσον, οὔτε τι μετ᾿ αὐτό, καί παραμετρεῖσθαι καί χωρεῖν αὐτό δυνάμενον), ἄναρχον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί ἀγέννητον πάντη, ἀγέννητον δέ πάντη, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἕν καί μονώτατον, ἕν δέ πάντη καί μονώτατον, ὅτι καί παντελῶς ἄσχετον, καί διά τοῦτο παντάπασιν ἄῤῥητόν τε καί ἄγνωστον, καί πάσης τῆς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτό καλῶς τε καί ἄγνωστον, καί πάσης τῆς τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτό καλῶς τε καί θεοπρεπῶς κινουμένων γνώσεως πέρας μονώτατον, μονωτάτην γνῶσιν ἔχον ἀληθῆ τό μή γινώσκεσθαι.

Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τό, " Εἰ γάρ τό μή ὄν οὐδαμοῦ, τό μηδαμοῦ τυχόν οὐδέ ὄν, εἰ δέ ἔστι που, πάντως, ἐπείπερ ἔστιν, ἤ ἐν τῷ παντί, ἤ ὑπέρ τό πᾶν."

∆ι᾿ ἥν αἰτίαν, ἴσως ὁ ἀκούων ἐρεῖ, Τήν ἀντιστροφήν ἀμφίβολον ὁ διδάσκαλος ἔθετο, προσθείς τό "τυχόν" ἐπίῤῥημα, πᾶσι δήλου ὄντος, κατά τάς λογικάς ὑποθέσεις, τοῦ, τό μηδαμοῦ ὄν μηδέν εἶναι, δικαίως παντάπασιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι. Πρός ὅν κατά τό τῆς πτωχῆς ἡμῶν διανοίας ἐπιδεές ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι Εὐνόμιον καί τούς ἀμφ᾿ αὐτόν, λέγοντες εἰδέναι τόν Θεόν ὡς αὐτός ἑαυτόν, τῆς πολλῆς ἐπισχεῖν μανίας βουλόμενος εἰς ἄτοπον δόξαν διά τῶν τοιούτων ἀπήγαγε λόγων. Ἤ γάρ λέγοντας εἰδέναι τόν Θεόν ὡς αὐτός ἑαυτόν, καί τό ποῦ χρή τόν γινωσκόμενον εἶναι προσεπάγειν αὐτούς πάντως ἀνάγκη, πρός τελείαν τοῦ γινωσκομένου κατάληψιν, καί οὐδέν οὐδενός τῶν ὄντων τό παράπαν οὕτω γε διενήνοχε (1233) κατ᾿ αὐτούς ὁ Θεός, τόπῳ καί αὐτός περιγραφόμενος, οὗ τί γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀτοπώτερον; ἤ μή λέγοντας ποῦ, ἤ μηδέ εἶναι τό σύνολον λέγειν, κατά τήν αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν, οὗ τί γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀθεώτερον; (πῶς γάρ καί τί ἄν εἴη τό μή πάντως ποῦ τό εἶναι ἔχον;) ἤ πάντως εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτούς ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῦ λόγου