512

But if, being constrained by these arguments, O sirs, you say that what is cast down for the cause of human constitution is not entirely dead, but partakes of some vital power, at least in some way, as clearly possessing a soul it will partake of such a power (for without a soul, a form of life could never exist at all among those things that are brought up according to nature and are clearly contained within the ever-moving celestial sphere, and a form of life without a soul simply does not exist at all, according to logical consequence), whatever kind of life you suppose that which is cast down to have at conception, you have revealed only a certain property of a soul, a difference which is constitutive of the substance in which it is, and distinctive of things that are not such. But if, forced by the truth toward what is necessary, you say that the embryo also has a soul, it is consequent and fitting for you to say what kind of soul this is, and how it is considered or spoken of. And if you affirm that it has only the nutritive and augmentative soul, then according to this argument of yours, that which is nourished and grows will clearly be the body of some plant and not of a human. And how a man will be the father of a plant, I cannot perceive, considering many things, since it has its being entirely from a man according to nature. But if you assign only the sensitive soul to the embryo, the embryo will be shown at conception to have the soul of a horse, or an ox, or some other land or air animal, and according to you a man will not be by nature the father of a human, at the first constitution; but of some plant, as I said, or of an animal upon the earth. What could be more absurd or more insane than this? For to affirm that the proper definitions of existence do not unfailingly co-exist with the first constitution of beings according to the natural difference of each, is to confuse all things with one another, and to maintain that none of the beings is properly that which it is and is said to be. And what is indeed a greater evil, it will surely be shown to contain a most manifest slander (1340) of the divine wisdom and power. For if all things that exist in any way have perfection in their proper principle before their generation according to the foreknowledge of God, then clearly also, when they are brought forth to generation so as to exist according to their own principle, they will unfailingly have perfection in their very actuality. But if beings have perfection according to foreknowledge, but imperfection according to their production and generation into being, either they will not be the very same things that were foreknown, but some things in place of others, or this would be a manifest and clear weakness of the creator, not having been able, according to foreknowledge, to present more fully that which was foreknown all at once with its generation in its actuality, as it is by nature according to its substance.

But if, wary of these refutations, you take refuge at last in this, saying that it is not just for that which is in the image of God and divine (thus calling the rational soul) to co-exist with a flow and foul pleasure, and that you ought to think it more seemly to say that it is introduced after the forty days of conception, you will be seen to be clearly accusing the creator of nature, and you will be shown to be reasonably incurring the dreadful danger of blasphemy that appears from this. For if marriage is evil, then clearly so is the natural law of generation; and if such a law of natural generation is evil, He who clearly made nature, and gave to it a law of generation, would justly be accused by us. And why do we turn away from the followers of Manes and the heretics before him, who for this reason alone, in a way, posited two principles and denied the God over all, since we have found you saying the same thing, even if not through the same words? But if for this reason to say that the rational and intellectual soul co-exists with the body at conception through

512

Εἰ δέ τούτοις στενοχωρούμενοι τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ὧ οὗτοι, φατέ μή νεκρόν εἶναι παντάπασι τό καταβαλλόμενον εἰς πρόφασιν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης συστάσεως, ζωτικῆς δέ τινος κἄν ποσῶς μετέχειν δυνάμεως, ὡς ψυχήν ἔχον δηλονότι τῆς τοιαύτης μεθέξει δυνάμεως (χωρίς γάρ ψυχῆς εἶδος ζωῆς οὐκ ἄν εἴη πώποτε καθάπαξ ἐν τοῖς ὑπό φύσιν ἀναγομένοις καί τῆς οὐρανίου δῆλον ἀεικινήτου περιφορᾶς ἐντός διειλημμένοις, ἀεί δέ ζωῆς εἶδος ἄνευ ψυχῆς τό παράπαν οὐκ ἔστι κατά τήν λογικήν ἀκολουθίαν), οἷον δ᾿ ἄν ὑποτίθεσθε ζωῆς εἶδος τό καταβαλλόμενον ἔχειν κατά τήν σύλληψην, ψυχῆς τινος μόνον ἰδιότητα ἐνεφήνατε, συστατικήν μέν τῆς ἐν ᾗπέρ ἐστιν οὐσίας ἀφοριστικήν δέ τῶν μή τοιούτων διαφοράν. Εἰ δέ καί ψυχήν ἔχειν τό ἔμβρυον βίας πρός τό δέον ὑπό τῆς ἀληθείας ὠθούμενοι λέγετε, τίνα τε καί ὁποίαν ταύτην, καί πῶς θεωρουμένην ἤ λεγομένην, ὑμᾶς λέγειν ἐστίν ἀκόλουθόν τε καί πρόσφορον. Καί εἰ μέν μόνην τήν θρεπτικήν τε καί αὐξητικήν ἔχειν αὐτό διαβεβαιοῦσθαι ψυχήν, φυτοῦ τινος δηλονότι καί οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καθ' ὑμᾶς τό τρεφόμενον καί αὐξόμενον ἔσται σῶμα. Καί πῶς τοῦ φυτοῦ πατήρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται σινιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω, πολλά σκοπῶν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπου παντελῶς τό εἶναι κατά φύσιν ἔχοντος. Εἰ δέ τήν αἰσθητικήν μόνην τῷ ἐμβρύῳ προσνέμετε ψυχήν, ἵππου πάντως ἤ βοός ἤ ἑτέρου τινός τῶν χερσαίων ἤ ἐναερίων ζώων ψυχήν ἔχων δειχθήσεται κατά τόν σύλληψιν τό ἔμβρυον, καί πατήρ οὐκ ἔσται κατά φύσιν ἀνθρώπου καθ᾿ ὑμᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, κατά τήν πρώτην σύστασιν· ἀλλά φυτοῦ τινος, καθώς ἔφην, ἤ ζώου τῶν ἐπί γῆς. Οὗ τί γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀτοπώτερον ἤ φρενοβλαβέστερον; Τό γάρ μή συνυπάρχειν διαβεβαιοῦσθαι τῇ πρώτῃ συστάσει τῶν ὄντων κατά τήν ἑκάστου φυσικήν διαφοράν ἀπαραλείπτως τούς οἰκείους τῆς ὑπάρξεως ὁρισμούς, φύρειν ἐστίν εἰς ἄλληλα τά πάντα, καί μηδέν εἶναι κυρίως τῶν ὄντων ὅπερ ἐστί τε καί λέγεται διισχυρίζεσθαι. Καί τό δή μεῖζον κακόν, διαβολήν (1340) τῆς θείας σοφίας τε καί δυνάμεως ἀρίδηλον ἔχον μεγίστην πάντως δειχθήσεται. Εἰ γάρ πάντα τά ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα πρό γενέσεως αὐτῶν κατά τήν πρόγνωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ τό τέλειον ἔχει, δηλονότι καί ἅμα τῷ εἶναι κατά τόν ἴδιον λόγον πρός γένεσιν παραγόμενα ἀπαραλείπτως αὐτῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τό τέλειον ἕξει. Εἰ δέ τό μέν τέλειον κατά τήν πρόγνωσιν ἔχει τά ὄντα, κατά δέ τήν εἰς τό εἶναι παραγωγήν τε καί γένεσιν τό ἀτελές, ἤ οὐκ αὐτά ἐκεῖνα ἔσται τά προγνωσθέντα, ἀλλ᾿ καθ᾿ ἑτέρων ἕτερα, ἤ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πρόδηλος ἀσθένεια τοῦτο ἄν εἴη καί σαφής, μή δυνηθέντος κατά τήν πρόγνωσιν τό προγνωσθέν ἀθρόως ἅμα τῇ γενέσει κατά τήν ἐνέργειαν ὡς εἶναι πέφυκε κατά τήν οὐσίαν, παραστῆσαι πληρέστερον.

Εἰ δέ τούτους ὑφορώμενοι τούς ἐλέγχους ἐπ᾿ ἐκεῖνο καταφύγοιτε τελευταῖον, φάσκοντες μή δίκαιον εἶναι τό κατ᾿ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ καί θεῖον (οὕτω τήν νοεράν καλοῦντες ψυχήν) ῥεύσει καί ἡδονῇ ῥυπαρᾷ συνυπάρχειν, μετά δέ τάς τεσσαράκοντα τῆς συλλήψεως ἡμέρας ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι λέγειν εὐσχημονέστερον οἴεσθαι δεῖν, τόν τῆς φύσεως δημιουργόν σαφῶς αἰτιώμενοι φανήσεσθε, καί τόν ἐντεῦθεν τῆς βλασφημίας ἀναφαινόμενον εἰκότως ὑπέχοντες φοβερόν δειχθήσεσθε κίνδυνον. Εἰ γάρ κακός ὁ γάμος, δηλονότι καί ὁ κατά φύσιν τῆς γενέσεως ὁ νόμος· εἰ δέ κακός ὁ τοιοῦτος τῆς κατά φύσιν γενέσεως νόμος, ὁ τήν φύσιν δηλονότι πεποιηκώς, καί δούς αὐτῇ νόμον γενέσεως, δικαίως ἄν καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς αἰτιαθήσεται. Καί τί τούς ἀπό Μάνεντος καί τούς πρό αὐτοῦ αἱρετικούς, ταύτης ἕνεκα τρόπον τινά καί μόνης τῆς αἰτίας, δύο ἀρχάς ὑποστησαμένους, καί τόν ἐπί πάντων Θεόν ἀρνησαμένους, ἀποστρεφόμεθα, τό αὐτό λέγοντας, εἰ καί μή διά τῶν αὐτῶν, καί ὑμᾶς εὑρηκότες; Εἰ δέ ταύτης ἕνεκα τῆς αἰτίας συνυπάρχειν τῷ σώματι κατά τήν σύλληψιν τήν λογικήν τε καί νοεράν ψυχήν λέγειν δι᾿