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activity in a thing finally, being in itself without hypostasis. In vain they put forward the will, not being effective of anything, without the one who both has it and wills. And this is what the teacher says. For clearly the thing willed does not in every case follow the will, and likewise the other things the others, without the contribution of that which underlies these, in which they also are. If, then, you infer divine things from examples among us, O you people, accept, conforming at least to your own hypotheses, that the things which are together with one another according to the middle relation are in every way simultaneous, I mean, the one who wills and the thing willed, the one who begets and the one who is begotten, according to the relation, (1264) and I say, the will and the begetting, being together with one another. For just as there is no sight without the one seeing and the thing being seen, nor thought without the one thinking and the thing being thought, so neither is there begetting without the one begetting and the one being begotten, nor will without the one willing and the thing being willed, because, as was shown, the thing willed does not follow the will without the contribution of the one willing. But if these things are simultaneous according to the relation, for the relation between both is unchanging, then the begotten Son was simultaneous with the begetting Father, who is always Father, through begetting, and according to you, not admitting in any way whatsoever an insertion of time between himself and the begetting Father, and the Son is no longer the Son of will, but of the begetting Father. And these things, he says, let them be said from examples among us, but the things of God are also beyond all these things, for whom begetting is perhaps the will to beget. But he expressed doubt about this through the adverb "Perhaps" because the begetting of the Son from the Father is also beyond will. For the Son from the Father is not mediated by will, nor is the Father's will in any way at all preconceived before the Son, because neither did the Father pre-exist the Son, just as mind does not [pre-exist] the word from it, nor light the radiance. For having their being simultaneously, both the Father and the Son begotten from him without beginning have one will, both simple and indivisible, just as, then, also one substance and nature.

From the same discourse, on the text: "Since what prevents me too, from making this premise, that, The Father is greater by nature, then adding that, But by nature not in every way greater, nor Father, to conclude, The greater is not in every way greater, or, The Father is not in every way Father."

Since the teacher wisely defined that the Father is greater than the Son in being the cause, as the Son is of the Father, but the Father is not from the Son, the Arians, adding the premise 'the cause is by nature,' maliciously concluded for him 'greater by nature.' First, he nobly refutes what was sophistically concluded by them by saying: "I do not know whether they deceive themselves, or those to whom the argument is addressed." For not simply whatever is said of something, will these things also be said of what is predicated of it; but it is clear of what and what things this is. For not whatever is said of the cause as cause, he says, will these things also be said of [it] by nature. For it is not reasonable that what is said of someone—say, a wise man or a king—as wise or as king, should also be said of the subject underlying these, as of men; nor to unlawfully include in the definition of the substance of the subjects the things said of wisdom as wisdom and of kingship as kingship, things which have no communication at all with the definition of the substance, taking them as its constitutive and complementary (1265) differentiations for its definition. Then, more wisely weaving a syllogism against them from their own premise, he turns them against themselves. And it is as follows: Since what prevents me too, from making this premise, that, The Father is greater by nature, then adding that,

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ἐνέργειαν ἐν πράγματι τέλος, καθ᾿ ἑαυτήν οὔσῃ ἀνυποστάτῳ. Μάτην τήν θέλησιν προεβάλοντο, μή οὖσάν τινος ἀποτελεστικήν, χωρίς τοῦ αὐτήν ἔχοντός τε και θέλοντος. Καί τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅ φησιν ὁ διδάσκαλος. Οὐδέ γάρ ἕπεται πάντως δηλονότι τῇ θελήσει το θεληθέν, καί ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὡσαύτως τά λοιπά, χωρίς τῆς τοῦ ταύταις ὑποκειμένου ἐν ᾧ καί εἰσί συνεισφορᾶς. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς παραδειγμάτων τεκμαίρεσθε τά θεῖα, ὦ οὗτοι, δέξασθε ταῖς ὑμῶν γοῦν αὐτῶν στοιχοῦντες ὑποθέσεσι τῶν ἅμα πάντως εἶναι τά κατά τήν μέσην σχέσιν ἀλλήλοις συνόντα, λέγω δή τόν θέλοντα καί τό θεληθέν, τόν γεννῶντα καί τό γεννηθέν, κατά τήν σχέσιν, (1264) φημί δέ τήν θέλησιν καί τήν γέννησιν, ἀλλήλοις συνόντα. Ὡς γάρ τοῦ ὁρῶντος καί τοῦ ὁρωμένου χωρίς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅρασις, οὔτε τοῦ νοοῦντος καί τοῦ νοουμένου νόησις, οὕτως οὐδέ τοῦ γεννῶντος καί τοῦ γεννωμένου γέννησις, οὐδέ τοῦ θέλοντος καί τοῦ θελομένου θέλησις, ὅτι μηδέ ἕπεται θελήσει τό θεληθέν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, χωρίς τῆς τοῦ θέλοντος συνεισφορᾶς. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἅμα ταῦτά ἐστι κατά τήν σχέσιν, ἀκίνητος γάρ ἡ ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν σχέσις, ἅμα ἦν ἄρα τῷ γεννῶντι Πατρί, ἀεί ὄντι Πατρί, διά γεννήσεως, καί καθ᾿ ὑμᾶς ὁ γεννώμενος Υἱός, μή παραδεχόμεος καθ᾿ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον μεταξύ αὐτοῦ καί τοῦ γεννῶντος Πατρός παρενθήκην χρόνου, καί οὐκ ἔτι θελήσεως ἐστιν Υἱός ὁ Υἱός, ἀλλά τοῦ γεννῶντος Πατρός. Καί ταῦτα, φησίν, ἐκ τῶν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς παραδειγμάτων εἰρήσθω, τά δέ τοῦ Θεοῦ καί ὑπέρ πάντα ταῦτα, ᾧ γέννησις ἴσως ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ γεννᾷν θέλησις. Ἀμφέβαλε δέ τοῦτο διά τοῦ " Ἴσως" ἐπιῤῥήματος διά τό καί ὑπέρ θέλησιν εἶναι τήν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός τοῦ Υἱοῦ γέννησιν. Οὐ γάρ μεσάζεται θελήσει ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός ὁ Υἱός, οὐδέ προεπινοεῖται τοῦ Υἱοῦ καθ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ἡ τοῦ Πατρός θέλησις, ὅτι μηδέ προϋπῆν ὁ Πατήρ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ὥσπερ οὐδέ νοῦς λόγου τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὔτε φῶς τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος. Ἅμα γάρ τό εἶναι ἔχοντες καί θέλησιν μίαν ἔχουσιν ὅ τι Πατήρ καί ὁ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀνάρχως γεννηθείς Υἱός, ἁπλῆν τε καί ἀδιαίρετον, ὥσπερ οὖν καί οὐσίαν μίαν καί φύσιν.

Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τό· "Ἐπεί τί κωλύει κἀμέ ταύτην πρότασιν ποιησάμενον τήν ὅτι, Ὁ Πατήρ μείζων τῇ φύσει, ἔπειτα προσλαβόντα τό, Φύσει δέ οὐ πάντως μεῖζον, οὐδέ Πατήρ, συναγαγεῖν, Τό μεῖζον οὐ πάντως μεῖζον, ἤ, Ὁ Πατήρ οὐ πάντως Πατήρ."

Ἐπειδήπερ μείζονα τῷ αἰτίῳ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τον Πατέρα σοφῶς ὁ διδάσκαλος, ὡς τοῦ Πατρός ὄντος τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Πατρός ὑπάρχοντος, διωρίζετο, προσλαβόντες οἱ Ἀρειανοί τήν τό αἴτιον φύσει πρότασιν συνῆγον αὐτῷ κακούργως τό φύσει μεῖζον. Πρῶτον μέν ἐπιλύεται γενναίως τό παραλελογισμένως ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν συναχθέν εἰπών· " Οὐκ οἶδα πότερον ἑαυτούς παραλογίζονται, ἤ τούς πρός οὕς ὁ λόγος." Οὐ γάρ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατά τινος λέγεται, ταῦτα καί κατά τοῦ ἀποκειμένου τούτῳ ῥηθήσεται· ἀλλά δῆλον κατά τίνος καί τίνα τοῦτ᾿ ἔστιν. Οὐ γάρ ὅσα κατά τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου, φησί, λέγεται, ταῦτα καί κατά τοῦ φύσει ῥηθήσεται. Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ λόγου τά κατά τινος φέρε εἰπεῖν σοφοῦ ἤ βασιλέως ὡς σοφοῦ ἤ ὡς βασιλέως λεγόμενα καί κατά τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τούτοις ῥηθῆναι, ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καί συμπαραλαμβάνειν ἀθέσμως τῷ τῆς οὐσίας ὅρῳ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τά κατά τῆς σοφίας ὡς σοφίας, καί τά κατά τῆς βασιλείας ὡς βασιλείας λεγόμενα, τά μηδέν καθόλου τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ἐπικοινωνοῦντα ὡς συστατικάς διαφοράς αὐτῆς καί συμπληρωτικάς (1265) τοῦ κατ᾿ αὐτήν ὅρου παραλαμβάνειν. Ἔπειτα σοφώτερον συμπλέξας αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν προτάσεως συλλογισμόν περιτρέπει αὐτούς ἑαυτοῖς. Ἔχει δέ οὕτως· Ἐπεί τί κωλύει κἀμέ ταύτην πρότασιν ποιησάμενον τήν ὅτι, Ὁ Πατήρ μείζων τῇ φύσει, ἔπειτα προσλαβόντα τό,